

Central Asia

Continuity and Change

Editor

Mushtaq A. Kaw




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Centre of Central Asian Studies
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Central Asia:
Continuity and Change

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Introduction

Amid natural panorama of mountains, steppes, deserts, plains and water courses, is situated a region historically known as `Turkestan'. The region is dotted with countless settlements inhabited by diverse ethno-cultural groups having fairly a rich culture in their background. These settlements mostly emerged in the wake of uninterrupted and brisk trade that once flourished along what a 19th century German scholar termed the great *Silk Route*. True, complex geophysical forces viz., formidable mountains, undulating deserts, unfordable stream and unending plains together with the periodical political convulsions at times deterred the pace and volume of trade. But trading communities resisted all such hazards, of course, for commercial gains and anyhow managed the movement of animals laden with

precious and luxurious commodities. Even the rulers and belligerent chieftains of warlike tribes, while struggling for survival or expansion of their politico-territorial jurisdiction, ensured that the trading activities in a particular area get intercepted only for a brief period. Similarly, settled and warlike peoples would be often seen merging their differences for the promotion of mercantilist activities and thereby amicably evolve a harmonious phenomenon while burying their age-long ethno-tribal rivalries. In fact, the mercantile societies, settled along the oasis, were convinced that trade and commerce with the nomads was more important than any struggle for political control.

Under these circumstances, shot into prominence several urban centres which in due course of time automatically transformed into models of urbanism besides centres of learning and artistic achievement. All types of people including traders, entrepreneurs, artists, skilled men, scholars, mystics and the like contributed to the social formation of these urban centres, which as was natural, stimulated an ambience of free thinking stemming particularly from the age-old contact of the traders with the trading communities hailing from different lands of the region. The intellectual influence accompanied by the secular mystic and religious philosophies played no less important a role in this behalf. The given atmosphere not only earned reputation to the region as a whole but even impressed the people around to borrow greater influence therefrom. Hence, it would be unfair to treat these centres merely as economic nodes engaged in the constant process of exchange of goods. More than that, they represented the features of excellent units of learning and thought which sought birth amid series of human actions related to process of cultural assimilation and transmission. The birth of new faith of Islam in Kashmir and that of Buddhism in Central Asia should be viewed in this historical perspective. Needless to remind one that the share of the missionaries to this reciprocity of give and take cultural

relationship, was of paramount importance. The people of the region in themselves were instrumental in transmitting their own language, custom, ritual, etc., to one another. All this taken together culminated into a civilisation that appeals to all of us, not to speak of foreigners.

Pursuant to this, the region assumed unprecedented importance which further grew with the disintegration of once a mighty political mammoth into a host of separate and independent geo-political entities on the map of Eurasia. The event was heartening and people were over-zealous for what they got without putting in that much of effort for it. However, with this, set in the process of a series of internal and external adjustments which the new-born independent entities are presently experiencing for consolidating their political character besides integrating themselves with the International community. Several schemes have been contemplated which include the creation of a common economic programme and a joint Central Asian Defence Force. Inter and intra-republic measures have been devised to coordinate the development programmes in the field of science and technology, education, culture, etc. As a part of joint ventures trade agreements have been concluded within the framework of the old trading patterns. For the shift to globalisation and free market economy besides overall economic development, funds have been procured from IMF, World Bank and other financial agencies. To ensure greater security, new-born republics have entered into agreements with Russia and other major countries agreeing therein to destroy the available nuclear arsenal.

Notwithstanding these measures, the Central Asian states are prone to numerous challenges of serious nature. The growth of religious revivalism therein is apprehended to threaten not only the ideological basis of the republics but even sever their relations with the western world thereby giving a signal to the multinationals and entrepreneurs to

take recourse to caution while investing money in these newborn republics. This is also likely to foil the spirit underlying the conclusion of security-related treaties of the republics with Turkey and other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Countries. Similarly, the objective of the policy planners to throw open their economies is far to seek the desired results in view of feeble structural, managerial and technical capabilities. A large youth population is intended to take up arms to procure jobs in a situation wherein some of the republics are hardly able to sustain their over all population. Economic Cooperation Organisation reflects theoretical expression and lacks financial resources to help the republics in building up their market economies. Inter and intra-republic agreements may weaken in the face of profound ethno-clan rivalries. The growth of ethnic nationalism in Russia itself may again transform the whole region into a trouble spot. Like-wise, a potential threat to the peace of region may not be ruled out when differences over the issue of jointly sharing the available above and underground natural resources are brewing fast. The issue of the use and control of the areas equipped with defence and nuclear facilities may foster a phenomenon charged with considerable hostility and even distance the republics from each other especially in the face of a situation where each republic is striving hard to assume the leadership of the region. Like-wise, the endeavours of the republic to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime and smuggling of ammunition may not be that successful in view of extra-ordinary problems the republics are themselves faced with. Rapid growth of China's economy, its military power and growing tendency to interfere in Central Asian affairs may one day bring China and Russia face-to-face with each other in the region. Lastly, the neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and India seem committed and over-zealous in extending support to the republics within their limited resources. But the republics themselves do not wish to bank upon, for vari-

ous reason, these countries with that much of confidence as is expected.

Therefore, the challenges Central Asian republics are presently beset with are so manifold and grave in character that certain people look to the future of these republics with utmost doubt. One wonders whether the republics will sustain on their own or will be forced to realign themselves again with Russia or wrest themselves completely from her vestiges; whether they will continue to subscribe to CIS or opt for a different stance for better tomorrow; whether they will conform to traditional secular culture or fall a prey to growing "Islamic Religious Revivalism"; whether the republics will continue to uphold the chosen path of free-market economy or whither away from it. And finally, whether they will be able to merge into the International community or withdraw therefrom in view of their inherent socio-economic, political or ethnic problems.

To dwell upon all such complex issues for the sake of evolving a theoretical solution besides examining the most fascinating features of the region's mysterious culture, the Centre of Central Asia Studies, University of Kashmir, organised a three-day national seminar on "Central Asia: Continuity and Change", from 7 - 9 October, 1997. Inaugurating the seminar, Prof. M.Y. Qadiri, Vice-Chancellor, University of Kashmir, highlighted the principle features of Central Asian culture. He stressed on the need of conducting research in a manner so that India's multi-dimensional ties with the Central Asian countries are crystallised. In his welcome address, Prof. A.M. Mattoo, Director, Centre of Central Asian Studies, drew the attention of the participants towards several complex problems the new-born republics are presently beset with. He also analysed the impact of the policy that the new-born republics have adopted in order to fit in the changing economic world order.

In all, 23 papers were presented in the seminar though only 16 of them were selected for publication in this volume. Out of these, a few papers may not strictly appear to be in correspondence with the theme of the seminar. Nevertheless, since most of them concern the region directly they have been therefore given a space in the present volume. However, most of the papers deal with the current economies of Central Asian republics. While A. S. Bhat seeks to examine the process of enterprise restructuring in Central Asian republics (CARs), Imtiaz-ul-Haq intends to locate the resource potentiality of CARs and the impact of Russian colonial rule thereon. Imtiaz-ul-Haq further traces the geo-technical threats posing the CARs together with the means as are prerequisite for an effective industrial and economic transformation in CARs. Rama Sampath Kumar sketches the extent of Russian control and influence in the energy sector of the CARs. G.M. Mir dilates upon the issue of the spatio-temporal variation in agricultural productivity of CARs. He devises the solution entailed for the improvement of productivity and development of the region. B. A. Khan unearths the nature of economic relations that obtained in the Central Asian republics constituting former USSR. Jagdish P. Sharma views the CARs in the context of international relations. Aijaz A. Banday, dilates upon the general features of the earliest human culture. He affords measuring, in time span, the antiquity of man in Central Asia. B. K. Koul Deambi estimates manifold problems CARs are presently beset with.

While dealing separately with the republics, R. G. Gidadhubli analyses the factors underlying the process of economic transition in Uzbekistan. He comes out with the schemes entailed for translating the process of transition into a reality. Prem Lata spells out the Tadjik areas which experienced social and economic transformation. P. L. Dash examines the most significant but interrelated problems of rising nationalism and growing religiosity in Tadjikistan.

Away from economics, M. Afzal Mir draws upon the most complex issue of ethnic composition in Kazakhstan. True, Kazakhstan is heading towards overall transformation. Nevertheless, traditional ethnic factor still governs her economy and politics pointing implicitly to its policy of upholding age-old cultural heritage unmindful of the devastating impact likely to follow the dreaded ethnic factor.

Turning to the religion, A. M. Rather and Rafiuddin Mukhdumi examine the sources of religious revivalism in Uzbekistan and Mongolia. Gulshan Majeed seeks to study the development of the institution of *khilafat* and its allied constituents till the advent of Chingez Khan.

While drawing upon Central Asia's relations with the neighbouring countries, S. L. Shali spells out some dominant characteristics of Kashmir and Central Asian art and architecture. Mushtaq A. Kaw sketches out the elements of continuity and change in China's socio-economic and political set up from the 9th to early 20th century. China, he believes, constituted not only China Proper but other parts of what is presently termed Chinese Turkistan. G. N. Khaki dilates upon a different methodological approach of Alberuni, the 10th century Uzbek scholar, on general sociological study.

That the guest scholars from within and outside the state participated in the seminar and presented their research papers is what essentially made the compilation of the volume possible. I feel obliged to place on record my thanks to all of them. The presence of Prof. Ram Rahul in particular generated extra-ordinary interest among the participants. His Presidential remarks and other valuable comments given during the technical sessions, were of immense academic importance. We are grateful to those scholars who agreed to preside over the technical sessions of the seminar besides all others, who for one reason or the other, could

not contribute their papers, nonetheless, deserve appreciation at least for the clarifications they sought from the paper readers and the valuable comments they gave towards the end of each session. For this our thanks go to Prof. A. Wahid, Prof. A. Q. Rafiqi, Prof. R. G. Gidadhubli, Prof. Dost Muhammad and Prof. P. L. Dash. I also express my deep sense of gratitude to Prof. A. M. Mattoo, Director of the Centre, who inspired me to organise the seminar and compile proceedings thereon. I also deem it essential to register my deep thanks to Aijaz A. Banday in particular and other faculty members of the Centre in general for providing timely assistance, as and when sought from them. That the institutions like Kashmir University and the University Grants Commission released the funds in time for the conduct as well as compiling the proceedings of the seminar is evenly worth appreciating.

I have compiled this volume while putting in my best efforts. Nonetheless, if the readers find any kind of lapses, I owe the responsibility.

Srinagar:
Dt: 20.3.99

Dr. Mushtaq A. Kaw

Keynote Address

Continuity & Change in Central Asia

R. G. Gidadhubli

The theme of the seminar 'Continuity and Change in Central Asia' is very important, very relevant and extremely timely. I, therefore, compliment the Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir for organising this seminar. Even as various issues concerning the theme of the seminar are going to be discussed and deliberated for three days, let us try to understand as to what are the major factors contributing to the changes in Central Asia.

The Soviet Break-up

The disintegration of the former Soviet Union is a major factor causing several changes in Central Asia. As you all know, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan declared their independence in August-September, 1991 in the aftermath of the August coup in Moscow. This was a further affirmation of the declaration of

sovereignty adopted in 1990. Kazakhstan did the same in December 1991. Turkmenistan put the question of independence to a referendum before its legislature for adoption. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991 was rather sudden and the Central Asian states were not prepared for the same. Being part of the Communist regime of the FSU (Former Soviet Union) for seven decades (and part of the Tsarist Empire prior to that), the Central Asian states did not have much experience and expertise of interaction with the outside world. Hence, the CAS (Central Asian States) faced considerable difficulties in comprehending new situation and consolidating political independence by avoiding political instability, establishing diplomatic, political and economic contacts with foreign countries, ensuring membership of the UNO and other international organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and so on. This is a major qualitative change in the life history of the CAS. While , an idea of forming 'Greater Turkestan' embracing all the Central Asian republics, was being considered as also retaining closer ties with the FSU in the form of a confederation, the CAS realised that each of them had to survive as independent and sovereign states.

Even as questions were raised and doubts were expressed as to whether some of the republics of the FSU would be viable and will survive as independent entities, over the last five years the CAS have survived and consolidated their political independence. Among other factors, leadership of each of the republics has played a crucial role. Incidentally, except in the case of Kyrgyzstan, in other four Central Asian states, the presidents were heads of the Communist Parties in the respective republics. Subsequent to the Soviet break-up, while the Communist Party was dissolved, and in some cases banned, the heads as also several ministers and major part of the bureaucracy have continued in the administrative machinery of the CAS.

Security:

The security issue has affected a major change for the CAS. In the Soviet era, this was a non-issue, since being part of the Soviet superpower, the CAS did not visualise or perceive any threat from other countries. But, after the Soviet break-up, independent sovereign CAS are faced with this problem. For instance, disturbances in Afghanistan are spilling over to the CAS, threatening some of them directly and still others indirectly. This has other dimension also. In many cases it is affecting internal security of the CAS through the problem of refugees, inter-ethnic conflicts and so on. Hence, the CAS are finding ways and means of solving their security problem through the good offices of the UN peace battalion, help and cooperation of Russia and so on.

Political and Economic Transition

The CAS are undergoing a major process of transformation from the former Communist political and economic system of the Soviet era to political democracy and market economy. The process of transformation and transition is not yet complete. The task of building new democratic institutions and market structures is not easy as the CAS did not have these traditions in the past. Moreover, major steps have been taken in that direction by enacting necessary legislation etc. For instance, Uzbekistan's president, Mr. Islam Karimov, has set out country's principles for transition-de-ideologisation, priority of economies over politics and so on. These principles and policies constitute a major change from the situation prevailing in the past when ideology and politics were foundations of the socialist society.

Similarly, the CAS have launched the process of economic liberalisation and privatisation of state property. This process, when completed, will make a qualitative change in the economic system of the countries. At the same time, in some of the CAS, particularly in Uzbekistan, the state continues to play an

important role in reforming the economy. In this context, in privatised units the state holds a dominant share, even in joint venture undertakings. Some of these elements constitute a continuity of the former period. In fact, Mr. Islam Karimov has stated that in bringing about economic transition in Uzbekistan, the policy should be such as not to demolish the old structure before building a new one.

New Linkages

The CAS are building new political and economic linkages after attaining independence. This is a major change for the CAS. It is important to know that efforts have been made to establish ties with western countries-Germany, UK, France and most importantly the USA. Similarly, Japan and South Korea are assuming importance for the CAS. This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet era when these countries were considered to belong to capitalist block and relations with them were minimal. The CAS have also been establishing close relations with the Islamic countries and other countries in Asia. In a sense, establishing new linkages is not only an expression of assertion of political independence and sovereignty but also of economic status. For example, the CAS have received considerable support from the western countries to bring about economic transition which needs resources for modernising technology of production capacities, for bringing about structural changes and above all, for exporting goods to earn hard currency. This is a major quantitative change for the CAS.

At the same time, the CAS cannot afford to sever old links. They continue to be members of the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS). In particular, Russia continues to be very important. So far as Kazakhstan is concerned, its links are closer with Russia for a variety of reasons, presence of significant part of ethnic Russian population, tie-ups with Russian enterprises whether for inputs or as market for the products of Kazakhstan and so on. In fact, both Kazakhstan

and Kyrgyzstan are already members of the 'Customs Union' which is newly formed by Russia and Bylourussia. Tadjikistan depends upon Russia to a great extent which is offering military support to safeguard its borders and also containing civil war inside the country. Turkmenistan has close ties with Ukraine in the energy sector. Uzbekistan has set up the first joint venture bank abroad in Russia. All these suggest that there is an effort going on for maintaining continuity in the links with the former republics of the USSR. But there is a difference. The links with the CIS are a new basis and in areas of mutual interest.

Reviving Old Silk Route

The revival of silk route is great change for the CAS. During the Soviet era, this was forgotten and possibly deliberately ignored. Links were established only with the centre, that is Moscow, and other places which Moscow considered desirable. The old 'silk route' which linked China and Europe through Central Asia is now being revived. In fact, many alternative modes of links are also being developed. Besides reviving some old land transport routes, gas pipelines are being laid from the CAS towards both west Europe and eastern parts, including China. Moreover, Central Asia is getting linked with modern telecommunication systems with western technology. In fact, when normalcy prevails in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan can be directly linked with the CAS as a part of the "silk route".

Resource Potentiality

The resource potentialities of Central Asia are vast comprising oil, natural gas, non-ferrous minerals, precious minerals, particularly gold and silver, rare minerals such as uranium etc. While, during the Soviet era, some of these minerals were exploited, after gaining independence the CAS have made greater efforts to explore and exploit them with the help of many western countries. For instance, on the basis of

new explorations it has been found that oil and gas resources of Caspian Sea are estimated to be so immense that they can meet the requirements of the USA for 25 years. Similarly, in the opinion of some experts, Turkmenistan is being considered as the 'Kuwait of the 21st century'. All this has been possible due to the huge investments made by many western countries. While the involvement of western countries has sometimes raised debate and controversy in the CAS, the leadership in the CAS are often in a dilemma. Natural resources are to be harnessed for earning hard currency in order to carry out the economic transition and economic development. This is possible by attracting foreign capital and technology. In fact, the CAS are looking to the western countries for 4-M's - Money, Machinery, Market, and Managerial skills. This is a major change for the CAS as they are in the process of consolidating their political and economic independence. However, this also makes them vulnerable to vagaries of world markets for their exportable goods and also to face constraints of transportation of goods being landlocked countries. There is also an inevitable element of competition among them to attract foreign capital and find foreign markets.

Great Game

The Central Asian countries have been witnessing a repetition of the 'Great Game'. While in the 19th Century Russia and Britain were the key actors in Central Asia, at the end of the 20th Century there are many players-West European countries, USA, Japan, China, South Korea and, of course, Russia. There is also another change. While in the 19th Century military strength was important, at present monetary strength is crucial. Similarly, while in the past the motive was acquiring political power, at present the motive is earning profit. Thus the nature of game is different.

India's Relations with the CAS

India has friendly and cordial relations with the CAS. In fact, after the Soviet disintegration, India was the first country to be visited by the president of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which indicates priority given to India by the CAS. In turn, the former president and the former prime minister of India have visited the CAS, followed by visits at the level of ministers etc. All this has helped in building the ties between India and the CAS on a new foundation. This is a quantitative change from the situation prevailing in the Soviet era when India's links with the Central Asian countries were decided and monitored from Moscow: and the Central Asian countries have historic ties from ancient and medieval times which are reflected in certain common elements in culture, religion, art, music and so on. This is a continuity from the past.

Notwithstanding these positive features, much more needs to be done to strengthen ties between India and the CAS, particularly in the economic field. There are vast potentialities for developing ties which are yet to be developed. For instance, the level of total trade turnover between India and the CAS, approximating Rs. 150 crores in 1995-96, was far from desired levels. Similarly, the number of India joint ventures in the five CAS, numbering less than one hundred, is too small as compared to several thousand joint ventures established in the CAS with foreign participation. Hence, India should increase the quantum of credit line offered to the CAS by the government of India for promoting trade and joint ventures in the CAS in manufacturing activities which include the areas relating to textiles, leather, food processing, pharmaceuticals etc.

Russia and Central Asian Energy Resources

*Rama Sampath Kumar**

Substantial quantity of oil and gas lies underneath Caucasus and the Central Asian states(CAS) that form the southern fringe of what was once the Soviet Union. An equal amount lie in the Caspian Sea bed. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan¹ and Turkmenistan are the three main republics of this area that possess large quantities of these resources². Nonetheless, objective economic stringencies before independence and a continuing lack of resources prevent Central Asia from raising the technical or financial resources for developing these hydro-carbon resources. They need foreign help. But Russia still seems to control the energy policies of these states. It is because Russia is the largest player in the Commonwealth of

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Independent States (CIS) and it cannot conduct its economic policy in isolation. Its economic and certain major political policies will have profound, even unforeseen impact, upon the Central Asian states.

This paper tries to examine the extent of Russian control and influence in the energy sector of the Central Asian states.

Hydrocarbon Resources

The oil and gas output in Central Asia comes mostly from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tadjikistan produce relatively small quantities of oil and gas. As far as hydrocarbon resources go, Central Asia is predominantly a gas producing region, with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan contributing substantially to the regional total. Kazakhstan is the primary oil producer in Central Asia, and the second largest producer in the CIS after Russia. According to one estimate the total reserves of oil in Central Asia are around 18.2 billion barrels and gas reserves around 246.46 trillion cubic feet³. Collectively, the Central Asian countries are net importers of oil and net exporters of gas.

Hydrocarbon production from Uzbekistan comes from two main areas in the Amu Darya basin. Gas in Turkmenistan comes from two regions, on the east from around Ashkabad and Mary, (Merv) and a western area located on the eastern Caspian sea coast⁴. Oil and gas production in Kazakhstan comes from four principal sources (1) the Kumkol field in southern Kazakhstan and three additional areas centred at (2) Atyrau and (3) Zhanazhol oil fields in western Kazakhstan and deposits on (4) Mangyghtauz and Buzachi peninsulas⁵. Initially these states thought that oil and gas resources would be an easy escape from domination by Russia. But soon realisation dawned on them that reserves are of no use unless they can be got out of the ground and shipped to a refinery. Unlocking the oil wealth of this region has become one of the greatest challenges for these states, for unless the oil resources can

be transported to international markets there is little hope for substantial investments. Having such enormous hydro-carbon resources, this region is now naturally one of the most attractive places for oil companies seeking foreign investments. But the task has not been an easy one as there are many political and economic hurdles.

Existing Pipelines and Energy Controlling Companies

The oil and gas pipeline network in Central Asia is extensive. There are four major sections, one being the oil import line from Russia and the other three export lines⁶. The import line runs from west Siberian oil fields and passes through Kazakhstan (Pavlador and Shymkent) and Uzbekistan terminating in Turkmenistan (Seili formerly Neftezhavodsk). Oil is shipped by pipeline via Shymkent to Uzbekistan's eastern refineries at Ferghana and Alty-Aryk. In addition to it, a pipeline from the Kumkol region in Eastern Kazakhstan feeds locally produced oil into the Pavldor-Shymkent - Seilli pipeline⁷. The three major oil export lines in Central Asia were designed to ship oil from the major oil producing regions in Kazakhstan. Most of the oil from Tengiz and Buzachi Peninsula is shipped north to Samara and moves to Russian refineries. Oil from the Zhanazhol region is shipped north to Russia through Orsk. Another pipeline from this region runs around the Caspian Sea to Grozny. There are over 10,000 kms, of gas trunk pipelines in the Central Asian republics which transport gas to Russia and Europe. Besides, the five capital cities of Central Asia are connected by gas pipeline.

Oil transportation within the FSU takes place predominantly through the existing pipeline system. i.e. approximately 85% of such intra-regional trade is via pipeline, 10% by rail and the remaining 5% via barge. But as regards the export of oil to countries outside the FSU it is through both pipeline and sea. Kazakhstan, for example, exports outside the CIS (through Russia) about 2/3 via tanker and 1/3 via

pipeline. Kazakhstan also exports crude form of oil from Aktau to Baku by way of Caspian Sea. Crude oil exported by both Tadjikistan and Kyrghyzstan is shipped by rail to Uzbekistan's refinery at Ferghana. These two nations do not possess indigenous oil processing facilities, and rely on imports of oil products. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are largely dependent on oil movement involving the Caspian Sea.

The existing pipeline network is sought with problems like limited capacity, physical deterioration and lack of spare parts. The existing transportation system traverse Russia as the Soviet planners had intended the dependence of all regions on Moscow. Even all exit routes are at present controlled by Russia. Unlike Russia, these states are landlocked and far from the major world routes. They need to invest heavily in infrastructure in order to trade abroad on their own⁸. For this, these energy rich states require companies that will help develop their vast oil and gas reserves and enable them to earn resources that will eventually get them out of Russia's hold. Russia does not want to lose control over the pipeline routes, because those who control the routes out of this region, which includes both the ex-Soviet Union's network of existing pipelines and plans for future pipelines, will ultimately decide how this potentiality vast reserve will be developed and to whom the oil wealth will flow,

Rosneftgaz is the organisation that controls the petroleum and natural gas sectors, and it is made up of 56 companies. This has been divided into two-Roseneft and Gasprom. While Gasprom controls the production and export of the natural gas in the country, Rosenft has given birth to companies like Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneft gas and Slavneft. Lukoil has become the petroleum giant of Russia, and second in the world after Royal Dutch shell. While 15% of the petroleum produced in Russia goes to Lukoil, 20 million tons of crude petroleum is processed in its factories⁹.

Gasprom, the Russian giant, is the world's largest gas producer with an incredible 38% of global reserves. With its vast 1,40,000 kilometre pipeline network, it controls nearly 100% of the Eastern European market, and 25% of the western European market. Gasprom, like Lukoil, is playing a difficult game with the former Soviet republics. After spending up to \$1 billion of its own funds for developing the big Karachagank fields in north western Kazakhstan, Gasprom insists on participating with British gas and Italy's AGIP in a \$ 7 billion project there. Russia is also making clear through diplomatic channels that anything behind the former iron curtain is Gasprom's territory¹⁰.

At present the monopolistic pipeline operator is Russia's state owned Transneft. Transneft was a branch of the Soviet Union's ministry of oil and gas and it controlled over 65,000 km. (40,000 miles) of pipelines. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Transneft has lost control over 16,000 km. of its network that lie outside Russia. It has also become a state run joint stock company, ultimately to be privatised. The question is whether the network is any longer useful, as it was meant to serve the Soviet Union which no longer exists. Many of Transneft's pipelines are under used because oil consumption in the heavily industrialised areas of European Russia and eastern Europe has collapsed. At present oil for the west passes through a few bottlenecks on the Baltic and the Black Sea, all of which already operate to full capacity. Transneft also is embroiled in certain internal problems, as various regions control the lines passing through their territory etc. So foreign investors collaborating with Transneft are not finding it easy.

There are two main pipeline projects that are now on the anvil:

- 1) The Azerbaijan - Mediterranean oil pipeline connecting the oil fields near Baku to Turkey's oil export terminal Ceyhan on the Mediterranean sea. This project is to be

extended to pump oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well thus creating another gulf in Turkey by being an outlet for Azeri and Central Asian oil to world markets.

- 2) The Caspian pipeline consortium is formed by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Sultanate of Oman and Russia along with Bechtel of US to construct a 830 kilometer pipeline. This pipeline is to link the existing 1300 kilometer line, running from Grozny to Novorssik, with Baku in Azerbaijan and the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan. With the conflict in Chechnya the route has now been revised to run via Daghistan. Of late, Chechnya has allowed the use of the existing lines.

The Extent of Russia's Control Over Central Asian Energy Resources.

Soon after the formation of the CIS, the CAS turned to Russia for help as they could not refine their own energy and convert it into finished goods. Russia sought to barter oil but Central Asian states preferred selling cotton. Russia learnt that the Central Asian states preferred selling cotton to foreign currency buyers as Moscow was subsidising their energy anyway. This forced Russia to sell oil to Central Asia and other CIS countries for foreign currency. The importance of Russia's influence in the energy sector of the CAS started gaining influence when Russia found that economic leverage could be converted to political influence. Russia continued to be a key player in all aspects of energy control.¹¹

The importance of Russia's energy sector is explained in the 1994 Russian National Security Concept, which has been printed in the Russian journal *Obozrevatel*. The journal observes that the entire agenda of current security issues, the supply of Russian fuels and raw materials to other members of the CIS, as well as the involvement of Russian troops in conflict, were subjects of utmost importance¹². It notes the interest of the CIS to restore foreign trade in energy with Russia. The

USSR had undermined Russia's potential as an energy supplier or exporter because Russia had subsidised their energy use and received almost nothing for it. This caused her huge loss and made her to redirect its vital foreign trade away from foreign customers' who were expected to pay as per market prices. Thus ending of subsidies and introducing world market prices are Russia's main interests which tries its best to stop the emergence of new competitors in the CAS. Further, Russia feels that if the CAS are not dominated by Russia they will implicitly revert to a hostile anti-Russian western sphere of influence.

It was easy for Russia to bring Kazakhstan toe its lines becasue Russia has made it dependent on the export and refining of its oil. The bulk of the oil is located in the west of Kazakhstan - in Mangistau, Atyrau, west Kazakhstan and Aktyubinsk region. Scanty deposits are in the Kyzlorda region. These reserves are distributed among 160 oil fields, though oil extraction is carried out only at 58 sites. There are two gas and three oil processing industries in Kazakhstan, Atyrau (feeding on Kazakhstani crude oil), Pavlodar (Rusian crude oil) and Shymkent (both Russian and Kazakhstani crude oil). There are two gas processing factories. The capacities of these factories and the product assortments produced by them are far from meeting the demands of the republic. Oil extraction is concentrated on the west of the republic, while the two main relatively modern refineries are located in the east and pipelines supplying, these refineries come from western Siberia and Tyumen. At present, the Pavlador refinery is at a standstill and Shymkent oil-refinery is yet to be utilised. The Atyrau has obsolete processing facilities and its capacity for crude oil is only 5 million tons a year. The communication roadways and pipelines still run north-south instead of east-west. Kazakhstan's oil fields in the west of the country produce oil for the Russian refineries, and at the same time, it refines oil from Russia in its refineries in the East. There are no proper pipelines connecting

its oil fields and refineries. It also helps Russia to underpay for Kazakh oil going north to Russia, and also overcharge oil coming into east Kazakhstan from Russia. Kazakhstan also depends on Russia for the export of oil to the western markets. It exports around 20 million tons of oil annually through Russia's existing pipelines. When last year Kazakhstan asked for permission to export more oil, the Russian officials explained that the pipelines were operating at full capacity and that they simply could not accept any more Kazakh oil. Kazakhstan's search for alternative routes has been fostered by Russia's own actions of limiting shipments of Kazakh oil to Novorossik and Tyumen oil to Pavlodar refinery.

There is another major reason why Russia wants to export the Kazakh oil and the Central Asian oil from Novorossik. The entry of Central Asian oil in the European markets will pull down the world petroleum prices and will affect Russian companies negatively. But if the oil is loaded at Novorossik, it has to abide the principle "the price of the petroleum exchange is determined at its loading place" as a basis, after which Russia will determine the prices. It is the main reason why Russia tries to see Kazakhstan exporting her petroleum from Novorossik. A consortium made up of Russia, Oman, Kazakhstan and Chevron (USA) will carry the oil obtained from other fields to Novorosik through a pipeline having the capacity of 1.5 million barrels a day and built at a cost of one billion dollars¹³.

Another factor working in Russia's favour to have a hold over the Kazakh oil is that until recently Kazakhstan did not have an oil ministry of its own and Almaty did not even know what was happening in many of the oil and gas production enterprises. In the Soviet days all the questions pertaining to the oil and defence industry were decided in Moscow. More important than this is the fact that the oil and gas industrial equipment were produced mainly in plants in Bashkiria, Tataria, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Today the acquisition of these products is wrapped up in a lot of problems, convertible currency,

transmission of payments and payment of duties. For all this Russia's help is required¹⁴.

Russia also uses its trump card of the ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan needs these Russians to operate most of the energy plants, oil rigs etc. as this section of the population still holds most of the technically skilled jobs. The Kazakh army is also almost entirely having its officials the ethnic Russians. Besides, the main aim of the Kazakh government since independence has been to keep the country stable, united and unified and hence does not want to take any action that might arouse ethnic conflicts.

Russia does not hold that much of a control on Azeri oil as it has in Kazkhstan, yet it has been manipulating methods by which it can put pressure on Azerbaijan. Russia's ambition to exert pressure became evident in September 1994 when Azerbaijan concluded a \$8 billion agreement with a consortium of western oil companies. (The western companies involved in agreement include Amco Corporation, Pennzoil Co, Uncoal Corporation and British Petroleum). They want to ship crude oil via a new pipeline across Turkey, bypassing Russia, While Russia wanted them to use its own port - Novorossik. The deal which paved the way for the development of three major Caspian Sea off shore oil fields (Azeri, Chirag and Gyuneshli) could remove much of the control that Moscow had over adjoining republics. But Russia refuses to recognise the contract. The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been making repeated statements that any oil found in the Caspian is the joint property of all the post - Soviet states bordering the Caspian Sea. Describing the Caspian Sea as a landlocked body of water (or lake), the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that the standard of the international law of the sea, particularly one pertaining to the territorial sea as an exclusive economic zone does not apply to the Caspian. Consequently, the Caspian Sea is the object of joint use, and

all decisions regarding its use, including the exploitation of its resources, must be made by all of the CIS - Caspian states. This means that oil and other resources of the Caspian Sea must be exploited with the participation and under the supervision of Russia. Earlier on, April 28, 1994, the Russian government sent London a "demarche" claiming a right to veto any exploration in the Caspian Sea at a time when President Aliyev was giving orders to expedite the final stages of negotiations on Azerbaijan oil with the British consortium. It is very clear that foreign pressure was mounting on Moscow as a result of which it took counter steps against it. "The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single eco-system and represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or activities including resource development have to be resolved with the participation of all Caspian countries"¹⁵ The "demarche" is addressed to Great Britain and not to Azerbaijan republic (SOCAR). Russia sees this as an act of the east v/s west and believes that whatever west will yield, Azerbaijan will compensate equal to that amount. But Azerbaijan does not agree with this. To quote the president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, "Our understanding of the Caspian Sea legal status is in conformity with the international laws and precedents. The Caspian Sea is divided into economic zones and the Azeri section is under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan." Despite US pressure on the Yeltsin administration for a more accommodating attitude¹⁶, Russia has continued to emphasize that it will not recognise any foreign contract with Azerbaijan, thereby posing a genuine threat to Azerbaijan's oil projects in which Lukoil already has a 10% share. Lukoil has petitioned Moscow to appoint it as a co-ordinator of projects for developing oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea, in order to prevent Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan from signing contracts with foreigners. If it does not take such a control, according to the Lukoil chief, then Russia "risks losing its positions on the Caspian Sea"¹⁷.

Competitors for Russia

Turkey

Two of the most prominent nations competing with Russia for economic influence in Central Asia are Turkey and Iran. Turkey's approach since 1991 has drawn the attention of critics who view this Islamic and Turkic solidarity as a kind of neo-Ottomanism or reborn Pan-Turkism. Turkish policy as outlined by the late premier and the then President, Turgut Ozal, spoke of Turkish influence from the Adriatic to China, while in reality it was more a policy of greater economic presence, especially in the Black Sea and Central Asia. At best it could be Turkey's realpolitik to restrain Russia, or a strategy of its cultural mission to Muslim brothers. America encouraged Turkey for it represented a model of a secular, democratic westernized Muslim state that could check Iran ideologically and Russia politically¹⁸. Turkey too has felt highly elevated by accepting this assigned role. Turkey, therefore, was one of the first countries to come in with pipeline proposals. Turkey's strategy was to build links with the new Turkic states by creating a new pipeline from Central Asia and Azerbaijan which would go through purely Muslim territories and bypasses Russia and Iran¹⁹. This is the basis of the Azerbaijan - Mediterranean oil pipeline, connecting the oil fields to Turkey's oil export terminal, Ceyhan, on the Mediterranean Sea. This project is to be extended to pump oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well, creating another gulf in Turkey by being an outlet to world markets. The Turkish government even promised to raise most of the two billion dollars required to build the line. But this original Turkish plan does not seem to get ahead as the Kurdish insurgency takes place where the pipelines are intended to go.

Turkey has also been using the increased traffic through the Bosphorous and Dardennelle straits as an excuse for building an alternative pipeline. Turkey and Russia have an

international agreement for allowing free passage through these straits. More than 50,000 ships use these waterways annually. About 5 million tons of crude oil passes through these waterways annually. The Turkish officials have been saying that safety and environmental concerns will force Turkey to restrict tanker - traffic through these straits. Turkey has suggested that since the Bosphorous waterway cannot cope with the increased traffic, there is need to shift the flow of oil from the Black Sea towards the Mediterranean Sea. A tanker accident in March 1994 confirmed Turkey's fears that the Bosphorous cannot carry all the oil that will come from the Caspian region and hence the traffic should be restricted. But Russia strongly believes that the Bosphorous is a mere excuse as the real issue is commercial advantage. Russia has also negotiated with Greece in order to reroute the pipeline through Bulgaria's coast to Thessalonki, which is an attempt to outbeat Turkey's policy of closing the Bosphorous on ecological grounds²⁰.

Iran

Like Turkey, Iran too has been promoting its strategic importance as a regional leader. Iran's policies and prospects in Central Asia during the initial years were misinterpreted by the western world. The west believed that since all the new Central Asian states were Muslim they will be prone to Islamic fundamentalism. But actually Iran's policy in Central Asia has been anything but aggressive. Like Turkey, Iran too must first overcome its own internal political divisions and economic malice and then only it can be a threat to Russia. Iran has been interested in only cultural and commercial contacts and has sought to enhance its relationship through bilateral agreements especially, in the area of construction of pipelines and transportation routes.

Iran presents its northern region as an ideal market for Central Asian gas and oil. Further, Iran wants to reduce its

dependence on the Persian Gulf as the only outlet for its oil exports by finding a new channel to Europe through the Central Asian states and Russia. Iran has also begun the construction of a railway to Turkmenistan. One of the most important projects between Iran and Turkmenistan is the construction of 1,450 km pipeline across northern Iran in order to transport Turkmen gas to western Europe²¹. According to this 30 year agreement, signed in January 1994, the pipeline will have capacity of 30 million cubic meters per year, and the capital investment will be to the tune of \$2.9 billion. (Initially the pipeline would transport 15 million cubic meters of gas and eventually 30 million cubic meters per day). Discussions are on about building a crude oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran's refinery. It will export equal amounts of crude oil from its terminals in the Persian Gulf to pay for the Turkmen crude. Another similar agreement has also been signed between Iran and Kazakhstan to process Tengiz crude at the Tehran refinery. The volume of crude will initially be 2 metric million tons per year which will increase to 5 million tons at later date. Iranian crude oil of an equivalent value will be exported on behalf of Kazakhstan from the Kharg Island terminal. The South European market, consisting of Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, consumes 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. At present this market is under Russian control, and Russia's efforts are directed towards restricting the entrance of Iranian (and Turkish) natural gas into this market. It, therefore, objects the passage of pipelines connecting Europe and Turkey and insists on the Transcaucasus - Russia - Europe alternative.

Japan

Due to tensions prevailing between Japan and Russia, Japan has been trying to prevent Russia from regaining a strong hold in Central Asia. Tokyo's policy clearly derives from Japan's attempt to limit Russian influence in Asia and find alternatives for economic influence in the former USSR²². This is the reason why Japan has taken an increasing role in Central

Asian economic development. It has begun to explore the possibilities of bilateral oil and even pipeline deals.

China

The strongest competitor for Russia in Central Asia is China. Because of China's growing wealth and power and reach across Asia, Russia needs Chinese help for entering in the East and South East Asia²³. China's interest in Central Asia revolves around the question of trade routes, transportation network, Islam and energy. China is very much apprehensive about the upsurge of Islamic or nationalist agitation among its Muslim people in Xinjiang and its western provinces that border Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. China realizes that this is more easily achievable only if it can establish intimate trading ties in Central Asia, support the existing governments and their relationships with Russia, and upgrade substantially Xinjiang's economic development and integration with eastern and coastal provinces of China. The intended net result is the re-establishment and expansion of the old silk route into a modern trade route that integrates Central Asia, Western China, the interior and coastal China into one network. One way to achieve this goal is by developing the Tarim basin Xinjiang. The integration of Central Asia's considerable energy deposits with China will also take off a considerable amount of pressure from the Tarim Basin. China in the last has become a net energy importer and since energy demands are expected to grow sharply in the near future, stability in Xinjiang and Central Asia are not merely politically desirable but are very vital for China's continued economic growth and modernization²⁴.

Pakistan

Pakistan's interest in Central Asia took shape after the collapse of the USSR. Initially it tried to play the Muslim card but when India reacted quickly to expand its own trade and economic ties the relations succumbed to the Indo-Pak rivalry in South Asia. India cooperates with Russia and Iran against

any Pakistani influence. India has been supporting Iran's effort to build the railway to Turkmenistan in order to forestall or divert trade from Pakistan²⁵. As far as the energy sector is concerned the only way Pakistan can come into the picture is by way of export routes but since either the road route or the pipeline route has to traverse Afghanistan, the continuing civil war precludes major investments in it as a trade route. India being a major importer of oil and oil products should take advantage of the opportunity and explore the possibility, independently or jointly, with other outside agencies, to bid a contract for exploration of oil in the CAS or the Caspian Sea for eventual transportation to India²⁶.

Conclusions

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, petroleum has become one of the most important instruments of relationship between Russia and the Central Asian states. The Central Asian states, though independent, see the need for economic integration of the former Soviet Union, and have built their relationship with Russia on economical and political balance of gains. Russia is using all possible means to have both political and economic control in Central Asia and because of her strategic situation has been using petroleum and natural gas as an important weapon. The pipeline issue is gaining importance because the ports Russia used to realise her exports are now in different countries. While some trade takes place through St.Petersburg, the attention is now on Novorossik. Russia wants to export the Central Asian petroleum to the world from here. It has to face the competition from other players in the area which include Turkey, Iran, Japan and China. If Russia succeeds then it could obstruct for long rebirth of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as strong players of energy exports in the world market. Dependence on Russia means relying on antiquated Russian infrastructure for their production, extraction and transportation. These technologies are outdated, poorly maintained and do not adhere to the

environment norms. Western and Japanese technology, on the other hand, offer much more economical advantages. It is also in the West's interest to diversify the number of oil suppliers and bring down the oil prices.

Turkey has internal political problems and does not have the kind of financial support which could pose a threat to Russia in the near future. Iran's disadvantages are the distrust of the West and her neighbours, the instability of the area from which the pipeline will pass and the high costs of the projects. In the foreseeable future China is likely to emerge as a counterbalance to Central Asia's exclusive dependence upon Russia. As China's and Asia's demand for energy grows, China will try to stabilize Central Asia and prevent disruptions in energy. Ultimately this will lead to more investments and more growth of trade. If one keeps in mind China's history of rapid economic growth and worldwide competitiveness, one can visualize the impact of Chinese entry into Central Asia. The same could be true of the Japanese and South Korean presence. There are many advantages in the entry of China into the Central Asian Market. Russia uses the existing infrastructure and even past connections and its resources will not materially help this region to develop. But China's attitude is based on a "self sustaining dynamism" that sees it to its advantage to develop Central Asia and integrate it into its own economic orbit. The West, especially USA, clearly see that the developments in Central Asia do not directly affect them. As for USA, its policy in Central Asia has been its determination to obstruct any Central Asian rapprochement with Iran. Viewed from this angle, the chances are that the future development of the Central Asian states in general and their energy in particular depends on the Asian giants.

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Challenges of Industrial Restructuring in the Central Asian Republics

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The main objective of industrial restructuring is to restore profitability of the loss-making enterprises. In the process of restructuring, the underlying causes of inefficiency have to be avoided and a new set of conditions ensuring viable production have to be established. Within the context of transitional economies it calls for fundamental changes in industry especially in areas of organisation, finance and management.

In the economies of the Central Asian republics (CARs) where the transition from planned to market economy has just begun, industry continues to be depressed, incremental capital-output ratio is high, corporate governance is weak, critical inputs

are in short supply, level of product competitiveness and capacity utilisation are low. The process of industrial restructuring, initiated in these newly independent states, is beset with various problems that call for an indepth study. This paper attempts to study the process of enterprise restructuring in CARs. Features of industry in CARs are discussed in the first section, consequences of the disintegration of former Soviet Union(FSU) in the second section and the need for Industrial restructuring is examined in the third section. Some of the related issues considered in this context are: legal framework, privatisation, macroeconomic imbalances, financial service sector, foreign capital inflows, and budget constraints of the governments of CARs.

Features of Central Asian Industries

The Industrial structure in CARs and elsewhere in other countries of FSU was created by decades of Central planning. Some of the distinguishing features of this centrally planned strategy of industrialisation are as follows:

1. Industrial sector of FSU was very large, accounting for 54 percent of national output during 1988 as compared to 24 percent in U.S.A. Industry was dominated by mechanical engineering and metallurgy. Mechanical engineering, metal processing including ornament industry accounted for 15 percent of national output, followed by food and drink (8 percent); light industry (6 percent); fuel industry (5 percent); iron and steel (3.7 percent); power generation (2.2 percent), and timber and paper industries (2.1 percent)¹.

Trade and industrial policy of FSU was highly inward-oriented. It emphasized self-sufficiency and regarded international trade as a necessary evil to obtain goods and services which could not be produced domestically. The amount and types of imports were dictated by the requirement of national plan. To finance the material

balance-gap between national plan and the domestic availability of a product-state also had to decide what goods to export and what to pay for imports. International trade was also state controlled. Comparative advantage and relative prices of commodities did not play any direct role². Industry enjoyed complete protection from international competition. Efficient allocation of resources which is the main advantage of free trade, was not allowed to work. State imposed an arbitrary specialisation on the industry³. The commodity basket which Soviet Union could export to the rest of the world particularly Western Europe remained limited in availability and low in quality. Situation became very fragile in 1980's when there was no growth in Soviet hard currency exports (except energy). This led to a significant decline in those imports which were crucially needed (technology imports) to modernise the industry.

3. Industrial structure was almost totally confined to public sector. CARs about 90 percent of fixed assets were owned by the state⁴. As a result of it, all market-factor, product and credit - were owned by the state. Overall policy environment was dominated by the state ownership. Hence, any exercise in industrial restructuring can not be perceived without the process of privatisation.
4. Industry was characterised by high product concentration. For many products there were only monopolies. Together with dupolies such industries accounted for more than 60 percent of production for many products. In 1988, the proportion of industrial output produced in plants employing more than 1,000 employees was 75 percent compared to 30 percent in U.S.A. Smaller and medium enterprises (employing less than 1,000 employees) were almost absent.⁵

5. Industrial structure in FSU was a part of the integrated system of industrialisation pursued under Central planning. Under this system, industry was vertically integrated across the frontiers of the republics of Soviet Union⁶. For industrial enterprises in various republics, dependence on Russian Federation was crucial, particularly for fuel and raw material. It was also the largest supplier - more than 50 percent of intra-USSR goods and services were supplied by Russian Federation alone. For highly specialised industrial enterprises of CARs, this dependence was pervasive as most of the industrial enterprises had to depend exclusively on Moscow for their factor supplies and product markets.

Product specialisation at the republican level led to the regional concentration of industry. Capital goods and intermediates dominated the industrial structure of Russian Federation. Finished goods industries were mostly concentrated in Belarus, Baltic States and Caucasian region while as food industry was confined to Moldova and Caucasian republics. Most of the industrial activity in Central Asia merely consisted of giving final touches to semi-manufactured items imported from Moscow. Final products from CARs were once again supplied to Russian Federation and Ukraine. Similarly, in case of ornaments, manufacturing units were located in CARs while as research and development wings were in Russian Federation. Tarpedo factory in Kyrghyz Republic and nuclear testing centre in Kazakistan are the well known examples. In case of fuels, oil refineries in Eastern Kazakistan had to depend on oil imported from Siberia. Those refineries could not use oil produced in western Kazakistan for want of pipelines. Oil produced in this part of the republic used to be, and is exported to Russian Federation. Similar was the situation in Turkmenistan which exported oil to Russian Federation

though for the finished product of the same commodity the former had to depend on the latter. Exports of oil and gas from CARs could only be and still continue to be routed through Russian pipelines. The main capital intensive manufacturing activity in Tadjikistan- aluminium plant - processed aluminium imported from other republics while as sugar refineries in Kyrghyz Republic depended on imports from Cuba. It was heavily subsidised transport cost which enabled industrialisation in CARs and cost made the movement of raw materials and finished products very cheap. Administrative decisions by Moscow have also influenced the location of industry in CARs. For instance, many industries fearing a possible aggression in the western Soviet Union, during the Second World War, were relocated to CARs. These were not shifted back after the war.

6. Due to artificial specialisation imposed on the republics, the process of industrialisation in CARs was not related to the comparative cost advantage of the region. For instance, local processing in Uzbekistan accounted for 12 percent of raw cotton in 1990⁷. Turkmenistan extracted 80 billion meters of natural gas annually, most of which was exported due to non-availability of chemical processing⁸. In Kazakhstan, more than 70 percent of exports consisted of raw materials and intermediate goods⁹. CARs also had to depend heavily on other republics for import of consumer goods and foodgrains.
7. An important feature of Centrally planned economy of FSU was that prices were determined by the Central authority. Since prices were not market determined, they failed to reflect the opportunity cost of production. Likewise, factor utilisations and their rewards, commodity composition to be produced and distribution of products - all were determined by the state. In addition to investment and production decisions, top management

of the industry was appointed by the Central authority. Political factors and military interests, were an instrumental factor in the determination of size and structure of enterprises¹⁰. Industry was heavily overstaffed. In some case overstaffing was to the extent of 100 percent¹¹. It was an offshoot of Central planning which guaranteed full employment at low wages. Command system also imposed a social welfare function on the industrial sector of economy. As a result, top management in addition of fulfilling production plans and running day-to-day operations of enterprises got more and more involved with the provision of social and welfare facilities like living accommodation, recreation and hospitals¹².

The Centralized planning led to serious distortions in the industry. Productive capacity of Soviet industry was very low - less than 50 percent as compared to western standards. In some cases like chemical industry, it was even less than one third as compared to that in U.S.A.¹³ Returns from large scale investment continued to diminish as incremental capital-output ratio rose from 2.0 in mid seventies to 3.5 in late eighties¹⁴. Firms also operated with larger inventories compared to western Europe. In many industries, there was an excessive use of scarce resources. Steel industry, for instance, used more than 50 percent of energy in 1980s as compared to Japan¹⁵. For many industries, profitability was mainly due to distorted prices and tax structures rather than due to efficiency. A significant portion of output in centrally economies was produced by industries with negative value added at world prices¹⁶.

Consequences of Soviet Disintegration

Disintegration of FSU was immediately followed by an unprecedented decline in output in all the independent republics

of Soviet Union, including CARs, mainly due to the disintegration of markets for the former republics of Soviet Union. Collapse of CMEA among the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe and U.S.S.R also led to the loss of markets for the new born republics of FSU. "Disintegration of markets drastically reduced the capacity of these countries to import inputs, spare parts, machinery and intermediary goods which in return led to the emergence of bottlenecks and scarcities that triggered a breakdown in the production"¹⁷. Since CARs were closely linked with FSU, particularly Russian Federation, (and their trade dependence was very high) they were hard hit by the loss of markets. Besides high dependence on FSU, CARs also had huge trade deficits which were financed by transfers from the Central planning authority in Moscow. Among all the republics, Kazakhstan had the largest inter-republican trade deficit (12 percent of GDP) in 1989. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, trade deficit was 11.4 percent in 1990. Collapse of FSU meant not only the loss of markets but also the disappearance of these transfers as well. This gave a serious blow to industrial output which fell drastically.

Disintegration of FSU also signalled the end of an economic ideology. All the newly independent republics including CARs started a transition from Central Planning to a market economy. As a requirement of the market-oriented economy prices were liberalized. Subsidies on freight charges were substantially reduced leading to sharp increase in prices which further aggravated the decline in the industrial output. Now it was no longer possible for Kazakhstan to import oil from Siberia at lower prices as Siberian producers found other profitable outlets for their oil exports. As such Kazakhstan now found itself in a paradoxical position where it has to export crude oil to Russian Federation at lower prices and import it from Siberia at a higher price. For instance, in 1992 export price of Kazakhstan's crude oil was only a quarter of the imported oil from Siberia¹⁸. Output decline was also followed by hyper-

inflation. Immediately after disintegration, the annual inflation rate in CARs went beyond 1,000 percent. Real income fell sharply leading to a drastic decline in demand for the industrial products produced in the region. Demand for military equipment, particularly from Russian Federation also dried up immediately. Following disintegration, industrial enterprises were further penalised by the emergence of a host of adverse factors. To benefit from inflation, enterprises engaged in the distribution of critical raw materials began to withhold payments. While supply bottlenecks affected all enterprises adversely small enterprises in particular were hard hit owing to their limited buying and selling powers. The shortage of essential inputs was further aggravated by the sale of these inputs in the hard currency markets. Emergence and exploitation of arbitrage opportunities became widespread¹⁹.

Industrial Restructuring

Most of the problems faced by the industrial economy of CARs are of historic origin. Low level of product competitiveness and capacity utilisation, overstaffing of enterprises, bureaucratic control and lack of corporate governance, use of obsolete technology, all are the creation of the era of Central planning. For such an industrial economy, restructuring seeking an improvement in the efficiency and competitiveness of industry is so that it is capable of competing with imports and developing new export markets is necessary. Such a restructuring calls for a plethora of policy reforms including institutional framework, privatisation, macro-economic stabilization, foreign investment, modernisation of enterprises, skill upgradation and management practices. Some of these requirements of restructuring are briefly discussed below.

- i) **Legal Framework:** Central Asian states do not have any experience of market mechanism. The region also has not any enterprise culture. Lack of understanding of market share is pervasive among citizens, managers and

authorities. Transition to market economy is just a few years old. Immediately what is needed is an institutional framework of a market economy. Legal and regulatory framework will allow the market economy to function, enforce competition and attract foreign investment²⁰. It will enforce contracts and clarify ownership of property rights. Privatisation and well functioning capital markets cannot emerge unless legal framework and contracted rights are established. With the help of the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development such a framework has been developed in CARs, especially for Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan. But so far it has mostly remained unimplemented as there is acute shortage of professionals who could make such a framework operational²¹.

- ii) **Privatisation:** Since industry in CARs is almost completely dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), restructuring must involve the process of privatisation so as to improve the efficiency of these hitherto SOEs. However, the experiment with privatisation, as observed during the past few years, reveals that except in Kyrgyz Republic and to a great extent in Kazakhstan the progress is slow and incremental in nature. Kyrgyz Republic has emerged as the main country in restructuring its industrial set-up through privatisation of SOEs. Here privatisation began with agricultural land and small business (first stage privatisation). During second stage, small and medium sized enterprises were privatised. In order to finance the privatisation a special fund, known as National Enterprise Fund, was created advancing interest-free loans to individuals. It enabled the citizens to purchase shares in private enterprises²². By the end of 1994, some 500 enterprises had been completely privatised. During 1995, another 900 enterprises were offered for sale. The state intends to complete the sale

of remaining enterprises by the end of 1997²³. The initial phase of closed privatisation transferred ownership to employee collectives. This type of privatisation gave rise to the problem of effective corporate governance (known as low quality-privatisation). In the subsequent phase low-quality privatisation was redressed by allowing the outside participation (non-employee participation)²⁴.

Kazakhstan has also made good progress in privatising its small and medium industry. Upto 1995, more than 2,000 enterprises had been transferred to employee collectives through closed privatisation. Non-employee participation is now being encouraged through new legislations so as to avoid the consequences of low quality privatisation. In Uzbekistan, 1300 enterprises had been privatised by the end of 1995. However, most of the closed joint-stock companies are now being reorganised for allowing non-employee participation²⁵. In other republics the process of privatisation has been delayed due to various reasons including civil strife in Tadjikistan on the one hand and the lack of interest to dismantle state control of industry by the Turkmenian President on the other²⁶.

This slow and patchy pace of privatisation is due to various reasons: a) despite promulgating various decrees, industrial policy still lacks focus and direction, making the process of reconstruction difficult; b) region has neither an entrepreneurial class nor any experiences with privatisation²⁷; c) workers and managers are opposing privatisation because they apprehend loss of jobs²⁸; d) working capital is in short supply due to inflation and high interest rates; e) work habits and attitudes of labourers and mental frame of managers, conditioned by a prolonged regime of command system, are in no way conducive for the growth of viable private enterprises²⁹; f) labour retention requirements imposed on SOEs do

not allow them to compete with emerging private enterprises; g) there are very few individuals having sufficient resources to purchase large enterprise; h) competition is unfair due to distorted markets and prices; policy interventions are still widespread and do not allow level playing field for private and public sectors; and i) rampant corruption has frustrated privatisation efforts. The process of reducing the size of the state in economic decision making has thrown open new opportunities of corruption in the independent states of FSU. Vested groups, particularly managers are fully exploiting the new opportunities³⁰.

- iii) **Divided Governments:** Success in achieving structural reforms including industrial restructuring, has remained elusive due to the divided form of governments in CARs. Governments here consist of two irreconcilable factions - the reformers and the retrenched hardliners. While as reformers want to go ahead with market-oriented reforms, hardliners are fighting for retaining the old system. A unified government, with a clear vision and commitment to market reforms, which is the basic pre-requisite for the success of standard policy prescriptions of market economy - is seriously lacking in the region. It has posed serious problems, particularly with regard to restructuring of natural monopolies and huge military-industrial complexes. Restructuring of monopolies requires creation of regulatory agencies for privatisation³¹. Ministries strongly oppose such agencies as it will stop the rents and profits which they are currently enjoying. Pre-privatisation restructuring of industry is very crucial in case of industrial complexes. Legal structuring which will transform SOEs into joint-stock companies and break up combines into core and non-core units, is opposed by the rent-seeking managers with vested interests. With the result, these industrial complexes have not been

broken down to make them attractive for private investors. Divided governments have also dampened the prospects of huge financial aid on the one hand and forced the central banks to guard their independence instead of pursuing sound monetary policies.

- iv) **Macroeconomic Imbalances:** Transition to market economy in CARs started amidst serious macroeconomic imbalances: high inflation, excessive exchange rate volatility, deep fiscal imbalances, and unemployment. Output fell due to shortage of input supplies, breakdown of inter-republican trade, and marketing difficulties³². Inflation was aggravated by monetary expansion and negative interest rates. Compared to other independent republics particularly the Baltic States, the progress in establishing stability in CARs has been very slow³³. Though output decline has bottomed out and four republics registered positive growth rates by the end of 1995, GDP was still negative in Tadjikistan (-7.0 percent). Similarly, annual inflation rates, though not as high as these were during the early nineties, are still excessively high in some republics, 183 percent in Tadjikistan and 193 percent in Turkmenistan. In other republics inflation rates were in the range of 25 percent and 35 percent by the end of 1995³⁴. Macro-economic deterioration has acted as a barrier to privatisation initiatives in various ways. It has created a hostile political atmosphere for structural reforms. It has also induced private investment into trading activities with quick returns³⁵.
- v) **Weak Financial System:** Industrial restructuring needs a strong financial sector which is not in operation in CARs. Banking sector is very weak and does not have the resources to lead the process of restructuring to be derived³⁶. During the command system, money simply served the main function of implementing the central plan.

Banks accustomed to carry out these central plans now find it difficult to allocate savings effectively. The practice of mono-bank where functions of a central bank and commercial bank were carried by one and the same bank, did not allow the system of financial intermediation to emerge. In the absence of financial intermediation there is no clear source of venture capital for funding restructuring in private enterprises. Financial governance is very weak. This again is the offshoot of Central planning where banks were not held responsible for their lending activities as it was directed by the government. State-directed lending still dominates and SOEs get the maximum credit at subsidised rates. There is acute shortage of a long term capital for the private sector. Uncertainty about the future course of economic reforms has encouraged high liquidity among banks as they find it difficult to evaluate financial viability of loans in an atmosphere of high interest rates and also uncertain political and economic environment³⁷.

- vi) **Foreign Capital:** Foreign capital inflow can play an important role in transforming industry in CARs. But so far the flow of private foreign investment has been modest. This is mainly due to the lack of legal framework, political instability (in some republics), and a lack of clear commitment to take economic reforms to their logical end³⁸. The region also lacks the experience as well as the basic infrastructure of coordinating requests and offers regarding foreign flow of funds³⁹. Bureaucratic obstacles have also discouraged foreign investment. Many investment proposals have failed to materialise due to unrealistic conditions imposed by the host governments. Foreign capital inflows have remained largely confined to official-aid-flows. Here again, CARs have been less fortunate as most of the official bilateral assistance, particularly from European Union, has gone to the former

Communist countries of Eastern Europe⁴⁰. In the absence of huge foreign resources, these countries will have to further tighten their policies so as to generate more savings. However, position with regard to foreign capital, both private investment and official-aid-flows, has been fast improving since 1996. Private foreign investment particularly in oil, gas and mineral exploration has increased substantially. With respect to foreign aid, U.S.A. alone increased its share by 40 percent for the year 1997.

- vii) **Budget constraints:** Programme of industrial restructuring is limited by the budget constraints of the governments. While foreign inflows are limited, domestic resource mobilisation has declined during the past four years⁴¹. The main source of government revenue, taxes on SOEs, is fast declining. Managers of SOEs have been manipulating business transactions and accounts resulting in a gradual decline of state's share in firm's income. Following privatisation, the structure of economy is changing. While as the old large enterprises are declining in importance and pay less and less taxes, the new and emerging enterprises have hardly been taxed. Tax base is very low and tax loopholes and exemptions are widespread. Taking advantage of weak administration, tax paying entities are successfully exerting pressure to evade tax bills⁴². Enterprise arrears particularly in energy sector have led to overdue payments of taxes and wages by this sector. Public sector entities including military and local governments are the largest debtors⁴³. Deterioration in fiscal revenue has emerged as a formidable task, frustrating the reforms including enterprise restructuring.
- viii) **Ethnic and Regional Dimensions:** The over-zealous map-making of Stalin and the Virgin Land Scheme of Khrushchev, have significantly changed the ethnic composition of population in CARs. Independence has given a flip to the sense of a new identity and ethnic

nationalism. Latent problems of many nationalities, which are re-emerging may well disrupt the social fabric and hamper economic relation if these are not handled carefully⁴⁴. There is no dearth of flash points like Bishkek and Osh in Kyrghyz Republic (dominated by Russian and Uzbeks respectively); Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan (dominated by Tadjiks), and northern border of Kazakhstan with Russia (dominated by Russians) in the ethnic jigsaw of CARs. From a bloodshed between Uzbeks and Kyrghyz on land transfer rights in 1990, the region has already seen many ethnic clashes during the past few years. One of the immediate consequences of these clashes has been the large-scale emigration of ethnic minorities particularly from Kyrghyz Republic and Tadjikistan. This has aggravated the shortage of skilled technicians and specialists in the region. The region was already cut off from the sources of technology and centres of advance research and development as such centres were located mostly in Russian Federation. Ethnic nationalism has also spilled over economic sphere. For instance, privatisation in Kazakhstan particularly in the beginning moved slowly and government deliberately prevented Russian enterprise chiefs from benefitting from any state sales-off⁴⁵. Similarly privatisation has moved fast in the country side of Kyrghyz Republic (dominated by Kyrghyz) as compared to Bishkek.

Decades of Central planning have created huge regional imbalances in CARs. While some regions have been neglected others are dominated by 'one enterprise' towns and still others particularly mining complexes, are geographically isolated⁴⁶. For many regions, features of industrial backwardness and the domination of population of Asian origin are inseparable from each other - Osh and Samarkand are the case in point. Any plan to alter the size of enterprises in disadvantaged regions may result in widespread outbreak of social interest and may

pit regional power centres against the central government. For these regions governments will have to develop active regional development policies to support industrial restructuring⁴⁷

Conclusion

Since independence Central Asian states have been facing various problems created by disruptions and distortions which were caused by the disintegration of former Soviet Union whileas distortions are historic in nature and have been caused by the decades of Central Planning pursued by FSU. Though the transition to market economy has already begun yet unlike Baltic states which followed a more comprehensive policy and hence achieved quick success in establishing macroeconomic stability, CARs followed a less comprehensive strategy and have experienced declining output and high inflation. Success with regard to correcting distortions , including enterprise reforms, has remained elusive. Process of industrial restructuring, seeking to improve the efficiency and competetiveness of industry so that it is capable of competing with imports and developing new export markets, is slow and incremental in nature. Main obstacles in the process of industrial restructuring include: absence of legal and regulatory framework leading to uncertainty on the part of investors about the commitment to reforms; lack of any experience with market economy by the authorities leading to false starts of privatisation; lack of entrepreneurs, managers and other professionals needed for a well-functioning market economy; lack of level playing field between private and public sectors due to widespread policy interventions; rent seeking behaviour of managers and poor work habits on the part of workers; lack of clear commitment to market reforms by a government which is currently divided between reformers and retrenched hard liners; lack of legal restructuring with respect to military - industrial complexes; weak financial sector characterised by lack of financial intermediation and experiences to lead the process of enterprise reforms;

deteriorating fiscal revenue reflecting an inadequate and inefficient tax system; use of outdated technology resulting in a colossal wastage of production; huge regional imbalances creating a hostile atmosphere for restructuring of SOEs in industrially backward regions, and a re-emergence of ethnic nationalism hampering economic relations and disrupting the social fabric of CARs.

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Economic Transition in Central Asian Republics: Problems and Prospects

Imtiyaz ul Haq

Historical Background:

The newly emerged Central Asian countries, - Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kyrghyzstan and Turkmenistan had experienced some vital historical events under the administration of the Soviet Russia. Before 1925 these states collectively constituted a part of Turkestan conquered by the Tsarist Russia during the latter half of the nineteenth century. At the time of its annexation with Russia it represented overwhelmingly an underdeveloped society, mostly dependent upon agricultural produce. It could be characterised by the existence of large feudal landlords who were notorious for the

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exploitation of the peasants by dominating the major economic resources. The Tsarist administration was overthrown by the Soviet Revolutionaries during the great October Revolution of 1917. It was a revolution organised by the working people, against their oppressors and exploiters i.e, capitalist. The ultimate goal of revolution in Central Asia was to alter radically the socio-institutional structure in order to give it a specific non-capitalist orientation from a pre-capitalist stage bypassing the capitalist path of development. During the initial phase of the Soviet rule, Turkestan was gradually fragmented into various republics, each representing a major nationality.

Immediately after coming into power, the Soviets captured the two main sectors of the economy, that is, agriculture and industry. In so far as the socialist transformation of agriculture is concerned, it was associated with a series of land-water reforms and a "collectivization" campaign. The land-water reforms were simply aimed at confiscating the surplus land and water resources from the big landlords, and the religious institutions, and distributing the same among the landless peasants so as to establish a classless society. The land-water reforms in Central Asia resulted in the escalation of social unrest and tension for these measures were considered to be against the principles of Islam. Finally, in the collectivization of agriculture the individual holdings were joined together and organised into big cooperatives known as collective farms (*kolkhozs*) and state farms (*sovkhoszs*), under the control and supervision of the state. This was done in order to harmonise production and increase productivity. The collectivization campaign was the most brutal episode in the entire history of socialist construction because the peasants were forced to surrender their land-holdings through bloodshed and violence. In the industrial sector, alongwith reorganizing the whole in-

dustrial base, the Soviets nationalised every sort of industry including small scale, tiny cottage units and business establishments. The other means of production such as, mineral resources, finance and banking, transport and communication were also nationalised. Thus, by the end of the 1940 these economies were transformed into a matured socialism called "Communism".

With the whiplash industrialisation, forced collectivization of agriculture and a massive use of terror as an instrument of socialist construction the economic development of Central Asia went through a sea change, under the Soviet rule, but at the cost of human suffering and misery. In spite of the rapid economic growth the economy of Central Asia was never considered to be functioning efficiently. Since much of these sources were wasted in the process of development owing to the primitive methods of production and presence of some negative factors like bureaucracy and red-tapism, loss of consumer's sovereignty, lack of incentives, loss of economic and political freedom, negligence of importance of human factor etc. and these gave way, in the long run to a period of stagnation. Growth rates dropped down considerably. The conditions were no less painful in other parts of the country. It was, therefore, amazing to see that a super power like the USSR., having one-sixth of the total surface of the land, was unable to feed its population even after seventy years of revolution.

In order to pull the country out of this crisis Gorbachev in the latter half of the 80's initiated a process of radical restructuring of the economy through a well known policy of "Perestroika". Initially perestroika was aimed at broadening the sphere of socialism. It stressed at the elimination of deformations and distortions acquired by the system in order to make it a real socialist democ-

racy. The policy centred around "democratization", and "decentralization" through individual labour activity, promoting their self employment and granting functional autonomy to the enterprise by transferring all the day to day powers to the grassroot level. The enterprises were switched over to a system of cost accounting i.e, self-financing and self-management (*khozraschot*). The trade which was a state monopoly was also decentralised, and enterprises were allowed to trade directly with foreign agencies. The Gosbank, which was a monobank and an additional instrument in the planning and allocation of resources, was replaced by three-tier banking system.

However, the concept and the process took a different turn, form, and magnitude during 1990-91 especially with the introduction of the laws on the property rights. The principles of Socialism were reversed and yet another phase of transformation started. The Soviets were allowed to sell and purchase industries and hire workers. In order to undo the disastrous consequences of "depeasantification" caused during collectivization drive, the land was allowed to be owned by farmers on lease so as to make them its real masters. Price reforms also accompanied at this stage of "Perestroika". Previously prices were determined and controlled by the state through large subsidies but under the new reforms the prices were left to be determined by market forces of supply and demand, and the subsidies were eliminated to a large extent.

During the period of perestroika, the economic and political conditions deteriorated to such an extent that it led to the dissolution of the whole USSR., towards the end of 1991.

Geographical Features

The Central Asian economic region comprising Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kyrghyzstan and Turkmenistan, is a vast territory of deserts and uplands with an area of 1277 thousand square kilometres which accounts for about 6 percent of the total area of the former USSR¹. The region is surrounded by the Caspian Sea on the West, Iran and Afghanistan on the South, China on the East and vast steppes of Kazakhstan on the North. Amu Darya and Syr Darya are the two major rivers flowing through these republics and these rivers culminate in the Aral Sea.

Demographic Features

According to the 1990 census, the Central Asian republics had a total population of 33.8 millions, representing about 12 percent of the total population of the erstwhile Soviet Union². The average population density of 26 per square kilometre is misleading because vast parts of the region consist of deserts and mountains where very few people live. In the fertile river basin the density of the population exceeds 200 per square kilometers³. The population grows at a fairly high rate: about 2.5 percent annually as against below one percent growth rate in other republics and Russian Federation⁴.

Economic Features

The Central Asian economy is predominantly agricultural. The agriculture sector, on an average, generates about 40 percent of the output (NMP) and is responsible for about the same percentage of employment⁵. The agriculture sector is characterised by a high degree of specialisation in cotton, making the former USSR the largest producer of cotton in the world. About 90 percent of this cotton production was supplied by these republics alone⁶. Uzbekistan, prior the dissolution of the USSR, was the fourth largest producer of the cotton in the world, rank-

ing behind the USSR, China and the USA⁷. Due to the scarcity of water the farming is done mostly along the rivers, dry deltas and oasis.

Central Asia is rich in mineral resources, such as oil, natural gas, coal, copper, antimony, mercury, gold, sulphur and precious stones. In addition to this, there are rich reservoirs of salt. The main industrial activities are cotton harvesting, textiles machinery, oil and gas production, machines, building, chemicals, metallurgy, leather and electricity generating industries. The industrial sector, on an average, accounts for about 30 percent of the NMP and generates about 20 percent of the employment⁸.

Problems and Prospects

Being rich in natural, as well as, human resources, the economic development of the Central Asian states under the administration of the Soviets has never been in accordance with their resources endowments. In fact, Central Asia, long before the Soviet rule and under the administration of Tsar was strategically covered into a raw material supply base for the Russian fast expanding industries. The Tsarist government paid a great attention to cotton cultivation and encouraged it at the expense of the food grains and other agricultural products. The Director of the Land Administration in Turkestan wrote in 1913, "Every *pood* of Turkestan wheat means competition with the Russian and Siberian wheat: every *pood* of cotton means competition with the American cotton. Hence it is better to import grains into the territory and free the irrigated land there for cotton cultivation"⁹. Even during the administration of the Soviets, the cotton culture received a further boost. More and more land was brought under cotton cultivation thereby making these republics heavily dependent upon the western republics

and the Russian Federation for the import of the food grains.

On the other hand very less importance was given to the development of the textiles and other labour intensive industries that could have absorbed the excess labour supply of the region.¹⁰ Instead under the notion of "socialist industrialization" the priority was given to the establishment of heavy and capital intensive industries. These industries required highly skilled labour and that too in small proportions. The skilled labour in large quantities was, therefore, imported into the region from the Western republics to be employed in these industries¹¹. Contrarily, the excessive labour resources in Central Asia, being relatively less mobile, could not be shifted to the labour deficient Western republics, and had to be absorbed by the agriculture sector under the famous principle that "no one under the socialism should be without a job." As a result, these republics were characterised by disguised unemployment and lower labour productivity.

The Central Asian republics, which produce abundant cotton, did not possess well-knit textile industries to convert the raw cotton into finished products. Instead, the raw cotton was purchased by the Central authorities at cheaper prices, processed into fabrics and garments outside the Central Asian region, and then brought back at higher prices. Only about 10 percent of the total cotton production was being processed domestically for their own use. Similarly, in Turkestan, which has huge deposits of the natural gas, the domestic population suffered from the gas supply as the natural gas was exported at a cheaper rate to the manufacturing branches of the Western republics for its chemical process and thereby derived higher incomes from its exports. The investment policies of the union were determined by the criteria of a region's or a republic's share in the total national income;

the other social and economic indicators were ignored. Since the Central Asian republics were confined to supplying of the raw materials and the benefits were reaped by the Western republics, by converting the material into finished products, their share in the total national output remained comparatively lower than those of the other developed republics. The investment criteria, therefore, was biased. It was neither based on the needs of the population nor aimed at reducing the socio-economic disparity existing between the Central Asian states and the Western republics.

The result, therefore, has been an unbalanced development of these economies both spatially and sectorally. Even Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika* which emphasized the need to expand and restructure the existing heavy industrial units was quite a favourable step for the Western developed republics but had hardly any favourable impact on the Central Asian economies where the need was to create a net work of labour intensive industries in view of the low levels of the skills of the indigenous excessive population and their resources endowments.

The introduction of a culture of self-financing self-management and removal of subsidies under *perestroika* was also unjustified from Central Asian point of view because it ignored the initial inequalities of incomes and development levels between these and the Western developed republics. The Central Asian republics primarily depended upon the central assistance in terms of the "Union transfers" also called "life lines" and the consumer good materials, bearing large subsidies. These union transfers and subsidies on the consumer goods were to a large extent responsible for upsetting the exploitative content existing in their relations. By virtue of these union transfers the republican budgets, with exception to

Uzbekistan, were able to maintain surplus. The problems emerged immediately after the disintegration of the USSR, towards the end of 1991, when these transfers came to an end and resulted in further economic decay in terms of massive budget deficits, hyper-inflation, deteriorating balance of payments, unfavourable terms of trade and severe shortfall in outputs due to the disruption of trade, linked with other republics and the external world.

Table
Transfers from the Union budget to Republican budgets of Central Asia.
(In millions of roubles)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Uzbekistan								
Union transfers	-	-	1900	2300	2900	6300	1200	-
Budget surplus/ deficit	-	-	-100	-400	-200	-300	-310	-1150
Tadjikistan								
Union transfers	164	442	234	53	219	-	2543	-
Union grants	-	-	244	420	321	-	0	-
Budgets surplus/ deficit	+79	+42	+113	+140	+111	-	+437	-1103
Turkmenistan								
Union transfers	94	164	192	259	218	728	1409	-
Union grants	169	213	230	345	433	0	0	-
Budget surplus/ deficit	+88	+83	+78	+102	+82	+122	+592	-4187
Kyrgyzia								
Union transfers	-	-	390	620	540	910	1930	-
Budget surplus/ deficit	-	-	+150	+90	+160	+30	+700	-5090

Source: *Statistical Handbook, USSR*, The World Bank.

The data for 1992 has been gathered from the concerned economic reviews published by the IMF, Washington -1992.

During the first nine months of the year 1992, i.e., after disintegration, there was a contraction in the growth rates of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan by 25 percent and 14 percent respectively, as against the last year level of production¹². Tadjikistan's economy shrank by 20 percent in the second quarter of 1992¹³. While as at the end of the January, 1992, the consumer price-index of

Tadjikistan was 550 percent higher than a year before¹⁴, and in August-September 1992, its trade deficit amounted to 1.4 billion roubles¹⁵. The position was all the more same in other republics.

The disintegration of the Central Asian republics from the Russian Federation has also become a serious threat to their prosperity because of the following reasons:-

1. Water Shortage: In Central Asia the essential economic resource or factor of production is not land or labour or capital but water. Its capacity to grow food is determined by the availability of water and the water supplies are falling from a level which is already inadequate. Every year the amount of water being siphoned off by the republics is 11 cubic kilometres of water flowing through their rivers, i.e., Syr Darya and Amu Darya. This amount of water siphoned off is already too small to maintain current levels of farm output. Nearly a quarter of the irrigated land of the largest farming region in Uzbekistan receives only 70% of the water that the main crop, i.e. cotton, needs for its proper growth. On the other hand cotton cultivation is considered to be water efficient, though virtually any other crop would require as much water¹⁶. Hence crop shifting offers no solution to the efficiency of water management. On the other hand, Aral Sea, which is considered to be the life giving system of Central Asia, is drying up. From 1960 to 1990 its surface area was reduced by about 60% from 68000 sq. km to 37000 sq. kms and its sea level in 1990 was reduced to just 14 mt¹⁷. In other words, it can be said that the surface area is shrinking at the rate of 2 percent per year and sea level of 30 cm a year. On the basis of these estimates, it can be said that in a span of next 30 years, i.e., from 1990 to 2020, the surface area of the sea would

be reduced to just 15000 sq. km and the sea level would fall to just 6 mt. Therefore, the Aral Sea, once the world's fourth largest in-land water body, will be converted into many residual drive lakes as its salinity is reported to have increased by more than three times since 1960.

The only possibility of increasing the water supplies was to divert water from the Russian Siberian rivers but Russia will not allow such a diversion because of its disintegration.

Related to the issue of water supply is the faster growth rate of population at the rate of 2.5 % per annum, implying thereby that during the same span of 30 years the population would have almost doubled from a figure of 50 million. The doubling of the population will double the demand for food grains and the food production is directly dependent upon the availability of water levels which would have also fallen by half during the same span and that from a level which is already inadequate.

Therefore, if the remedial measures, to check the growth of population at this exceedingly high rate and maintain the water levels properly, are not undertaken seriously this region will have to face disastrous consequences.

2. Water Disputes: In view of the inadequate supplies of water the possibility of serious water disputes between the upstream and the down stream republics cannot be ruled out. Such situation will definitely worsen the political relations between the republics and thereby put more and more pressure on their economies.

3. Border Disputes: After their disintegration from Russia, and having achieved the status of independent sovereign countries, the border disputes are likely to take place in the future, because of the arbitrary demarcation

of the borders by the imperial Russians' and subsequently by the Soviets.

4. Landlocked Countries: The Central Asian states are land locked countries. They have no direct access to sea and are entirely dependent upon Russian rail and road system for their communication with the rest of the world. The dependence on the Russian routes can be a threat to their integrity. Although Central Asia has been presently linked up with the neighbouring countries by a road facility through Turkmenistan and much of the trade has started to take place through this route, yet the facts remain that they don't have their own port facility.

In view of the mentioned factors, as well as the already distorted economic base, the short-run prospects for the development of these economies seem to be quite pessimistic. The most serious problem before these economies, that needs to be solved urgently, is economic stabilization through a successful shift to market economy by structural adjustments and by establishing a legal and regulatory frame-work. Effective stabilization policies should aim at achieving a reasonable degree of price stability, external balance and a sustainable rate of economic growth. The structural adjustments should aim at creating a viable private entrepreneurship by sufficiently clearing the issue of property rights, building of the market based institutions and broadening and deepening of financial sector reforms. In support of the efficient financial systems, the Central Banks need to design policies that enhance the stability of their monetary system, avoid excessive supply of money to bring inflation under control and a proper supervision on the commercial banks for effective co-ordination and policy implementation.

However, the success of all these reforms, immediately, depends upon productive capacity of an economy.

But the Central Asia has an extremely unproductive base. Nevertheless, production in these economies can be improved in the short-run by spreading a network of small-scale labour intensive industries, thereby making the farmers the real masters of the land. The success of these short-run structural changes depends upon the financial status of these republics which is currently unsound. Therefore, cooperation with the external world for capital inflow becomes essential. Again, these economies do not present a much attractive base for the foreign investment to take place in abundant quantities, especially from the Western developed countries, unless and otherwise it becomes politically important for them to do so. In recent years most of the foreign direct investment from the European developed countries has flown to the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, partly, in view of their locational suitability with the European Union. Although the East Asian and Middle East countries like India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey etc. are presently taking a keen interest in promoting bilateral economic relations with these republics these countries being hard pressed themselves have little to offer. The only possibility of making these economies viable, in the short-run, and to make up the inadequate supplies of the foreign capital, is in establishing trade links, preferably, with the Western countries. These economies have enormous potential of exports being rich in natural resources like oil, gas and other minerals. Turkmenistan alone has 8 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves and 700 million tons of oil reserves and extracts about 80 billion cubic meters of gas and 6 million tons of oil per year¹⁸. Similarly, Uzbekistan produces about 40 billion cubic meters of gas and 3 million tons of oil per year¹⁹. Even those countries which have the scarcity of natural resources, like Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzistan have the large potential to generate hydro-electricity that has a great export value in the neigh-

bouring countries. The currency earned, thereupon, could be utilized for the establishment of a network of the light and food industries, especially, the labour intensive textiles industries. Since these countries used to produce almost the whole of the total cotton of the former USSR, and Uzbekistan alone being the fourth largest producer of the cotton in the world, the textile industries have really a significant role to play in their economic development. Thus, in the long run the prospects could be bright.

Conclusions

The Central Asian countries are today once again passing through a very critical but rather peaceful phase of economic transformation. They have ultimately been able to tear the "Iron Curtain" and liberate themselves from the shackles of socialism. On account of the abolition of the Communist organisations, the transition apparently seems to be an easy affair but due to the misuse of their vast resources of energy, misallocated investment policies, and their crippled economies, the transformation is virtually going to be a painful procedure to follow; how long will it last is a difficult matter to predict. In order to lessen the pains of transformation the inflow of foreign capital and technology, especially from the industrially developed Western countries is a necessary precondition. The role of international financial institutions like IMF and the World Bank is of paramount significance in influxing the hard currency and dictating the path of economic development through technical expertise necessary for smooth transformation of the system and exploitation of substantial untapped resources.

Notes and Reference

01. The figures have been computed from the data given on *Statistical Handbook, USSR, The World Bank Publication, 1992*.
02. Figures computed from the data given on *Ibid*.

03. Khan Aziz ur Rehman and Ghai Dharam, *Collective Agricultural and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia*, 1979.p 1.
04. *Statistical Handbook*, p 4, 5.
05. Figures computed from the data given in *Statistical Handbook*.
06. "Pakistan policy of Central Asia", *Journal of South Asian Studies*.
07. Khan Aziz ur Rehman, *op. cit*, p 63.
08. Figures computed from the data given in *Statistical Handbook*.
09. Quoted in :Kaushak Davendra, *Central Asia in Modern Times. A History from the Early 19th century*, Moscow, 1965. p 68.
10. The Central Asian republics have the highest growth rate of population roughly around 2.5 percent as against a mere one percent of the European republics.
11. The total net in-migration over the years 1954-70 for Uzbek SSR was 410,000; for Tadjik SSR 149,000; for Turkmen SSR 120,000 and for Kyrgyz SSR 166,000.
12. *Economic and Social survey of Asia and the Pacific* (Part one), 1992, United Nations New York, 1992, 1993. P. 52.
13. Warikoo (ed) *Central Asia*, P 157
14. *Economic Review Tadjikistan*, IMF, Washington, 1992. p 5.
15. Warikoo, *op. cit*, p 163.
16. *The Economist*, December 26th 1992; January 8th, 1993, p 31.
17. *Uzbekistan: An Agenda for Economic Reform. A World Bank country Study*, 1993, p 242.
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Impact of Agricultural Productivity on Rural Development of Central Asian States

*G.M.Mir**

Significance and Objectives

The importance of agriculture in the regional development is borne out by the fact that it provides basic ingredients necessary for the existence of mankind in addition to most of the raw-material for other sectors of economic activity. The role of agriculture becomes more crucial for the development of the Central Asian states (CAS) in general, and its rural areas in particular, as this sector contributes about 35 percent of regional GNP and provides over 43 percent of employment. Moreover, the region has a weak and lopsided industrial base. So in order to develop the region, agriculture becomes an

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issue area to be addressed on priority. Productivity being the strongest indicator of agricultural efficiency, its variation, both in time and space, has effected the levels of rural development and growth performance intensities. Agricultural productivity is a multidimensional concept which indicates technological advancement, effective management of available resources and organisational set-up for agricultural production. These factors effect the relative production in any region. The productivity which is a measure of efficiency with which inputs are utilized in agricultural operations, is a physical rather than a value concept and its three best known partial measures are productivity of land, labour and capital. Land productivity is the most permanent and fixed among the three conventional categories of inputs and is of primary importance as a determinant of the total level of food and agricultural production. Whereas the labour productivity determines the income and living standards of population engaged in agriculture, productivity measures of capital are particularly complicated to compute and difficult to interpret. This is largely because of both diversity of farms and purpose for which capital may be utilized in agricultural production. Moreover, owing to the paucity as well as negligible changes in the limited available data on capital productivity, mainly due to the institutional framework of erstwhile Soviet Central Asia, this variable has been excluded in the present study. So the basic objective of this paper is to:

- a) examine the spatio-temporal variation in agricultural productivity and the corresponding impulses responded by the rural development;
- b) delineate productivity regions in order to be in a position to suggest ways and measures for the improvement of productivity; and,
- c) highlight the concept of development without destruction i.e., improving the production pattern but simultaneously to have a sustainable approach,

reduction in regional imbalances and to maintain ecological balance.

Methodology

A series of attempts have been made all over the world by scholars working in different disciplines particularly geography, agricultural sciences and economics, to measure agricultural productivity and rural development. Briefly, the productivity measures range from output per-unit area, output in relation to inputs, output expressed in terms of grain equivalents, calories, starch value and carrying capacity, to output per agricultural worker etc. Thompson¹ expressed it in terms of gross output of crops. Kendall² treated it a mathematical problem and initiated a system of four coefficients (i) productivity coefficient (ii) ranking coefficient (iii) energy coefficient and (iv) money value coefficient. Hirsch³ has suggested crop-yield index while Zobel⁴ considers it output per man per hour. Valkenburg⁵ insisted on land productivity based on acre-yield ratio. Stamp⁶ suggested another method for measuring agricultural productivity by converting the agricultural production in calories and the desirable calory intake measure he termed as Standard Nutrition Unit(SNU). Mackenzie⁷ has measured the production efficiency by using the coefficient of output relative to input. Enyedi⁸ determines agricultural productivity by dividing the yield of the respective crop in unit area by the total yield of the crop at the national level and the resultant values are seen in ratio to total cropped area of the unit divided by the total area at the national level. These formulae were followed by a series of techniques by scholars including Garg, Deshpande, Surma, Khusro, Bhatia, Nangia, Bhalla, Shafi and others. But keeping in view the nature of the problem, pattern of data availability and a score of other relevant combinations, including the aim to have the desired results, the techniques adopted in the present study are as under:

Productivity of Land

For the assessment of the productivity per-unit area, the formula used is as devised by Shafi⁹ which is a modification over the formula given by Enyedi. In the improved formula the summation of the total yield of all crops in the unit area is divided by the total area under the crop considered in the unit area and the position thus obtained is examined in relation to the total yield of all the crops considered at the regional level divided by the total area under these crops. The formula can be expressed as follows:

$$\frac{(y_w + y_r + y_m \dots n)}{t} : \frac{(Y_w + Y_r + Y_m \dots n)}{T}$$

Where:

- y=Yield per unit of the respective crop in the unit area
- w=Area under that particular crop
- t= Total area under all crops in the unit area
- Y=Per unit yield of the respective crop at national level
- W=Area under that particular crop
- T=Total area under all crops at national level

Productivity of Labour

So far as the labour productivity is concerned, its measurement is based on the technique followed by Singh and Chauhan¹⁰. It can be expressed as:

$$lwi = \frac{w_i}{w_r} \times 100$$

Where:

- lwi=Agricultural worker Index
- w_i =% Agricultural workers/hectare sown area in the unit
- w_r = Corresponding data of the region

The composite index of agricultural worker has been calculated through the following equation:

$$lewi = \frac{lej}{lwi} \times 100$$

Where:

lewi = Agricultural productivity/agricultural worker

lei = Agricultural productivity/hactare of net sown area

lwi = Agricultural worker index

Measurement of Rural Development

Both, agricultural productivity per-hectare of net sown area (lei) and per agricultural worker (lewi), have been taken into account in order to measure the degree of rural development. The value of these two indices has been considered as the composite index of rural development (Irdi). This can be formulated as:

$$\text{Irdi} = \frac{\text{lei} + \text{lewi}}{2}$$

Data Base

The main sources of data are *Agricultural Census, FAO Production Year Books, Europa World Year Books, Crop Census Reports, Agricultural Atlases, IMF Reports, UNESCO Periodicals, Labour Manuals, Statistical Handbooks, UN Demographic Year Books, ILO Labour Statistics Yearbooks, UNESCO Statistical Year Books* and a variety of occasional papers and digests of statistics published by different organisations. In addition to some secondary sources in the form of books and journals, information and data has been gathered from concerned embassies. Data generated through panel discussions, seminar interactions, electronic media, press releases has also been utilized with the required degree of precaution.

Study Region and Grouping

In order to measure spatio-temporal changes in agricultural productivity and the corresponding responses impulsed by the rural economy of CAS through aforementioned formulae, the period under study has been divided into three

phases, well demarcated by the political, socio-economic and institutional upheavals as well as marked stages of agricultural development. The three phases which are represented by their respective averages, are enumerated below:

Phase Status	Developmental Stage	Period
I Pre- <i>perestroika</i>	Stagnant	1940-41 to 1984-85
II Post- <i>perestroika</i>	Experimental	1985-86 to 1990-91
III Post-independence	Transitional	1991-92 to 1996-97

The crops selected include all the important ones: foodgrains, cotton, fodder, vegetables and fruits. All food crops have been grouped in cereals, cotton and fruits under commercial crops while fodder and vegetables have been clubbed together under domestic consumption crops (DCC). This grouping is based on the regional data and agricultural crop grouping index. So far as the study area is concerned, it includes five Central Asian states viz., Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tadjikistan - all members of CIS. Hence state will be the unit of study while the region will comprise the composite index of all Central Asian states.

Results and Discussion

The spatio-temporal changes in agricultural productivity within the area under study will be studied through the land as well as labour productivity followed by the resultant rural developmental responses.

Productivity Trends of Land

The pattern of agricultural productivity in the region exhibits some significant variations, both in time and space, and generally shows a positive growth trend from first phase to third phase. The intensity of such a change is well marked, on inter-state and inter-phase considerations, with a definite focus on shrinkage in cotton area and sprawling of cereals

and cash crops (table 1.1). So far as levels of productivity in cereals are concerned, Kyrgyzstan has taken the lead in first two phases followed by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. In the third phase Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan have shown increasing trend in the productivity of cereals by percentages of 22.82, 11.46 and 5.20 respectively over the base phase whereas Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have registered decreasing trend, with percentage figures of -21.28 and -9.42 respectively. The higher rates of increasing productivity as shown by some states, particularly in post-independence period, are mainly due to the political attitude of changing cropping pattern in favour of food crops, mostly at the cost of cotton monoculture. Moreover, the comparatively effective water management, the farmers' realization of the importance of available water and foreseeing the negative impacts of mismanaged limited water resources, have also played a significant role in the improvement of irrigation network leading to higher yields. These efforts have led to an increasing irrigation intensity of 97 in case of Turkmenistan, 93 with respect to Uzbekistan, 87 in case of Tadjikistan, around 70 in case of Kyrgyzstan and almost 11 in case of Kazakhstan. The composite index of cereal productivity shows that the highest level has been achieved by Kyrgyzstan, the productivity index of which comes to 1.169 followed by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan, with figures of 1.080, 0.995, 0.953 and 0.810 respectively. A deeper insight into the table 1.1 reveals that the states previously having higher irrigation intensity are sometimes registering comparatively a higher negative productivity which obviously is the result of unplanned-cum- excessive water use, leading to soil salinity and other allied pollutants.

In commercial crops, Uzbekistan has maintained its higher position through all the three phases but has shown a downward trend in the productivity level by a percentage figure of -21.04 over first phase. With the exception of Kazakhstan,

the other three states have shown a better performance of productivity in commercial crops, Turkmenistan by 26.16, Kyrghyzstan by 7.55 and Tadjikistan by 6.11 percent. The overall picture shows that the highest level of productivity of cash crops is experienced by Uzbekistan, i.e. 1.31 times higher than Kazakhstan, 1.25 times than Turkmenistan, 1.19 times than Kyrghyzstan and 1.13 times than Tadjikistan.

Soon after the independence of CAS the political leadership in some states, especially Uzbekistan, forced the farmers to abandon cotton culture in favour of food crops and that is why the cash crops, particularly cotton acreages are falling. Within the cash crop group, fruits have shown a definite increasing trend, especially after independence in these states.

The domestic consumption crops (DCC), including mainly vegetables and fodder, do not show a clear inter-state and inter-phase relationship. Although Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and Tadjikistan are showing higher productivity level in DCC, as compared to other two states, even their inter-phase trend is also somewhat fluid. Tadjikistan has shown 20.20 percent increase in the second phase which decreased to 9.43 percent in third stage. Similarly, Kyrghyzstan which has been able to increase its productivity by 5.70 percent in second phase shows a decrease of 0.36 percent in the third phase. Turkmenistan has somehow improved a bit its performance by 3.01 percent in the second and 3.25 percent in third phase. While the situation in case of Kyrghyzstan has been worse, particularly after independence, Uzbekistan has performed better in third phase after a set-back in experimental stage of post-*perestroika*. Generally, this pattern of productivity trend is due to two main reasons. Firstly, fodder crops are related with stock densities which, in turn, vary in a great measure in time and space. The time to time droughts, changing nature of agrarian economy, varied domestic needs, changing land use particularly after independence, the quality of livestock and other associated factors are mostly responsible for the situation.

Table 1.1
Indices of Agricultural Productivity and
Growth Trends (Per Unit Area)

Crop Group	Growth Rate%	Phase	Turkmenistan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Cereals		I	0.942	1.278	0.885	1.114	0.807
		II	0.995	1.224	0.889	1.118	0.775
		III	1.050	1.006	1.087	1.009	0.849
		I-II	5.62	-4.22	0.45	0.35	-3.96
		I-III	11.46	-21.28	22.82	-9.42	5.20
	Commercial Crops		I	0.818	0.966	1.373	0.846
		II	0.947	0.937	1.054	1.031	1.029
		III	1.032	1.039	1.084	0.784	1.058
		I-II	15.77	-3.00	-23.23	21.86	3.20
		I-III	26.16	7.55	-21.04	-7.32	6.11
Domestic Consumption		I	0.861	1.294	1.057	0.824	0.975
		II	0.887	1.034	1.034	0.871	1.172
Crops(DCC)		III	0.889	0.953	1.262	0.827	1.067
		I-II	3.01	-20.09	-2.17	5.70	20.20
		I-III	3.25	-26.35	19.39	0.36	9.43

Source: Compiled and computed on the basis of:

- (i) *FAO Production Yearbooks*;
- (ii) *IMF Reports*;
- (iii) *Statistical Handbooks of World Bank* and
- (iv) *CIS Progress Reports*.

Secondly, the vegetables have shown changes both in acreage as well as in variety depending mostly on need-based quantum, nutritious status, changing food habits etc.

Mode of Labour Productivity

The pattern of agricultural productivity per agricultural worker exhibits well-marked spatio-temporal changes. It is evident from the table 1.2 that sometimes inter-state as well as inter-phase productivity levels of workers are more pronounced than unit area productivity. Turkmenistan having a least figure of labour productivity in stagnant period, has increased such productivity level upto to the leading mark in transitional and post-independence phases, with percentage growth rates higher in CAS whereas Kazakhstan has remained on the lowest ebb in this regard.

Table 1.2
Agricultural Productivity/Agricultural Worker

	Agricultural Worker Index			Agricultural Productivity/ Agricultural Worker		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
Turkmenistan	3.609	0.906	0.794	0.490	1.952	2.227
Kyrgyzstan	2.272	2.093	1.588	0.873	0.947	1.249
Uzbekistan	4.345	4.531	4.235	1.005	0.964	1.031
Kazakhstan	0.163	0.312	0.323	1.631	0.852	0.823
Tadjikistan	5.000	5.093	4.176	0.951	0.933	1.138

Source: Computed by the author on the basis of following sources:

- (i) ILO Labour Statistical Yearbooks;
- (ii) UNESCO and World Bank Reports.

Within this range Uzbekistan is better placed, followed by Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The agricultural worker index which is negatively proportionate to per capita productivity, is showing lower figures in case of higher valued states, partly because of higher acreages under commercial crops and partly due to lesser concentration of agricultural workers. The overall assessment of labour productivity leads to two important

observations: all states of the region show encouraging trend, particularly after the second phase and if we compare the above table (1.2) with table 1.1, it is clear that the states having higher acreages under commercial crops encompass higher labour productivity and vice-versa.

Productivity Intensity

The composite index of land and labour productivity, as revealed by the two preceding tables, as well as their superimposition leads to varying intensities in productivity of all selected crops, from all the units of study in all the phases (table 2.1). The table shows some micro-level observations when the variations therein is studied with a magnitude approach.

Table 2.1
Productivity Matrix

	Turkmenistan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan	Tadjikistan
Cereals	0.072	0.218	0.054	0.109	0.043
Cotton	0.093	0.125	0.187	0.075	0.375
Fruits	0.083	0.125	0.250	0.050	0.062
Fodder	0.025	0.125	0.041	0.031	0.062
Vegetables	0.007	0.015	0.031	0.006	0.010

Source: Computed on the basis of table 1.1 and 1.2.

Briefly, the table leads to some observations which can be summarised as follows. In Uzbekistan the lead in weighed productivity is taken by fruits, in Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan by cotton and in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan by cereals. Cotton ranks second in Uzbekistan whereas cereals get third place followed by DCC. The situation of vegetables and fodder crops is more or less same in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. But Tadjikistan and Kyrgyzstan emerge with different equations. However, by superimposing the preceding three tables it can be concluded that all states of Central Asia are showing an encouraging growth trend in some cereals and fruits accompanied by a medium growth rate in DCC, *albeit* with varying degrees. This change is well pronounced in the post-independence phase which registers a sharp decrease in cotton acreages and productivity as well. Furthermore, the

upward trend of labour productivity is noticed from the first to the second phase, with more or less balanced situation in last two phases.

Levels of Rural Development

The two components of rural development, i.e. agricultural productivity per-unit area and agricultural productivity per-agricultural worker as discussed in the preceding text show that Turkmenistan has achieved the highest degree of rural development within CAS as its index of rural development comes to 1.245. It is interesting to note that the state stands at the lowest ladder of land productivity within the region but has been able to improve its labour productivity beyond expectations. It has multiplied its unit area productivity by a percentage as low as 1.13 times but has increased 4.54 times its worker output from pre-*perestroika* to post-independence phase. The next level is experienced by Central Asian mountainous state e.g. Kyrgyzstan which has managed to be a leading state so far land productivity in first two phases is concerned though on a phase-to-phase basis decreasing trend is evident. It has been pushed back to second position by Uzbekistan in post-independence period. So far as its worker output is concerned, the state shows increasing figures with the passage of time and its third phase is 1.43 times ahead of pre-*perestroika* stage. Uzbekistan which has attained medium level of rural development is very close to Kyrgyzstan in over all agricultural productivity as its index of rural development is 1.040 as against 1.052 of Kyrgyzstan. The state has shown better signs of land productivity from first to third phase with a push back in middle phase whereas in case of labour productivity although it ranks second in first two phases but the intensity of productivity shows a downward trend in middle phase. The third phase, though, ranked at the fourth level, encompasses 2.58 percent increase over the base phase.

Table 3.1
Degrees of Rural Development

Level of Development	Index value of			State
	Unit Area	Per Worker	Rural Development	
Very High	0.935	1.556	1.245	Turkmenistan
High	1.081	1.023	1.052	Kyrghyzstan
Medium	1.080	1.000	1.040	Uzbekistan
Low	0.936	1.102	1.019	Kazakhstan
Very Low	0.969	1.007	0.988	Tadjikistan

Source: Based on tables 1.1 and 1.2.

The low degree of rural development is clearly manifested by the largest state of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, where components of rural development signifies different strides in different stages. The components of rural conditions do not show any definite relationship. The virgin land use planning has played an important role in deciding its rural lot. The earlier higher growth rates in productivity were followed by sudden decreases in most of the farms. In experimental phase a boost took place in case of agricultural productivity of land where as labour output was the lowest in third phase. The last level of rural development has been experienced by Tadjikistan. The developmental ratio in the levels of rural development attained by Central Asian states reveals that Turkmenistan is 1.18 times developed than Kyrghyzstan, which in turn is 1.01 times ahead to Uzbekistan. Tadjikistan which stands at bottom so far as the degree of rural development is concerned is 1.03 times backward as compared to Kazakhstan. The ratio of development between the lowest and the highest degrees come to 1:1.26.

Major Findings

There exists a positive correlation between agricultural productivity and rural development in CAS and any change in one variable is responded by a change in the other variable. It is worthy to note that such relationship is quite visible also

between the agricultural productivity and GNP as well as HDI of the study region indicating thereby the role of agricultural productivity not only in rural development but also in regional development as well. The process of superimposing rural development over productivity leads to the formation of five combinations which give rise to five distinct productivity-rural development regions requiring different approaches to develop.

Dynamic Region

This region shows a higher level of productivity with a higher growth rate. Such equation applies to Turkmenistan, though having higher productivity, it experiences higher growth rate in one component only i.e. labour productivity. Its higher productivity level corresponding to a higher growth rate is mainly due to its higher irrigation intensity, the highest in CAS, better agricultural infrastructure, suitable weather conditions particularly in favour of some specialized crops and comparatively skilled labour force. But the region has accumulated saline soils, polluted water bodies and has registered other unwanted pollutants which needs an urgent attention.

Progressive Region

Kyrgyzstan represents such areas which have medium productivity but a higher growth rate implying a promising future development of the area. The progressive character of these regions are due to their comparatively balanced and sustainable developmental approach. Kyrgyzstan located in Central Asian mountains is still a virgin area in many respects and is endowed with for its future generations.

Stagnant Region

The region is characterised by medium level of productivity and medium growth and Uzbekistan comes under this category. Although the state has the higher arable land

with good irrigation facilities but due to the mismanagement of water and cotton monoculture, the state has not only reduced the growth rate of crops due to life threatening salinity and other allied pollutants resulting in multiplying wastelands, but also encouraging a grave catastrophe of receding water level and drying up of aquifers. However, the recent efforts supported by various countries as well as some international organisations are proving fruitful in this regard. The urgent caution to be taken here is to respect the spirit of balanced eco-system and sustainability.

Sluggish Region

This region including Kazakhstan within its purview, show a medium level of productivity with low growth rate. The institutional framework, socio-economic conditions and infrastructural set-up go a long way in characterizing this type of region. Kazakhstan's large area, water scarcity, low density of population as well as unplanned virgin land programme are some of the main factors responsible for its existing agricultural productivity.

Acute-cum-Problem Region

These regions have low productivity with medium to low growth rate. Tadjikistan almost faces similar problems as faced by sluggish region so far agricultural productivity is concerned. In addition to other factors, certain socio-economic, geographical and technological forces play a deciding role.

The above productivity-cum-rural development regionalization scheme demands that in dynamic regions the productivity is not an issue area to be tackled but to control the evils created in the march of high growth rate, and refrain from reaching the stage like law of diminishing returns. The improvement in productivity should be focus of attention in stagnant and other problem regions. But the pace of development should not be at the cost of future as some meso-

regions have witnessed, particularly in pre-independence period.

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Economic Transition in Uzbekistan and Indo-Uzbek Economic Ties

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After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main economic objective of Uzbekistan has been its transition from the former socialist economy to market economy with the creation of a multisector economy, competitive environment and gradual price liberalisation. With that in view, Uzbekistan has taken several measures to develop its economy on market principles. Several laws have been passed with regard to ownership rights, entrepreneurship, de-statisation, privatisation and leasing etc. All these laws facilitate the development of a legal basis for the formation of market infrastructure. Similarly, as per the decree of the president of Uzbekistan, enterprises, organisations and private farmers can now make and exercise their own decisions. Reorganisation of the administrative ap-

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paratus and reorientation of its functions have been undertaken. In place of branch ministries and departments, new institutions have been created in the form of associations and concerns, particularly with regard to certain key sectors of the economy such as food industry, consumer industry, gas industry and so on. Even in the rural sector new economic relations are being introduced. 'Peasant farming' is gaining momentum. This is done with the creation of special 'land fund' in the republic. Family farming is being encouraged to cater to the market needs of the society.

From this brief overview it is evident that there is a qualitative change in the economic mechanism of Uzbekistan. Although the process of transition is not complete, due to various constraints and difficulties, the country has achieved considerable success in translating its objectives into reality. This was also due to specific in approaches and principles adopted by the country. The president of Uzbekistan, Mr. Islam Karimov once stated that the independent Uzbek republic should achieve economic independence in order to consolidate its political independence. For economic transition, however, one should not demolish one's own home before building a new one. In other words, Uzbekistan has made efforts to introduce changes in phases rather than bringing about abrupt total change. In this regard, it is claimed that the Uzbek model is substantially different from the approach of some other CIS republics. In particular, Uzbekistan has not proposed to introduce shock therapy which was once attempted by Russia.

In order to achieve the economic transition the country has set out the following principles.

- 1) The first principle is to decide the future of the country's economy. The country was under the influence of the Communist rule for about seven decades. But in the post-Soviet period its leadership has rejected the totalitarian command economy. According to Mr. Islam Karimov, there

was realisation of the adverse consequences of the old, inefficient and ideologically-oriented economic system. Moreover, Uzbekistan's one-sided and hypertrophied development as a raw material tributary of the former centre would have major effect for some time yet to come on the country.

- 2) The independent Uzbekistan has given primacy to economics over politics. This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet era when politics decided everything. This principle is being followed in all major issues concerning domestic as well as external developments in the country.
- 3) The leadership of the country is convinced that national interest will be better served if the state does not give up totally the management of the economy. In fact, the state has remained the main reformer in the transition process. The state sets priorities and the sequence of phases in which transition will take place. This is in contrast to the approach of several other CIS countries.
- 4) The Uzbek government has been taking measures for a strong social policy. This is done in view of the social and economic situation in the country where the leadership is convinced that there is need for social protection, particularly of the vulnerable strata of the population such as old people and children. This has also become necessary taking into account specific demographic, historical and cultural features of the country.

Economic Performance During 1992-1996

The break-up of the former Soviet Union has very adversely affected economies of all the former republics of the USSR. Uzbekistan is no exception. The immediate impact was severe economic crisis, with sharp decline in production, in all sectors of the economy, high rates of inflation, high level of unemployment and so on. The performance of the Uzbek

economy in terms of some major economic indicators for the period 1992-1996 was as follows.

Uzbekistan Economy 1992-96

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Real GDP%	-10.6	-2.3	-4.2	-1.2	1.6
Inflation%	645	534	1568	305	64
Population(Mln)	21.7	21.9	22.4	22.5	22.7
Budgetary Balance % of GDP	-18.4	-10.4	-6.1	-4.1	-3.9
Total External Debt Mln. US \$	60	1032	1194	1630	1925
Exchange Rate <i>Som.</i> vs \$	--	--	11.6	30.0	40

From the data contained in the table it is evident that there were negative growth rates in gross domestic product upto 1995 due to sharp fall in the output in industry, agriculture, construction etc. Similarly, inflation rate went very high in 1994 and has shown declining trend since then. Budgetary deficit has also gone down from over 18 percent in 1992 to below 4 percent in 1996. External debt has increased over the last 5 years and has reached nearly \$ 2000 mln. In 1996 as a result of large-scale foreign investment in the economy Uzbekistan introduced its own currency *som* in 1994 after breaking off from the *rouble* zone and even as per official sources *som* has devalued against *dollar* over the last two years which is a reflection of persisting economic problems.

However, there has been some improvement in the economic performance in 1996. Industrial output, particularly that of consumer goods, increased at moderate rate of 6-8 percent while agricultural production declined as compared to 1995 levels. Increase in capital investment of about 7 percent from all sources (that is including foreign investment) indicates the success of the efforts of the Uzbek government in attracting foreign investors. Similarly, significant rise in retail trade turnover is a reflection of growing dynamism of the privatised trading units in the country. This is also due to two-fold rise in the

income of the population. At the same time the number of unemployed persons increased by about 10 percent since absorption of labour in privatised units-in-low. Mr. Islam Karimov has observed that Uzbekistan has attained economic stability though other CIS countries are still facing economic crisis. Thus by 1996, Uzbekistan's GDP level was already 82 percent in comparison to 1990 level, while in Russia it was about 62 percent, in Bylorussia it was 60 percent, in Kazakhstan it was 45 percent and in Ukraine it was 44 percent. Among Uzbekistan's major achievement in the economic sphere is making the country self-reliant on two crucial items, namely foodgrain and oil. In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan being part of the 'Single Economic Complex', this aspect was not emphasised. But after the Soviet breakup it is considered necessary to be self reliant in these vital commodities. This is a qualitative change from the Soviet era. More than a million hectares of land is devoted to grain farming in order to increase foodgrain production to about 3.5 million tonnes. Similarly, in the case of oil with intensive exploration and exploitation of oil wells, the output has gone upto over 4 million tonnes in 1996.

External Economic Ties

After attaining independence, Uzbekistan has been active in establishing international diplomatic and economic ties with a large number of countries. It has been the explicit objective of the leadership of the country to open up and integrate the country with world economies. In this context the statement of the president of Uzbekistan that 'Uzbekistan is open to the world and the world is open to Uzbekistan' is very significant. It reflects the intention of the country not only to assert its sovereignty and independence but also to bring about a break from the Soviet era when Uzbekistan was totally under the control of Moscow. There were also economic imperatives for establishing closer external economic ties with other Central Asian countries which were considered to be economically

weak, financially deficit and hence dependent upon the centre for budgetary allocation. Uzbekistan badly needed external economic assistance for the development of its economy. Moreover, transition from socialist set up to market economy which involved privatisation, major structural changes and technical modernisation of production units needed vast resources which Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian states, lacked. Uzbekistan has been making efforts to get external economic assistance in addition to mobilising internal resources.

Major sources of international support have been international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For getting this assistance Uzbekistan became a member of these institutions after its independence. These international financial institutions have helped Uzbekistan through various schemes such as Systematic Transformation Facility, Current Stabilisation Fund, Cotton Subsector Development Fund and so on. An idea about the quantum of economic assistance can be had from the fact that during the period 1993-96 Uzbekistan has received about \$247 million from the World Bank alone. In 1995, the World Bank agreed to provide about \$160 million for strengthening the national currency *som*. The objective of the international financial institutions has been to help the economies in transition to support market building efforts by these countries. On its part Uzbekistan has made substantial progress in carrying out economic reforms and achieving economic stabilization. This has been appreciated by the World Bank and, as reported by the Interfax in 1996, Uzbekistan was considered as a priority country for investment. It is important to note that the support of the international financial institutions has helped Uzbekistan to get assistance from other sources as well.

Uzbekistan has been getting liberal assistance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank and so on. Besides international institutions, a large number of developed

countries have offered credits for general economic development and project assistance. In order to attract foreign capital, Uzbekistan has undertaken pragmatic policies of liberalising its economy by adopting laws on 'Foreign Economic Activity', relaxing import restrictions, removing bureaucratic controls for establishing joint ventures and attracting direct foreign investment. In May 1994, a law was passed concerning 'Foreign Investment and Guarantees of Activities of Foreign Investors'. This law comprising 34 articles is very liberal to attract foreign investment in any economic activity in the country - industrial, trading, banking, insurance etc. - wholly or jointly with local partners. They can acquire property, transfer shares, set up branches in Uzbekistan and can take away profits. The government guarantees the security or rights of investors for fulfilling their activities in accordance with general norms or international law.

The Uzbek government has initiated the process of creation of new infrastructure for promoting external economic relations with the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, setting up of the National Bank of Uzbekistan, Customs Committee and so on. It is a matter of great significance that efforts have been made for modernising the banking system in the country by way of creating inter-bank computer networks, introduction of electronic mail, creation of automatic inter-bank accounting system and so on. In order to achieve this, in a short period, it was resolved by the government to exempt, till 1st January 1996, all commercial banks including foreign banks from the payment of all taxes so that the money saved by banks could be used for modernisation and for attracting foreign consultants and providing training to bank personnel. Such measures may go a long way to overcome the constraints of poorly developed financial and banking structure in the country.

Joint Venture Activities

The Uzbek government has given great importance to joint venture activities as part of promoting its foreign economic relations and integrating with world economies. Besides passing laws to liberalise the economy for boosting external economic relations, the Uzbek government claims to have relaxed bureaucratic controls in order to attract foreign investment through joint ventures. The government has entered into agreements with several countries including the USA, Germany, UK, Turkey, South Korea for protecting rights and interests of foreign joint venture partners. As observed earlier, the Uzbek government holds shares in privatised units and in joint ventures so as to facilitate joint venture activities. Six major financing sub-departments of the ministry of Foreign Economic Relations dealing with foreign trade have been converted into joint stock companies. In such companies, the Uzbek government holds 51 percent of shares. Among the financial institutions which participate and promote foreign economic activities in Uzbekistan are Uzbek Invest, Promstroi Bank, Agroprom Bank and so on.

In order to attract joint ventures into the country, liberal tax concessions are given to foreign investors by the Uzbek government. The concessions vary on the share of foreign partner in the joint ventures-tax free concessions on profit for holding 51 percent and above in the total stock. The duration ranges from 2 years for trade and tourism, to 3 years for processing, agriculture, transport and 5 years in construction activities. There are additional incentives for joint venture activities which are engaged in manufacturing and also exporting activities.

Needless to state that Uzbekistan has the prerequisite for attracting foreign participation in joint ventures. As observed earlier, the country has opened up its economy through the policy of liberalisation. The country has rich resource potential

of gold and uranium deposits, non ferrous minerals, natural gas, cotton etc. In these items Uzbekistan is one of the leading countries in the world. The country has technically skilled labour force which is needed for modernising the economy. Moreover, Uzbekistan has proved its political and economic stability which is a major consideration for attracting foreign investment. Above all, the location of Uzbekistan in the centre of the Central Asian region, on the old silk route, gives it a unique advantage which accounts for nearly half of the total population of Central Asia, thus offering wide market opportunities for joint venture undertakings.

All these factors have enabled Uzbekistan to register over 3000 joint ventures out of which nearly 50 percent are already operating. They cover all sectors of economy, mining, industry, agriculture, transport and communication and trade. The Uzbek government is looking forward for joint ventures with foreign countries not only in capital but also in modern technology and equipment, managerial skills, training of qualified technical and managerial personnel in order to meet the demands of the domestic market with necessary goods and services. It is significant to note that Uzbekistan is looking forward to export its manufactured goods through joint ventures to enable the country to earn much needed hard currency.

Germany, USA, UK, South Korea, Turkey are some of the leading countries with a large number of joint ventures in Uzbekistan. Among the prestigious joint ventures are the Zaravshan-Newmont joint venture with the USA for gold mining, Daewoo automobile manufacturing firm from South Korea, Siemens from Germany in electrical equipment, and so on. Mention may be made of the fact that gold production of Uzbekistan has exceeded 70 tonnes per year, and the automobile factory at Asaka produces 200,000 cars and minibuses and Uzbekistan has taken pride in being an exporter of cars in a short period of its independence. The British firm Oxus Resources Corp. is to develop non-ferrous deposits at

Khondiza in Surkhaandarya Region in the southern part of the country which has rich deposits of lead, zinc, copper, silver, gold etc. Importance given to high technology, by the country, is evident from the fact that two Japanese firms Mitsui and NEC will install 380,000 telephone lines and build both fibre optic and microwave facilities.

In 1996, more than 30 large and 16 medium size and many small enterprises were set up in Uzbekistan. Among them mention may be made of the following: Kabul-Toytepa Textile joint venture, Uzslaman Textile Complex in Namangan Oblast and joint ventures for producing leather and fur goods. Total volume of direct foreign investment in 1996 was about \$1000 million which was more than twice the size of direct investment in 1995.

Importance given by the country to joint venture activities and the efforts made by the leadership to attract more joint ventures is evident from the views expressed by the deputy minister of Uzbekistan, Mr.M.Djalilov. He has opined (in an article in *Narodnoe Slovo* of 11th June 1997) that the foreign investor is protected under the law of the country. According to him, the republic has formulated legal basis for market economy and there is economic freedom for foreign investors as per the constitution. He has added that the country is working out legal framework closer to the international norms related to the IMF and World Bank etc.

With the experience so far gained with joint ventures and the new requirements of the country, the President of Uzbekistan, Mr.Islam Karimov, issued a decree on 30th November 1996 "About additional incentives, concessions to enterprises with foreign investment". As per this decree, there are some additional conditions. Like the fixed capital of the enterprise with foreign capital should not be less than \$300,000; one of the partners should be foreign entity; the share of foreign investment should not be less than 30 percent of fixed capital.

From this it appears that Uzbekistan is interested in joint ventures which are of medium and large size with capital investment of about one million dollars.

Foreign Trade

Foreign trade of Uzbekistan has been increasing rapidly since the country's independence. As per the latest World bank publication, imports and exports were as follows*.

	Imports		Exports	
	1994	1995	1994	1995
In US\$ (Million)	2609	2863	2690	3109
In Som(Million)	27975	86814	30311	95629

*(Source: *Statistical Handbook 1996, States of the Former USSR*,
The World Bank, Washington, 1996)

As per the above data, foreign trade has not only expanded significantly during 1994-95, but Uzbekistan has also been generating substantial surplus on trade account. Major product groups of imports are food, chemicals, textiles, metals and machinery. In 1995 machinery group of items accounted for over 40 percent of total imports which is an indication that the country has been giving high priority to economic development through technology imports of machinery for mining, processing of agricultural raw materials, industrial manufacturing in sectors such as automobile, telecommunication etc. Major items accounted for about 60 percent of total exports.

Even as the volume of foreign trade has expanded, another significant change has taken place in the foreign trade sector which relates to drastic change in the direction of trade. In the Soviet era, Uzbekistan's external trade was closely linked with other republics, particularly with the Russian republic. With the efforts made by Uzbekistan during the last five years, to integrate with the world economies, geographical distribution of Uzbekistan's foreign trade has changed which is evident from the data in the table*(overleaf).

Geographical Distribution of Foreign Trade
(In Million US\$)

	Exports		Imports	
	1994	1995	1994	1995
Total	2690	3109	2609	2893
of which				
CIS countries	1660	1283	1401	1259
Non CIS countries				
Europe	616	727	490	778
Asia	256	352	273	724
America	21	16	102	33

*(Source: *Statistical Handbook 1996, States of the Former USSR*,

The World Bank, Washington, 1996, pages 520-521)

From the above data it is clear that trade with the CIS countries has gone down to less than 50 percent, while non-CIS countries have been gaining importance in Uzbekistan's foreign trade. However, within the CIS group, Russia and the Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are important trade partners.

Europe has emerged as the major trading group and in that UK, Germany, Netherlands, few East European countries such as Hungary, Czech republic are major trade partners. UK is significant due to its position in international trade centre of metal exchange, cotton exchange etc. Among Asian countries, South Korea, Turkey, China, Japan are assuming significance. Among the rest of the countries USA has assumed great significance as a source of capital imports of machinery and equipments.

Uzbekistan has few important commodities which are its main sources of hard currency earning. These are gold, cotton, non-ferrous minerals, uranium etc. So far as gold mining is concerned, USA, Germany, UK are reported to be actively operating to gain control for joint exploration and processing of this precious metal in collaboration with the Uzbek government sponsored agencies. It appears that the president, Mr. Islam Karimov, is directly in charge of this item for signing protocols or memorandum of understanding. Similarly, so far as cotton is concerned, the prime minister is vested with final

authority for final allocation and export. Some of the foreign firms have contracted for 35-40 percent of total cotton output. Russia, a traditional buyer of Uzbek cotton, has been able to enter into long term arrangement to get access to about one third of output. Hence this leaves hardly 25-30 percent of non-contracted cotton for there may be many claimants including Turkey, China and some other CIS countries who offer a wide variety of goods such as grains, fabrics, etc. in the form of counter trade. In short, advanced countries are trying to establish a major hold over the key products of Uzbekistan which will have a great international significance in the future.

The Uzbek leadership is keen to rebuild business contacts and economic ties with Russia and other CIS countries. It is a matter of great significance that Uzbekistan along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have formed 'Common Economic Space' to promote subregional economic-cooperation under which transport of goods among them could be facilitated. Uzbekistan is also a member of Economic-Cooperation Organisation (EKO) and is actively promoting economic ties with Turko-lingual group of states, comprising Turkey, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan. Turkey has several advantages to forge economic ties with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries: geographical proximity, common religion, culture and traditions etc. Turkey has wide ranging economic ties with Uzbekistan and has been a major exporter of consumer goods to Uzbekistan. Turkey has been cultivating the Uzbek market by arranging exhibitions every 2-3 months, establishing a large network of joint trading ventures, promoting counter trade arrangements with Uzbek trading organisations and so on. Similarly, Pakistan and China are also actively cultivating the Uzbek market for trading in a wide range of goods and also for entering into counter trade arrangements.

Inod-Uzbek Economic Ties

Both India and Uzbekistan have been developing and strengthening mutually beneficial friendly political and economic relations. While the foundation of friendship between the peoples of India and Uzbekistan was laid decades ago during the Soviet era, it has been reinforced by the exchange of goodwill visits by the leadership of both the countries after Uzbekistan's independence. It is evident from the fact that India was the first country to be visited by the president of Uzbekistan, Mr. Islam Karimov. The establishment of diplomatic relations, exchange of visits at governmental and business levels are an added evidence that there is genuine desire on the part of both the countries to promote trade and economic relations.

Several Indian goods such as tea, coffee, spices, cigarettes, basmati rice are in demand in Uzbekistan. Similarly, Indian manufactured products such as textiles, garmets, medicines and pharmaceuticals products, pesticides and textile machinery may find easy acceptance in that country. For promoting the export of some of these items, the Government of India has offered credit lones to Uzbekistan since 1993. The construction of hotels in Tashkent and Samarqand by Indian firms should also contribute to expand economic ties between the two countries. In turn, Uzbekistan has been offering cotton, raw silk, non-ferrous minerals, fertilizer etc. An idea about expanding Indo-Uzbek trade can be had from the following:

Indo-Uzbek Trade
(value in Rs.lakhs)

	Uzbekistan		India	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1993-94	469	431	2258	2043
1994-95	2178	2618	4980	7886
1995-96	2303	3554	7236	7870

From the above data it is clear that trade between India and Uzbekistan has increased significantly during the last three

years - about five-fold in exports and eight-fold in imports from Uzbekistan. Thus, Uzbekistan is a country with high growth potential in trade. However, India has trade deficit with Uzbekistan, which means that there is enough scope to expand exports to that country. It may be added here that in addition to this official trade, there is significant volume of trade carried out by so called 'shuttle traders', who export a wide range of consumer goods such as garments, knitted wear, electronic goods, hosiery products etc. from India. While there are no reliable data on the volume of this trade, it is estimated that it may be about 20-25 percent of official trade volume. Another important feature of Indo-Uzbek trade is that, among Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan is an important trading partner of India as it accounts for nearly 25-30 percent of total trade with the Central Asian region. In fact, as of now Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan account for the bulk of India's trade with this region which is attracting the attention of the world market.

Notwithstanding this, the level of two-way trade achieved so far cannot be considered optimal or even satisfactory. As one Indian exporter put it, so far as India's consumer goods exports are concerned, it is mainly 'Briefcase trade'. This shows that there is wide scope for expanding trade with Uzbekistan. The prevailing low level of exports is mainly due to several constraints. For instance, the major constraint for expanding two-way trade is the absence of direct and easy transport route line. Except by air, exports to Uzbekistan have to be routed through third countries over long distances. The new rail - link between Iran and Turkmenistan is expected to reduce distance, and also the transport cost, as exports from India can be routed through Bandar Abbas in Iran. However, certain infrastructure and better handling facilities are needed for fuller utilisation of this route for trading with the Central Asian countries.

Finance is another constraint affecting trade. It appears that many Uzbek organisations lack funds for importing goods but can offer goods in return under counter trade arrangements.

This form of counter trade is not much practised by Indian firms, while many foreign countries seem to be widely accepting this practices. Moreover, during the initial years following the Soviet break-up, for most of the Uzbek trading organisations there was a general lack of awareness of the international trading practices. But this constraint seems to be getting over with the training of Uzbek graduates both at home and abroad in foreign trade. Similarly there is general lack of information for Indian trading community about the changes that have taken place in the former Soviet republics which are in transition and the wide scope that they offer for trade and other opportunities. There may be general information gap about the new institutions and organisations that are coming up as also about the reliability of partners for establishing business contacts.

India has also been developing economic relations with Uzbekistan through joint venture activities. These relate to both trading and manufacturing activities. Some of the leading joint ventures are: Bisleri Beverages, Gangadharan Appliances, Ajanta Pharma, Chemical International, Everest Agro Industries, Delhi Dairy Specialities and so on. In the field of pharmaceutical industry India seems to be doing relatively well. Besides Ajanta Pharma, Core Group of Ahmedabad is proposing to establish joint venture in Uzbekistan to produce much needed medicines and drugs in that country, not only for meeting the domestic market of Uzbekistan but also for catering to the Central Asia market. Some of the joint ventures have received credits offered by the Indian government.

The efforts made by India so far with regard to joint ventures are too inadequate, considering the scope that Uzbekistan may be offering. A few dozens of joint ventures by India are not significant as compared to over 3000 joint ventures that are registered during the last 5 years. While India may not be able to compete with the developed countries in setting up joint ventures, a much more active role by India's captains of industry in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian

countries seems to be urgently needed for mutual benefit of India and the Central Asian countries.

Prospects

India has good prospects to expand trade and economic co-operation with Uzbekistan. For achieving this there is need for well co-ordinated efforts on the part of the government, banking and credit institutions and private business community in India. It is more important to work out a viable strategy to promote trade and to make effective presence in the Uzbek market which will, eventually help trade with other Central Asian countries as well. Moreover, a strong political will supported by expeditious credit facility, is necessary to boost trade with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries.

Disintegration of Soviet Union: Its Impact on Russian Federation

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Introduction

The break down of former Soviet Union into fifteen independent states has given rise to a lot of speculation about the nature of economic, social and political transition through which these regions are passing. Attention of intellectuals has been mostly devoted to the economies of those regions which severed their relations with Soviet Union. The present paper, however, attempts to study the impact of disintegration on the Russian Federation. However the discussion is confined to the study of nature of economic relations and degree of independence among various republics of the former Soviet Union. The relevant secondary data has

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been collected from various World Bank Reports and from other official and un-official sources. Since the data covers a very small period, therefore, the result of the study be taken as tentative because it reflects only the short-run trends in the Russian economy.

Nature of Economic Relations and Degree of Independence among the Republics of Former USSR

The Russian Federation was the largest of the 'Union Republics' encompassing 76.2 percent of the former Soviet territory and representing 51.3 percent of the total population. Russia enjoyed a predominant share of the former Soviet economy. In 1991 it accounted for 61 percent of the G.N.P. Although overall foreign investment in Russia have been low, because of the closeness of its economy and unfavourable climate, they have been much higher as compared to other Soviet republics. Russian Federation has attracted 72.8 percent of total foreign investment capital of the former U.S.S.R.¹

Table I
Exports and Imports in 1990
(in millions of rubles foreign trade prices)

	Inter State Trade		External Trade		Total Trade	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Russia	86449	56583	46468	46506	132917	103089
Ukraine	35968	42468	7829	9301	43797	51769
Belarus	16043	17259	2010	3073	180053	20332
Uzbekistan	6889	10993	813	1296	7702	12289
Kazakhstan	8450	14570	1039	1900	9489	16470
Georgia	2852	4464	301	902	3153	5366
Azerbaijan	4576	4308	423	826	4999	5134
Lithuania	4155	7169	397	902	3153	5366
Maldov	2704	4947	237	837	2941	5784
Latvi	3939	4873	178	960	4117	5833
Kyrghystan	1954	2910	52	759	2006	3669
Tadjikistan	1643	3082	356	383	1999	3465
Armenia	1989	3155	64	500	2053	3655
Turkmenistan	2773	2438	114	306	2887	2744
Estonia	1951	3116	116	346	2067	3462

Sources:Gostomstat.

Russian Federation also had some advantage in respect of inter-regional trade. A study of Table I clearly reveals that Russia in 1990 had a favourable balance of payment position with all the republics except Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. This was not only due to its following the colonial practice of importing raw materials and agricultural products and exporting finished products but also because the Central authority giving directions to investments and resource utilization, was vested with Moscow.

A study of some of the important economic and social indicators lends credence to the above view point. A study of Table II (overleaf) shows that in respect of per-capita income, energy consumption, infant mortality, annual food consumption, availability of milk and eggs, and infant mortality, Russia was better placed as compared to other republics. The distribution of gasoline and diesel fuel to the agro - industrial complex in 1991 stood at 50 and 51 percent respectively for Russia and 21 percent and 18 percent for Ukraine. The corresponding percentage for the entire Central Asian region stood at 17 and 20. The distribution of grain combines, feed harvesters and corn harvesters gives a similar picture. The respective percentages for Russia stood at 64.6, 57.1 and 34.3 whereas for the entire Central Asian Region it was 15.4, 12.3 and 17.5².

These differences are vital in case of Central Asian republics as they also reflect glaring differences in the levels of development among the republics visa-a-vis Russia. Being conscious of the wide inter-regional differences in respect of levels of development, factor endowment position and differences in non-economic factors the Central authorities of the former U.S.S.R. deliberately adopted a policy of strong economic integration of different regions with the intention that increased dependence would counter all tendencies of republics to break away from the union. A policy of "regional

Table II

Some Economic and Social Indicators of levels of Development in 15 Republics in 1991

States	Population in millions	Per Capita income in Rubbles	Life Expectancy infant mortality	Energy Consumption per-capita in Kw's	Annual per-capita Food Consumption of milk and eggs in K.g's.
Russia	149	3780	69/2	5665.0	75/386/297
Ukraine	51.8	2410	70/17	N.A.	69/373/272
Belarus	10.2	3230	66/02	N.A.	73/425/323
Uzbekistan	21.5	850	69/42	N.A.	31/210
Kazakhstan	17	2160	69/30	4722.1	70/307/120
Georgia	5.4	2290	73/19	N.A.	46/289/140
Azerbaijan	7.1	1220	72/31	N.A.	34/292/143
Lithuania	3.7	2780	71/13	N.A.	84/480/305
Maldova	4.4	2090	68/23	N.A.	57/303/203
Kyrghystan	2.7	4120	69/18	N.A.	85/454/259
Tadjikistan	4.4	1220	66/37	11.47.6	51/266/154
Armenia	5.3	780	70/51	N.A.	70/307/111
Turkmeristan	3.9	2160	72/24	N.A.	56/446/163
Estonia	1.6	360	70/13	N.A.	84/487/289

Source: Completed from World Bank Reports and Official Soviet Statistics.

specialization" was pursued to achieve certain economic and political objectives.³ Productive inputs were so allocated that it resulted in the location of raw material sources in one place while their processing was done at another place. While productions of components was done in many areas, their assembling took place in one or two places. Over 2000 industrial products were produced at a single enterprise. In 209 of the 344 major commodity groups in industry, a single large enterprise account for more than half. In 109 cases, a single enterprise produced 90 percent of the total production⁴. All large-sized boilers were produced in one enterprise in Russia, and the smaller boilers in Ukraine. The oil submersible pumps were manufactured exclusively in Azerbaijan and steam piston pumps in Ukraine. All dycasting machines were produced in Maldevia, corn harvesters in Uzbekistan and fodder harvesters in Belarus. The country's requirements of sewing machines and irons were supplied by Russia and of air conditioners by Azerbaijan⁵.

Thus diverse pattern of resource allocation was present not only in industry but also in agriculture, giving rise to various agricultural zones. The Lower Volga Area in Russia and Lenkoran in Azerbaijan were termed as "Union Orchard". Ukraine emerged as the sugar belt and Central Asia specialized in cotton productions, while Belarus emerged as the main producer of potatoes.

Effect of Disintegration

Given the strong and extensive intra and inter-industry linkages implicit, in a highly closed integrated economy, merging of independent economic units is bound to have serious economic implications in all the newly formed states. The effect, of course, will vary from region to region, depending on the degree of dependence, factor endowment position, institutional setup and the direction given to the economies by the national leadership in each state. It would be difficult to encampass all

the variable and regions involved. Therefore, the subsequent discussion is exclusively devoted to the study of the effect of disintegration on Russian Federation.

With the break up of Soviet Union, Russian Federation lost control of some of the favourable factors that it enjoyed during the period of Communist rule. Since 1991 certain negative trends have set in which have adversely affected its production, structure of the economy, investment climate, demographic factors, pattern of foreign trade and the price-level which are likely to have far reaching influence on its future course of development.

One of the disturbing trends that has emerged is in respect of structural changes in its economy since 1990. The percentage contribution of agriculture industry and service sectors towards GDP is presented in Table III. The table shows that where as percentage contribution of productive sectors decline from 1992 onwards, the contribution of service sector increase from 33.3% in 1992 to 51.1% in 1994, thereby reflecting a negative trend in the economy, despite the fact that such a trend is not unexpected following the privatisation of the economy and growing number of people getting involved in self employment.

Table III

**Percentage Contribution of following sectors towards G.D.P.
in Russian Federation**

Sectors	1985	1990	1992	1993	1994
Agriculture	11.9	16.6	10.1	8.6	6.4
Industry	50.0	47.6	56.1	48.1	42.5
Services	38.1	35.8	33.3	43.1	51.1

Source: Trends in Developing Economics 1994, *Extracts*, Vol I; *Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, the World Bank, p. 83.

The macro-economic environment in Russia deteriorated dramatically in 1992. The production in Industry and agriculture fell sharply. Tractor production in Russia declined by 23%, the output of forges and presses by 35%, the production of mineral fertilizers fell by 21%, that of refrigerators by 14% and television sets 18%⁶. Such shortfalls were experienced by other republics also notably Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia. The decline in agricultural production and supply of raw materials resulted in a serious decline in the output of the food industry, chiefly milk and meat production. The output of meat was less by 25% in 1992 and the whole milk production declined by 55.60% in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. The profitability of enterprises declined. The share of enterprises, operating at a loss in Russia, increased from 11% in 1991 to 17% in 1992; from 13% to 14% in Uzbekistan and from 15% to 16% in Turkmenistan during corresponding period⁷. The fall in investment, lack of demand, decline in imports of raw materials and components, absence of comprehensive reforms, uncertainty with regard to shape of economic and political institutions and break up of economic linkages were the reasons for the crisis.

One of the direct manifestations of the serious economic crisis that engulfed the Russian economy was the unprecedented rise in the general price level. Inflation during 1992 reached 2300% and by 1993 1000%. During 1992 GNP declined by 19% and real wages by 32%⁸. The problem of instability affected investment environment adversely. Entrepreneurs preferred to hold assets in non-liquid form. Firms preferred short-term projects and many insisted on cash-on-delivery arrangements-frequent changes in exchange rate led to the break up of certain contracts, thereby aggravating business relations. The decline in economic activity and consequently in personal incomes, created sluggish demand for many services, especially personal services such as private health care, hair dressing, restaurants and tourism.

Another negative trend which emerged in Russia after 1990 was in respect of its foreign trade. The exports from Russian Federation, which stood at 82,600 million U.S. dollars in 1990, declined to 50,688 million in 1994, representing a fall of 28.6 percent. Imports declined from 82.870 to 36.253, representing a fall of 56.3 percent⁹.

The disintegration of U.S.S.R. led to sudden disruption of trade relations between the republics. Given the closed nature of their economics, every region felt the impact. The Central Asian republics were dependent on Russia for their energy needs, fertilizer, machine tools, agriculture machinery and processing of agricultural products. Russia, in turn, is dependent on other republics for cotton, uranium, natural gas, and other raw materials. Russia is dependent on Central Asia cotton for maintaining ten million jobs¹⁰. Russia with its huge oil and gas reserves is dependent on Ukraine. Ukraine is the transit route for more than 90 percent of Russian natural gas exported to eastern and western Europe¹¹. Thus capacity of Russian economy to recoup from the disastrous consequences will to a large extent depend upon the economic cooperation which the other republics will extend to it.

Some recent findings have also shown the disturbing trends in demographic factors. It has been estimated that in Russia a population of 150 million people die every year as the death rate exceeds the birth rate by 1.6 times¹². Further large inter-republic migration will have its impact not only on the economies of the republics they have, but also on the Russian economy. In the short run, such an inflow of resources will make its impact felt on the factory as well as on the indigenous product market, though its effects may be difficult to evaluate in the long run.

Conclusion

With the break down of former Soviet Union, Russian Federation lost control of various favourable factors which it

enjoyed during the period of unnatural and forced union of republics. These advantages were in the area of share of foreign investments, inter-regional trade, distribution and allocation of resources. Consequently, negative trends emerged which involved the entire economy into a serious crisis. The future course of development in Russia will be a function of a number of economic and political factors. The future trends will depend on the nature and success of reform measures adopted in the recent past in free - play of market forces including reforms in the financial sector and also on volume and nature of foreign assistance Russian leadership is able to attract. In this context, perhaps, the most crucial determinant would be the nature and extent of cooperation the Russian authorities are able to evoke from other republics, which should determine the profitability of its investment and access to foreign markets.

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Emerging Scenario in Central Asia

*B. K. Kaul Deambi**

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Central Asian states which formed part of the Union, declared themselves independent and emerged as republics. The people of these newly freed republics feel excited at being free and over zealous and eager to shape their own destiny and fashion their own identity. But, at the same time, they are beset with number of problems.

Prof. Yaacov Hoi of the Tel Aviv University points to the extremely complicated ethnic situation as it presently obtains in the Central Asian republics. He feels that the collective consciousness of the Central Asian people seems to be simultaneously sub-national, national and super-national which means

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that they tend to identify themselves both at the level of tribes such as Tekke, Legay and Manghyt or as Uzbeks, Kyrghyz and Turkmen or simply as Turks. What this complexity will mean in terms of their establishing a collective identity remains a matter of speculation. Though the ethnic tension have not become strident in these multi-ethnic republics the scene is complex and it is difficult to predict the future. In Uzbekistan 71 percent of the population is Uzbek and 8 percent are Russians. In Kazakhstan, Kazakhs are only 42 percent, Russian 38 percent and others 20 percent. The pattern in the three smaller republics is almost the same with the mix of the indigeneous and Slavic elements.

Islamic Identity

An important development that has taken place in the the Central Asian republics is the assertion of their Islamic identity. Despite all the rigours of Communist rule, the under current of Islamic System of values and practices have continued unabated in Central Asia. It is natural that with the death of communism a trend should be discernible towards resurgence of Islamic values and ideology in the six republics. Several Islamic countries have been working enthusiastically to see that this trend continues and grows in intensity. In this direction Saudi Arabia made a beginning by inviting the state recognised *muftis* and *ulema* of these countries to join the *Rabita-al-Islami* and by sending hundreds and thousands of copies of The Holy Quran to these countries for free distribution. Scholarships are being provided to young *mullahs* to study religion in Saudi Arabia. Even Pakistan donated two printing presses, provided scholarships for Muslim students to study in Islamabad and also promised establishing there a radio station. Libya donated large quantity of paper for printing religious literature. These countries have also made liberal donations for building of mosques and religious schools. Islamic University of Tadjikistan is to be built with Saudi money on the banks of

the Dushambe river where thousands of students will be imparted religious education. In Uzbekistan nearly 3000 students are already studying in two new Islamic schools built by Saudi Arabia. The number of mosques went up from 160 to some 5000 in one year. The Islamic forces have already begun to assert themselves as was evident from the recent elections in Tadjikistan where the Islamic Revival Party and its opposition democratic forces made an impressive showing. In Tadjikistan Iran has been holding cultural exhibitions and making generous donations by way of religious literature and printing presses. With the increase in the facilities for Islamic teachings and the Islamic permeation of culture Islam has registered a significant growth in the new republics but it is not clear what shape the Islamic resurgence takes in these republics.

Economic Scenario

The seven decades long Soviet rule in Central Asia led to an unprecedented economic development. The literacy rate also registered a significant growth. Considerable development was achieved in the fields of housing, health, transportation and industrialisation. However, the end of Soviet regime in the area has resulted in complete collapse of the economic order. The common man is suffering from shortages of food supplies and inflation. Even the Rouble which continued to be the common currency in Central Asian states has also collapsed. Political leaders are finding it very difficult to restructure the economy. The old party bosses in all these republics have been elected as New Presidents through universal adult franchise. Thus, though there is continuity of governance " it is not clear how the old-dyed-in-the wool CPSU cadres can be expected to bring about a market-oriented new economic system".

The Central Asian republics are rich in natural resources. Uzbekistan (population 21 million), the most populous among these republics, has a little oil and gas production and is largely dependent on its cotton produce. In area the biggest but sec-

ond in population to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan (population 17 million) produces 25 million tons of oil and will produce more once Tengiz field comes on stream. Because of its huge nuclear arsenal and rocket launching facility, Kazakhstan is also strategically important and can enter into advantageous economic deals with rich countries. Tadjikistan (population 5.2 million), bordering Afghanistan, depends mainly on agriculture and is least developed among the six republics. Turkmenistan (population 3.5 million) has some oil and gas production and a large cotton crop. Kyrghyzstan (population 4.5 million) has good agricultural potential. Except Kazakhstan, other republics are not too developed industrially.

The neighbouring countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are vying with one another for gaining a foothold in this vast new Muslim market with its rich array of raw materials, such as cotton, uranium, silk, natural gas, oil and above all nuclear arsenal.

Turkey

Though separated from Central Asia by the Caspian Sea, Turkey has developed close ties with the region. All the Central Asian republics except Tadjikistan speak Turkic dialects. The Turkish people are proud of their Central Asian descent. Turkey claims to be the first country to have embassies in all the Central Asian republics. It invited Turkmenian President Saparmurat Niyazov, Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kyrghyz President Askar Akayev who were effusive in their praise for Turkey. Leaders of the region's opposition parties such as Mr. Mohammad Salikh (leader of the Uzbek party "Erk") repeatedly cite Turkey as their model for democracy. The highly influential Persian speaking Tadjik Muslim leader, Qazi Akbar Turan-Jonzoda commented recently that "Turkey is the best religious and political example for us." The Kyrghyz President, Mr. Akayev, hailing the renewal of ties with Turkey as a historic and joyful event, has eulogised Turkey as a guiding star. Turgut

Ozal, President of Turkey, while speaking of the common history, deep cultural affinity and strong ethnic ties with the new Turkic republics of Central Asia, remarked, "Turkey the only secular representative democracy in the Middle east that hosts a free market economy is seen as something of a model for these newly emerged states. We are well placed to open new fields of cooperation with these states."

Central Asian leaders are overwhelmingly ex-communists. Although they have embraced the cultural aspect of the Islamic revival that swept through the region in recent years they are also determined not to copy Iran or Saudi Arabia's models of Islamic orthodoxy. They hope that by aspiring to Turkey's mix of moderate Islam and Western economics - the "Turkish Way" as Mr. Islam Karimov, the Uzbek President calls it, they will stave off the threat of radical Islam and ensure economic restructuring in the region.

Iran

Iran regards itself as the principal gateway to Central Asia. Since Turkey is a difficult and problematic entry point and Afghanistan is too much embroiled in internal turmoil to act as a link between Central Asian and the subcontinent, Iran accords topmost importance to building up intimate relations with the republics of Central Asia. The main thrust of new relationship is political, economic and technological. Iran has offered to build rail-road lines across the republics so as to provide them an opening into warm waters of the Persian Gulf. Last year it inaugurated Mashdad-Sarakhs-Tejan railway link which gave Tehran a rail-road connection with the "New Silk Route" formed within Central Asia. Iran has also promised to build a rail link from Ashkabad to northern Iran which would connect it to the Gulf. Iran has also offered a corridor through its own territory to India enabling to step up its economic activity. It has expressed its willingness to cooperate with India in achieving the common goal of thwarting the flow of radical and fundamentalist Islamic

stream into Central Asia. It is due to Iran's awareness of its own handicap in achieving this goal single-handedly as its religious influence in the area is restricted to Tadjikistan with which it shares common language. "We have no intention to export Islamic fundamentalism to Central Asia", said the Iranian interlocutor, "and we find the leaders of these republics anxious to build political and economic relations rather than forge Islamic contacts".

Afghanisan

What makes Afghanistan geopolitically significant in the Central Asian context is its being the main connecting land link to Central Asia for both Pakistan and India. The caravans, both political and cultural from Central Asia have had to pass through Afghanistan to reach the subcontinent. Hence, Afghanistan has always been a meeting point of the cross currents of different cultures and civilizations that grew up and flowered in Central Asia.

Afghanistan is microcosm for entire Central Asia. With its Tadjiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Aimags, Ismailies, Shias and Sunnis, it contains all the Central Asian elements in its population. What happens in Afghanistan has a direct bearing on Central Asia. Much depends on the outcome of battle for supermacy currently going on in the war-ravaged country between the forces of Northern Alliance backed by Iran and the Taliban backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan

Pakistan is trying to outpace all other countries in building relations with Central Asia and seems to have reaped some success in this direction. As the Communist regime in Central Asia was over-thrown, Pakistan vied with other neighbours to send aid and contribute liberally for the revival of Islam in the Central Asian republics. Pakistani delegations have been frequently touring the republics and Pakistani Government has

offered credits to enable them to import Pakistani manufactured goods. It has also promised to buy gas from Turkmenistan and pipe it out through its sea ports. Pakistan is also, believed to be trying to acquire weapons and enriched uranium from Tadjikistan. To promote its political and economic interests Pakistan is earnestly trying to construct roads linking Islamabad to Central Asian capitals. It has already obtained the approval of Economic Cooperation Organistaion (ECO) to strengthen the existing Karakoram Highway at a cost of Rs. 3.07 billion. The proposed upgradation of the highway will be accomplished after using over 80,000 tonnes of explosive material and will link Pakistan with China, Kyrghyzstan and Tadjikistan. Pakistani analysts openly admit that the Karakoram Highway will be an important trade "conduit" connecting Pakistan with the Central Asian states and eastern China, allowing for a lucrative two-way commercial arrangements.

However, Pakistan's penchant for exporting radical Islam to Central Asia rather than building sound economic relations with the Central Asian republics has stood in its way of achieving what it was capable of achieving. An editorial published in the News commented, "Pakistan has managed marginal success in connecting regional and neighbouring states but it is far from what is possible with the proposed road and rail link and an oil pipe line running through western Afghanistan to connect the Central Asian states to Pakistan and its seaports still to be implemented, the rich economic potential that could be exploited remains untouched."

The proposed upgradation of the Karakoram Highway in one of the most difficult terrains in the world as it is fraught with numerous hurdles and obstacles. It is prone to frequent falling of rocks and land slides and during last year a major portion of the Highway was washed away in flash floods. It is doubtful whether this 900 km. long highway involving lot of recurring expenditure and high degree of engineering and technical skill for its upkeep and maintenance will be commercially viable.

Pakistan's hands are presently too full in Afghanistan and is having little time at its disposal to attend to its interests in Central Asia. Perhaps it feels its interests in Central Asia would be better served if it succeeds in its game of getting a government of its choice in Afghanistan.

India

With India, Central Asia has had very close political and cultural ties since ancient times. In medieval period these ties reached new heights and even in the modern period India has forged special cultural and economic links with Central Asia. Ever since Jawahar Lal Nehru visited the Central Asian states in 1956 and 1961 there has been a tradition of exchanging scholars, intellectuals, scientists and artists between India and Central Asia. Large number of Indian students have been studying in the University and other institutions of higher learning in Tashkent. Dance ensembles and ballet troupes from these republics have been visiting India for years. Indian movies and Indian music are popular throughout Central Asia. Presidents and delegations of each of these republics have come to India in recent times to seek economic cooperation and strengthen bilateral ties. There is significant amount of warmth and affection for India amongst the peoples of the republics. India has reciprocated in equal measure. Indian leaders and official delegations as also cultural troupes have visited the republics in recent years.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has left the Central Asian republics in a very poor state of economy. Despite producing 65 percent of Soviet Union's cotton and silk, Uzbekistan has remained a poor country. Its rich deposits of gas, oil, coal, lead, copper, gold and marble have not been able to lead the republics to a desirable economic status. What is true of Uzbekistan is true of other republics as well. "The adoption of market economy by the newly independent states", remarks S.K.Singh, "will require a lot of restructuring and re-

training of personnel in fields like banking, foreign trade, insurance, introduction of computer for management and marketing techniques. Privatisation of public sector units will mean organising shares and stocks, stock exchanges and building up new style cadres with marketing and managerial skills. In these areas they wish to seek India's help. Indian envoy in Tadjikistan, B.P. Muthu Kumar, has emphasized the need to set up a string of Indian Trading houses in the private sector. 'Their representative, "says he, "could survey the vast market all over Central Asia for basics like tea, sugar and rice to agricultural implements, light engineering goods. India could also help in food processing and leather processing". He adds, "There are no huge investments needed, but sky is the limit if we go about it with patience." There is acute shortage of consumer goods and India has the capacity to manufacture most consumer items.

However, Indian Journalists who have toured the Central Asian republics during recent years have found that the Indian response to the economic needs of these republics has not been very positive, quick and sufficient. Thus Mehendra Ved of the Times of India, in one of his write-ups, observes, "Lack of information and perhaps enterprise is keeping away the Indian entrepreneur from Central Asian republics where a virtually uncharted terrain exists for trade and manufacturing activities. Indian presence is a big zero in the multimillion dollar. The multinational cooperations have already bagged large tracts for exploration of oil and gas along the Caspian Sea in Turkmenistan. In Tadjikistan gold and silver mining is one of the many areas Indians could venture into but have not. Indian traders have by and large kept away from these virgin markets where practically everything is imported. Reluctance to move away from Moscow and reach out to Central Asia has kept the bilateral trade with each of the five republics at dismal levels". What is being frittered away, laments Ved, is not just business opportunities but the tremendous goodwill for India that is professed by the people of the republics who are struggling to

reach out. "Opportunities", says he, "do not knock twice at the door of nations at a time of intense international competition to build new economically productive relations".

The biggest hurdle of trade growth between India and Central Asia has been the unsettled conditions in Afghanistan and India's poor relations with its neighbour, Pakistan. This has sealed the age old land routes between India and Central Asia. To overcome this difficulty Iran has repeatedly offered India direct access through its territory to the Central Asian republics. But here too India has been too slow and sluggish to take advantage of this offer.

To conclude, the future of the Central Asian republics, confronted with manifold problems, is beset with uncertainties. It is not yet clear whether they will completely shake off the vestiges of the Soviet regime and find altogether new bearings; or whether they will continue to be the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States or whether they will strike a new path for themselves. They have to restructure their shattered economy and build up their own defence and security. They have to deal with the new problems concerning language, script, religion and cultural conditions. The republics are predominantly Muslim in population but here Islam has grown under secular administration. It is not clear whether they will keep up their age old tradition of religious and ethnic harmony or will succumb to the forces of radical and fundamentalist Islam under political and economic pressure. Political analysts feel that purely religious oriented appeal to them is likely to prove counter productive as they are primarily beset with bread and butter questions. The secular and democratic countries like India and Turkey should come forward to help the republics reshape their economy, solve their basic problems of food, shelter and clothing, including health and education, and enable them to come out of the present atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion.

Central Asia, Iran and Turkey

*Jagdish P.Sharma**

Among the West Asian states, Turkey and Iran have a special relationship with the Central Asian states. Both Iran and Turkey are neighbours of Central Asia, one is a geographical neighbour while the other is a close neighbour. Both have had connections with Central Asia since earlier times. Since 1991, both Iran and Turkey offered themselves as role models for the socio-economic and political development in the newly independent Central Asian states. In my paper, I am dealing with the relations of Iran and Turkey with the states of Central Asia since 1991.

With the disintegration of Soviet Union in mid-1991, a new chapter in the history of Central Asia opened, the

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emergence of the states of Central Asia. At the end of 1991, five sovereign republics of Central Asia became independent, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, and Turkmenistan. Stretching over a vast territory, the new Central Asian states are situated in a geo-strategically important region of Asia - a confluence-point for South, West and East Asia. The states of Central Asia have geo-political, strategic and economic importance for both Iran and Turkey, as well as for China, India and Russia. During the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics were extremely dependent upon the Soviet Union. Now they are seeking to diversify their economies or promote their trade. They are involved in the process of elaborating their own mechanisms of foreign economic activities. One of the main directions of the foreign economic policy (FEP) which is being carried out by the Central Asian states, could be defined as follows: "Establishment of a new system of FEA based on market economy and search for new effective ways of cooperation based on the neutral status of these states". It (FEA) envisages establishment of new foreign economic relations (FER) between the Central Asian states, particularly Turkmenistan, and the rest of the world on a new foundation; priority is given to bilateral relations and to closer bilateral integration in different fields of economy¹. They had to cope with the onerous task of consolidating their new found independence. They are in the process of consolidating their border and developing their own currencies, customs, posts, armies and embassies. In January 1993 the presidents of the Central Asian states held a summit in Tashkent and announced that all necessary conditions had been met for the formation of a Commonwealth of Central Asian states. Encouraged by the United States and Turkey, the governments of Central Asian states decided in January 1993 to establish an inter-governmental coalition to be known as the Central Asian Regional Union (CARU). The CARU was basically formed on the basis of their common ethnicity, Turkism. The founders also expressed a commitment to the concept of creating a greater

Turkistan. The CARU rang alarm bells in Iran but also alerted the Kremlin in Moscow, China and, to an extent, India. The CARU was applauded by the United States, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Even before the official end of the Soviet Union the loosening of ties between Moscow and the Central Asian Muslim republics had brought down the Islamic "Iron curtain". After 70 years of separation from their ethnic and religious fraternity Soviet Muslim eagerly began to seek contact and acquaintance with them. The most dramatic manifestation came in January 1990, when large crowds from Soviet Azerbaijan tore down the border posts and poured into Iranian Azerbaijan. Since then official and unofficial contacts between Soviet Muslim republics and other Muslim countries have multiplied. For obvious ethnic, cultural and historical reasons, Iran and Turkey have emerged as principal poles of attraction. But other Muslim countries, including such key Arab states as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have not been absent from the scene. Saudi Arabia in particular has been extensively involved in Central Asia through encouraging Islamic education. Iran and Turkey have an added geographical advantage. Landlocked Central Asian states also realise that their access to the sea can be attained mainly through Iran.

The Iranian leadership is aware of this geographic imperative. In fact, large areas of Central Asia fell within the orbit of the Iranian world for a long period. Iran gradually lost them to the imperial Russian advances in sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Iranians reacted swiftly as the Central Asian republics started opening up². Immediately Iran has proposed to Central Asian leaders "the revival of the silk route".

The Iranian proposal involves building of road links and land routes between the Central Asian states and Iran. Agreements were reached initially to build a 200 kilometer rail road line from Mashhad to Sarakhs linking Iran with Turkmenistan, and an additional 300 km of line in Kazakhstan connecting Iran to China and the Pacific. Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati,

former foreign minister of Iran, in his January 1995 visit, made a strong appeal for Indo-Iranian cooperation for tapping economic opportunities arising out of the opening up of the Central Asian states. He specifically mentioned the areas of oil and gas, textiles, railways and light and heavy engineering where scope for such cooperation existed. He pointed out that Iran was building rail links with the CIS and India, with its expertise in the field, could help in achieving this. He also said that CIS were known to have the second largest reserves of gas in the world and Iran would like to tap this. India could set up joint fertiliser plants in Iran which could supply the nutrient to India. He also said that CIS had a good supply of cotton and both India and Iranian companies could think of buying the commodity and processing it on a contract basis³. Accordingly in a path-breaking move, India, Iran and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in April 1995 that provided access to Indian goods to the Central Asian states through the Iranian land route. It can be upgraded into a treaty and would improve trade and economic cooperation between the three signatories, besides increasing the flow of transit between Central Asia and India through Iran⁴.

In addition to establishing bilateral diplomatic relations with all Central Asian states Iran embarked on a number of regional initiatives, including the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) and organising the states bordering on the Caspian Sea. The latter initiatives brought together Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. This opened for the Central Asian states in the north, to the Arab world in the South-west and to Turkey and Europe in the West. Iran's skilful diplomacy sprang into action at the sixth meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which ended on December 11, 1991 at Dakar, the capital of Senegal. There Iran with determination set itself up as an alternative to Saudi Arabia as the world leader of Islam. Hashmi Rafsanjani, the President of Iran, sponsored a proposal for admitting Central

Asian states to the OIC, and also presented Azerbaijan's delegates, Sheikh-ul-Alam Allan Shakur Pashazade (Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Caucasian Muslims) and Kazakhstan's deputy foreign minister, Sailau Batyrshaurly. In January 1992, with president Niyazov of Turkmenistan and Velayati in attendance, Iran and Turkmenistan opened the border of the two states. The two dignitaries signed a memorandum of cooperation that provided for work to begin on the construction of the railway line to link Turkmenistan with Iran. In March 1992, the two states entered into an economic agreement. Valued at over \$ 80 million, it provided for barter of Turkmenian "goods and raw materials" for use in the Iranian industry. As in the case of Turkmenistan, relations between Iran and Kazakhstan, too developed rapidly after the establishment of diplomatic relations in early 1992. In February 1992, Foreign Minister of Tadjikistan, Mr.Hakim Kayumov met Rafsanjani, the President of Iran and expressed Dushanbe's desire for "cultural, political and economic cooperation" between the two states. During the Ashkabad summit in May 1992, Iran established diplomatic relations with Kyrghyzstan and Uzbekistan, both the states were interested in socio-cultural and economic cooperation with Iran. In early February 1992, the Uzbek trade delegation visited Iran, Turkey, and other West Asian countries. In addition to bilateral relations, the Islamic Republic of Iran also embarked upon a number of regional initiatives designed to promote its image as the leader of the Muslim World and as a major outside player on the former Soviet Muslim scene⁵. Ignoring Washington's strong advice to avoid tightening economic links with Teheran, Turkmenistan's President, Saparmurad Niyazov, signed a memorandum of understanding with the leaders of Iran and Turkey at the summit of the Economic Conference Organisation (ECO) in Ashkabad on 14 May 1997 for a pipeline to carry an annual load of 30 bn. cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan. The \$ 7 bn. project, with Iran footing the bill for the pipeline in its territory, estimated at \$ 3.5 bn, is expected to be completed by A.D.2002.

On 13 May, 1996, President Rafsanjani of Iran inaugurated a rail link between Iran and Central Asia. This inauguration ceremony was attended by 11 heads of state and dignitaries from over 50 countries. Rafsanjani said the \$ 210 m. railway would benefit peace and stability in the region by moving two million tonnes of goods and half a million people between Iran and Turkmenistan.

The relationship of Iran with the Central Asian states does not have to be looked at from one dimension only but from multi-dimensional angles. Apart from the geo-political, economic and geo-strategic factors, the most important aspect of Iranian-Central Asian relations is the cultural identity and linguistic affinity between them. Both the regions demonstrated good will, preserverence, and affinity between them. The record of Iranian - Central Asian relations over the past few years has been extremely positive. Both sides seem to be willing to further nurture these fruitful relations⁶.

Turkey has valuable assets of its own in Central Asia. Turkey endeavoured to establish itself as a major outside participant in the affairs of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. It serves as a bridge of friendship and cooperation between the East and the West, the North and the South. It promotes harmonious and mutually beneficial relations with all countries, large or small, near or far⁷. In addition to geography, (except Tadjikistan) Turkey has historic, ethnic, religious and linguistic affinity with the Turkic - speaking Central Asian states. Tadjikistan is a cultural continuation of Iran. While Turkic peoples have many common ethnic and linguistic characteristics, there are also vast differences among them. For example, various Turkic dialects are not mutually intelligible. However, Turkey is an important player in these states. Though none of the countries involved (Iran, China and Turkey) has so far moved to overshadow Russian influence, their efforts, particularly Turkey's economic endeavours largely help to lessen the region's dependence on Russia. Turkey made vigorous

attempts to project itself as their sole-model. Islam, secularism, democracy, free market economy and pro-western orientation were high lighted as the four major components of its identity that needed to be adopted by the Central Asian states. Turkey has given large credits to Uzbekistan (\$ 500 million), and Kyrghyzstan (\$ 75 million), in addition to establishing television links and cultural exchanges with them. The Turkish President, in his February 1995 visit to India, laid considerable stress on the possibility of Indo-Turkish joint ventures in the third countries. The Central Asian region is an area where the potential for cooperation is immense because of the ties both countries have in this region. India along with Iran is a familiar friend, while Turkey, with its secular and democratic polity, is seen as a model which the Central Asian states would like to adopt⁸.

Turkey had moved to establish its presence in the Central Asian states even prior to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In 1990, Ankara reacted favourably to Azeri and Kazak requests for cooperation in telecommunications and signed an economic and cultural cooperation agreement with Turkmenistan. In November 1991, Turkey was the first country to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan and, in December, it extended recognition to and expressed an interest in developing closer relations with all the other Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. In addition, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrghyzstan visited Ankara and emphasized the ethnic ties that bind their people with Turkey. Relations between Uzbekistan and Turkey entered into a new phase with the signing of agreements on cooperation in spheres of economy, trade, transport, communications, culture, education, science, the media, tourism and sports in mid-December 1991. Prospects of friendship between Kazakhstan and Turkey remained limited because Ankara initially proved reluctant to invest money in the Kazakh economy. Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey, in his April 29, 1992 visit to Alma Ata, offered \$ 200 million in credit as well as help in a number

of major projects. Turkish firms took lead in assisting Kazakhstan in oil exploration, construction of oil refineries and an electric power station, laying of pipeline to Turkey, reconstruction of the port of Aktau, transport of Kazakh goods from the Caspian to the Black Sea and distribution of Kazakh goods in Turkey. Thus, Demirel's visit to Kazakhstan provided an important stimulus to the development of Kazakh-Turkish relations. In addition to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan were the other Central Asian states with which Turkey attempted to establish close relations⁹.

The emergence of independent states in Central Asia had generated great interest in this part of the world. This interest has grown with the discovery of enormous oil and gas reserves. As far as the role of Iran and Turkey is concerned both have brought a measure of economic opportunities to the region. Both see Central Asia as a large and profitable market with great potential. The governments of both countries have taken an active part in encouraging their respective business communities to expand their dealings with the CIS. They have also opened credit lines to export their products to the Central Asian states, though, in this respect, Ankara with Western backing, has been much more active than Tehran. Nevertheless, both Iran and Turkey, due to their geographic location and economic opportunities they offer, still remain significant regional players in Central Asia. Both are keen to strengthen the political, economic and cultural stability in the region.

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Social Transformation in Tadjikistan during the Soviet Period.

Prem Lata

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has thrown up several issues that require an in-depth research and critical examination. It is true that a greater amount of discontent was prevalent in the society which finally led to the breaking up of the USSR. However, it may be mentioned that some peripheral regions did undergo major changes in their socio-economic set up during the socialist period. Tadjikistan is one such relatively remote Central Asian republic that saw significant social and economic transformation during this period. Tadjikistan has undergone major socio-economic changes since the early 1930's. These changes transformed the old tribal-feudal set up leading the society towards modernisation.

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Broadly speaking, under modernization a society strives to reduce illiteracy and encourage economically productive skills in the field of education; the status of women is redefined and secular beliefs start replacing traditional and religious dogmas. Apart from this, extended kinship units lose some of their persuasiveness giving way to greater geographical and social mobility. Finally, modernization leads to breaking up of rigid hierarchical social stratification.

Agrarian reforms of the earlier decades in Tadjikistan not only led to major economic changes but also caused some fundamental alterations in the socio-cultural fabric of the society. First of all, the institutional constraints on the growth and development of the society then prevalent, were effectively removed. Similarly, one observes remarkable improvement in education, status of women, health facilities, mortality rate, higher life expectancy and higher living standard. However, alongwith this, one sees a number of traditional elements still persisting such as high population growth rate, big size of households, comparatively restricted urbanisation and low labour mobility etc. It reveals coexistence of the old and the new or the traditional and the modern in the society. Besides, the attempts of social transformation did not have uniform and upto desired level impact in the region. To elaborate on some of the indicators which reflect social change, one can say social transformation is a phenomenon where economic prosperity and education complement each other. Education is both a cause as well as the result of development. The task to remove mass illiteracy in this region began with setting up of an extraordinary commission on illiteracy liquidation in mid 20's. By the end of the first decade effective results were achieved in this field. Where only 3.3 percent population in the age group of 9-49 was literate in 1926, the figure rose to 82.8 per cent in 1939. After almost complete eradication of illiteracy in the first-stage, efforts were made for qualitative improvement during next 2 decades. Compulsory middle-level education was

effectively implemented during the 9th five year plan (1971-75). Though a lot was achieved yet in comparison with the achievements of other republics of the USSR much remained to be done, especially in rural areas where higher education is yet to pave its way and rural population outnumbers the people living in urban areas in being deficient in this respect. The situation had not improved much till 1979 when out of 1000 persons, above the age of 9 years, 86 were recorded as having higher education in the urban areas and only 27 persons in the rural areas. However, for secondary education, the disparity between the two was not much. Nevertheless, Tadjikistan's performance in secondary and higher education remained poorest. It not only lagged behind as compared to the whole of the USSR but also in comparison to other Central Asian republics.

Related to the development of education is the question of the choice of the medium of instructions. It is more important for a non-Russian nationality. An optimal situation in a multi-lingual country demanded a focus on bilingualism especially in Central Asian context - only 29.6 percent of the total population registered itself as bilingual in Tadjikistan as per 1979 census. Keeping in view the special place given to Russian language at the union level and in the spheres of technical and higher education, not knowing Russian was certainly disadvantageous to Tadjiks as it restricted their movement in higher technical education.

Creation of a nation in terms of homogeneity of territory and the culture was the essence of Soviet policies. Loyalty to the revolutionary ideas was another important point of integration with non-Russian people. Infact, *Druzhiba Narodov* or the friendship of the Tadjik, the Russian and other Soviet people was the means of drawing Tadjiks within the orbit of Sovietization. The creation of Tadjik - Soviet culture basically meant the grafting of the Soviet content into progressive elements of the traditional culture. An overview of the entire

period shows that the main consideration of the Soviet state was to gain leadership through educational and cultural programmes. To Western scholars the means adopted were atrocious and oppressive to local culture. However, one doubts if the common people of Tadjikistan or even the intelligentsia felt culturally oppressed in the Western sense. A Tadjik history, free of Soviet bias and Western anti-socialist propaganda, is awaiting academician's attention.

Nowhere was the impact of modernization on Central Asian society as striking as it was in the case of the position of women. Traditionally women had considerably low status within the family and the entire social order. They were deprived of all rights and were kept ignorant and isolated from the outer world. Women were given equal and active role, legally under the new socialist system. The forceful *hujum* campaigns of the early years, encouraged the women to discard some customs as bride - price, polygamy and women's seclusion in *ickuari* etc. Contrary to muslim custom, women were allotted land and were drawn into production on a large scale by the end of 1930's. Women, who were completely forbidden to go out of the house in order to earn, formed 39 percent of the workforce by 1980. It was quite an impressive change. Almost all women of the republic started receiving primary education in the post-war period but their attendance in the secondary and higher educational institutions remained rather low till the end of the 1970's. As women in Tadjikistan started from a very low level and suffered from various cultural and religious restrictions, their achievements need to be evaluated after considering these restraints

One third of all deputies of Supreme Soviet of Tadjikistan in 1980 were women. Some women like Nizoramah Zifarova, Makufrial Karimova, Anzorat Rakhimora and Hamrah Tashirora even held high offices. About 20.5 percent members of the CPSU of Tadjikistan were also women, in 1981.

The women also started taking active part in various performing arts. It was hardly possible to imagine a women performing or managing stage affairs, a few decades ago, in Tadjikistan. However, all these improvements did not exactly make it easy for them to achieve equal status in society. Though they were having equal rights but whether they had equal status remained debatable. In a strongly patriarchal and male dominated society, they remained dependent on men for all crucial decisions despite their education and economic independence. They were forced to accept a second rate status compared to men in all aspects. The continuation of old tradition of *kalyam* further undermined their position in Central Asia.

The practices of orthodox Islam prevalent in Tadjikistan were quite at odds with the demands and ideas of the reconstruction of the socialist society. Therefore, ordinances were issued in order to separate state and education from religion. The *wagf* land, the main source of income for religious institutions, was liquidated. Muslim *shariah* and *adal* laws were replaced by the civil Soviet code of laws. However, the Soviet Tadjikistan's war with religious ethos did not cause serious loss to Islamic tradition. Islamic customs were effectively practised at home, if not outside. Officially there were no religious institutions but the children were taught the Quran and other religious principles and practices in a close domestic circle by parents, grand parents and friends. For religious sessions and prayers, Tadjiks gathered in each others houses. Even in *chaikhans*, clubs and other gathering places, *namaz* was often being offered. During 1980's, the unofficial religious activities among Tadjiks were on the increase. Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, these covert religious activities came to the open in a big way with deep political overtones. However, they failed to develop constructive channels. Revived traditional religious values could not be balanced against the secular prepositions of the different state institutes in Tadjikistan.

This failure resulted in deep crisis, engulfing every sphere of human life in Tadjikistan during the post- Soviet years.

Among other important social changes in Tadjikstan the important one is that the large families began to breakup under the pressures of new economic demands. Although small nuclear families had not completely replaced the big joint families yet their size became smaller. The average size of a family in Tadjikistan also came down though it remained largest among the republics of the USSR. Average number of children born to a Tadjik woman was highest among all nationalities. This accounted for the highest rate of population increase in Tadjikistan between 1950-1984. The higher birth rate is related to comparatively lower rate of economic development, lower position of women in Tadjik society, lack of awareness of birth control methods, and persisting hold of old customs and traditions in the society.

Urbanisation is another important indicator of social transformation. Most of the population of Tadjikistan continued to live in rural areas, and peasantry formed the biggest social group till the end of the last decade. Industry was almost absent in Tadjikistan before the Soviet period. Therefore, despite rapid industrialisation and very high industrial growth rate, Tadjikistan did not register the level of industrial development experienced by some other republics. Notwithstanding immense urban population growth rate during Soviet period, the republic remained one of the least urbanised republics of the USSR. This can also be attributed to the republic's specialization in cotton cultivation. Since the labour requirement for cotton cultivation, on an average, is six times higher than for the cultivation of grain, it leads to proportionately higher retention of labour in rural areas. Secondly, higher procurement price for cotton provided better incentive to rural population to remain attached to their old occupation than to shift to urban areas for seeking employment in industry. Low level of bilingualism among rural population also acted as deterrent to their

migration to urban areas. Extension of modern amenities such as schools, modern means of transport and communication, health facilities, water, electricity and other infrastructural facilities in rural areas, further reduced the migration. In short, limited higher education and lesser mechanisation of farming, especially on private farms and continuation of some socio-cultural factors - all contributed to the lower level of urbanisation in Tadjikistan.

Changes in class structure of the Tadjik society, alongwith other Central Asian people, are also quite significant. The traditional class stratification of the Tadjik society gave way to socialist structure. The social classes and groups of the early period i.e. landlords, traditional intelligentsia, small peasants, share croppers, landless farmers, petty traders and industrial entrepreneurs and a few industrial workers, all disappeared during the Soviet-period. In the new socialist order, there were two basic classes: the working class and the collective farm peasantry. Increase in the number of workers, manual and mental, during this period certainly shows social mobility which resulted from rapid economic development. However, the existence of a hierarchical social structure cannot be denied after looking at the political and administrative power set up.

In short, general standard of living rose immensely as a result of rapid industrial growth and increase in agricultural output. Socio-cultural development was also rapid in Tadjikistan as compared to the adjacent parts of its neighbouring countries like Iran, Afghanistan, India and China. Life expectancy, infant mortality, level of adult education, gross national product and per-capita income are some of the indicators that strongly substantiate the above mentioned inferences. However, it can hardly be denied that the general standard of living in Tadjikistan still remain lowest as compared to other republics of the former USSR.

Finally, social transformation is not synonymous with development or modernization. Modernization is a complex process. Though economic process forms its basis, an increase in gross national product or per-capita income does not fully cover this phenomenon. It not only encompasses many other socio-cultural aspects but also requires the very transformation of the nature and outlook of man. This transformation is both means to an end as well as an end in itself. A modern man must have willingness and openness to new experiences, innovations and changes. He must be oriented towards efficiency and planning. Numerous attempts were made in this direction in Tadjikistan. Though, the region responded favourably to some extent but still a lot remained un-achieved. Development of the mountain regions of Tadjikistan without long-term prospective for a comprehensive and harmonious socio-economic development and the forcible transformation of farmers and craftsmen into an industrial and agricultural *proletariat* hit them badly, hence the traditional elements of the society belonging to an economically unfavourable region could easily be influenced by the ecological agenda put forth by the movement for Islamic resurgence of Tadjikistan. The interlocked issues of ecology, economy and culture account for today's turmoil in Tadjikistan.

The present day Tadjik man is a product of history: the revolution, technological advancement, planned endeavours of the leaders of the erstwhile Soviet state and persistence of the old traditions and values. Thus we see in Tadjik society the elements both of continuity as well as change which link it with not only modern but also with post-modern world of great technological communicational revolution. Tadjikistan, the socio-cultural milieu of which changed to a great extent during the Soviet rule, still continues with many of its pre-Soviet social and cultural structures and values which are in fact quite relevant even after the collapse of the Soviet regime. It is important to remember that there is no contradiction between continuity and change; infact, the two are complementary.

The Tadjik Cauldron

P. L. Dashr

The Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union faced the sudden challenge of building new nation-states. While breaking away from the erstwhile union, they made it sure not to lose their identity in the emerging Commonwealth of Independent States. Hounded by the legacy of their Soviet past, with a disappearing political alliance and dilapidated economic system, they further faced an intractable task of coping with interrelated problems of rising nationalism and growing religiousity. Taken all together, the challenge was uphill and the feasibility of surmounting it, with or without Russia, remained a distant dream.

The poorest of the Central Asian states was Tadjikistan. Sixty-six years back, it was nowhere in the world map. It was

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the last bastion of resistance to the Soviet power. Despite tremendous strides on all fronts during the Soviet years, it remained mountainous and backward, filled with desert and sparsely populated. Its inhabitants, mostly cotton growers, shifted from their nomadic lifestyle to that of settled dwellers in the river valleys. Forgetting their traditional pattern of tending sheep, they engaged themselves in cotton growing. The canal that meandered through their plot, irrigated the land they cultivated. Through Soviet years, the life style considerably changed in the cities, while hardship grew in the villages. Yet, those were the years of their overall change that had brought the Tadjiks to limelight. The post-Soviet times have remained really tough. Laden with the vicissitude of independent development, buffeted by soaring inflation and plummeting living condition, Tadjikistan yearns for peace that evades it in the midst of continuing civil war. An attempt is made here to highlight a few complex issues facing post-Soviet Tadjikistan, including regional rivalry and emerging ethnic hostilities that threaten to jeopardize the prospects for a sovereign and prosperous Tadjikistan.

Troubled Rebirth

Toward the last phase of *perestroika*, though belatedly, Tadjikistan has entered into the mainstream of political upheaval. The religious revivalism, headed by the Islamic Renaissance Party and the democrats then opposing the Communist regime, combined their efforts to capture political power. Since the Communist *apparatchiks* had managed an electoral comeback in 1991, the opposition alliance succeeded in the summer of 1992 in coercing president Rakhman Nabiyeu into establishing a coalition government.

Apparently, angered by the atrocious endeavour of the emerging opposition, the Communists worked hard through the autumn of 1992. In November 1992, aided by an organisation known as the Tadjik Popular Front, the

Communists made a parliamentary coup and staged a second return to power under the leadership of Imomali Rakhmanov. Then began a massive purge of the opposition. Death, repression and summary execution characterised the politics of Tadjikistan during this time. Within a few months, the nascent opposition was effectively crushed. Many leaders were forced to go underground; and a few had fled to exile. The intensified availability of Russian, Uzbek and Afghan weapons on the territory of Tadjikistan exacerbated the brewing hostility between the opposition and the government. This had precisely set the background for a civil war in strife-torn Tadjikistan.

While Imomali Rakhmanov continued to consolidate his power through force, the exiled opposition from northern Afghanistan appealed to Moscow for restoration of peace and democracy. This appeal soon received an international response, and the question of human rights violation by the new Tadjik government cropped up high on the agenda. The Amnesty International and the Helsinki Watch Group vehemently criticised the Rukhmanov government for its misdeeds. Right around this time, Moscow sensed the danger of a brewing civil war and decided to militarily involve itself in the Tadjik conflict. However, the flash point of the Tadjik civil war was the brutal killing of 25 Russian border guards - 17 more were fatally injured; and one was missing. The casualty apart, a *mujahedin* attack on the border outpost No. 12, on 12 July, 1993, on the Tadjik-Afghan border not only dashed the outpost to the ground, but also left no virtual trace of border military control. Russia was taken aback. It quickly realized that a protected military danger was looming large. Tadjikistan was on its way to become a second Afghanistan for Russia. The whirling pace of the mid - July *mujahedin* attack had revealed two serious things. It exposed the vulnerability of the Tadjik and CIS borders in Central Asia, and definitely proved Russia's incapability to deal with abrupt dangers. Available reports said that of the 1000 *mujahedins*, who participated in

the operation, some 200-250 men continuously stormed the outpost, while the rest of them ensured that the Russians gained no ground at all². All of them together did not even allow the Russian soldiers to poke their heads out of trenches.

As further events unfolded, it became clear that Russia was not fighting the *mujahedins* alone; there were militants of the Islamic Revival Party armed to teeth by Chinese and Arab weapons and clad in Pakistani camouflage uniforms³. This was post-Soviet Russia's first encounter, beyond its own territory, with a strategically well organised combat force with multinational connections. The experience of Afghanistan flashed across the memories of the Russian soldiers. Next day of the battle, when a representative commission from Moscow headed by Russia's border troops commander, Col. General Shlyakhtin, flew to inspect the ruins of the outpost No. 12, he quipped "so the shunk, don't think they gave us a bad scare". And with that it was decided not to move the outpost to a new safe place, but rebuild it on the old ashes⁴. Russia had thus emboldened herself in the thick of the Tadjik conflict and still continues her engagement in Tadjikistan.

Conflicting Quagmire

Post-soviet Tadjikistan thus remained a strife-torn republic, whose saga of agony was intricately interwoven with Central Asian politics. The prevailing situation was reminiscent of a civil war in which several forces were at work. The politicians of the past as well as of the emerging systems, the various ethnic groups trying to assert their position in the new environment, the mafia actors in alliance with the black marketeers and hoarders, the Islamic revivalists, whom the outside world feared as "fundamentalists", the drug barons, who had found the Afghan-Tadjik border as a safe heaven for their illegal activities, and finally, the presence of Russian troops in the guise of CIS peacekeepers were all active elements of the quagmire of conflict the post-Soviet Tadjikistan had found itself to be involved in.

The expanded array of activities of these groups gives us an indepth understanding of the Tadjik trauma, which is not entirely a regional conflict; not necessarily an ethnic conflict, not even a political controversy between various post-Soviet factions. More interestingly, it is a civil war with involvement of cross-border elements that makes the Tadjik conflict an unending hostility, and that too, with clear undertones of a low intensity conflict. The active partners of this conflict are Tadjikistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Turkmenistan (all CIS members), and Afghanistan, which is a cross-border partner. The international community has apprehended the spill-over effects of this conflict for effecting regional peace and security. It has remained concerned over the fate of events in Tadjik -Afghan borders that might tear apart the region and impede the process of nation building in the newly independent states of Central Asia.

While all other issues are interfaces in a broad regional platform, the one that prominently envelops the Tadjik environment, with a serious Central Asian connotation, is the Russian factor. This factor in the Central Asian perception comes into interplay in post-Soviet politics primarily because of Russia's vast interest in the region in general and in Tadjikistan in particular. Russia has quickly grabbed the opportunity of Central Asia's desire for reintegration after Soviet disintegration. Such prominent leaders as Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, and Islam Karomov of Uzbekistan have been demonstrating their wisdom publically for an integrative structure with Russia to emerge. For example, Nazarbaev was vocal at the Istanbul meeting of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation in July 1993 about Central Asia maintaining vital links, both with the CIS and OEC⁵. It is obvious that commonalty of interests between the Central Asian states and Russia precipitates the issue of mutual cooperation. And in the conflicting quagmire of Tadjik civil war, these interests have directly involved the Russian and CIS peacekeepers not to allow the region glide into the perennial abyss of hostility.

Following the gruesome borderpost incident of July 1993, Russia's response to defend the Tadjik borders was fairly quick. Russia had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Tadjikistan and has sent in her troops as per this treaty to help a friend. Russia had also been appealing to other Central Asian states to participate in the so-called process of peacekeeping by involving their own troops. The response to this call had remained only partial. Russia, too, has been trying in vain to elicit the UN support to her troops presence in Tadjikistan. These are Russia's legitimising endeavour according to which it had committed itself to help and defend the borders of another sovereign state, where it does not have any juridical legitimacy. Russia, "believes that exacerbation of the situation on the Tadjik-Afghan border is a threat to Russia's vitally important interests and its security".⁶

Thus, Russian military involvement in the Tadjik civil war was the outcome of the compulsions that sprang from the changing post-Soviet situation. Mainly, two factors determined the objectives of Russia's immediate involvement: the explosive situation emerging on the security and strategic fronts, and the fate of several thousand Russian speaking population living in Tadjikistan. The Russian Federal Migration Service continued to feed data that revealed the magnitude of exodus of the Slavic population from Central Asia. According to this data "about 300-388 thousand Slavs, who lived in Tadjikistan before the Dushanbe unrest had fled the republic...abandoning their apartments and belongings."⁷ The rate of emigration was alarmingly rising. From Tadjikistan 20.6 thousand people emigrated to safer places in 1989. The corresponding figure for 1990 was 60.3 thousand⁸. Altogether 3 million Slavs lived in Central Asia,⁹ who were in peril of their lives.. They had been looking towards Russia for help and Russia, of course, felt duty bound to extend such help. The other reason for Russia's worry was brewing situation in Tadjikistan and the imminent strategic and security danger stemming from it. The Soviet

collapse had considerably changed the security questions in the region. Russia has been feeling increasingly vulnerable in the 'near abroad' and had decided to play her decisive role in her own interest of security. Tadjikistan, near the Wakhan corridor, had remained strategically a precious place with borders of China, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan touching the CIS borders. Russia never wished to slip this place out of hand. Given the volatility of post-Soviet borders through which narcotic trafficking, illegal arms trade, pilferage of fissile nuclear materials, moneylaundering and smuggling have become a routine affair, Russia tried to be vigilant in this area and looked for an earliest opportunity to safeguard the security of its extended CIS borders. The unstable situation in Tadjikistan provided such a opportunity. The hostile atmosphere posed by the fluid political environs in Afghanistan precipitated the urgency for direct Russian involvement in Tadjikistan.

Regional Rivalry

Tadjikistan is territorially divided into four regions. Corresponding to these regions, there are four regional groups engaged in rivalry for asserting their political supermacy. The ongoing civil war since 1992 is a bloody battle between these rival groups. The Khojandis from the Fergana valley, who ruled over Tadjikistan through the Soviet years, in alliance with Moscow, carried with them the support of the southern Kulyabis. This precisely meant that the Khojandis enjoyed Moscow's patronage and the Kulyabis basked in the sunshine of their influence. The victims of this power ploy were the Garmis, living in the East, and the Pamiris living in western Tadjikistan. Mostly farmers, forcibly settled by Stalin to do cotton cultivation on the newly irrigated lands, the Garmis and the Pamiris forgot their peripatetic past and began leading the life of settled dwellers. Over the years, they became literate and were completely Sovietised. From green cotton fields they looked to the Soviet power with crimson hopes and raised demands for

better living. Some of the Gypsies, who had initially abandoned their living places several times before they settled in one place, even felt the benefit of Soviet reforms. However, these people largely remained confined to their cotton fields; beyond politics they led the life of villagers, and whenever demanded, threw their support behind the Soviets. As a result, the Khojandis and the Kulyabis continued to strengthen their power base by closely aligning themselves with the Kremlin and thus exploited the cotton growers. They grew cotton that was sold at a premium price elsewhere. The price was kept as much a secret from them as the place of sale. Over the years, when they grew conscious about the end result of their labour and demanded to know whom the profit accrued to, the ruling lobby was quick to put down their voice of protest. After the Soviet disintegration, the permissive politics that replaced rigid centralism, allowed them to vent their grievances. The results were quickly visible. The two groups that traditionally enjoyed power for decades stood diametrically opposed and ensuing result was the continuing civil war.

Whether these groups were distinct ethnic identities in Tadjikistan, or whether they were regional power brokers supplanted by Moscow in the distant prefecture, is a debatable issue. Ethnically, Tadjikistan was as multi-ethnic as any other former Soviet republic. The Russians controlled the few industry that worked. The Uzbeks usurped their prominent position to keep away Tadjikistan from the benign patronage of the Kremlin. However, amidst these regional efforts, Moscow, never forgot the geostrategic location of Tadjikistan and considered it a point of cross-culture confluence. Even after the Soviet collapse, the Tadjik realities were not forgotten by Moscow, and emphasis was laid on ethnic identities and national feelings.

The problem of ethnic complexities in Tadjikistan is not pretty old. Gypsies from all over Central Asia visited this land in search of pastures for tending their cattle. When they settled,

they did not have any sense either of statehood or of sovereignty. However, subsequently, the pride of independent nation was given to them by the Soviets. The Soviets demarcated their territory, gave them a cyrillic script in place of their own, created national theatres, published communist newspapers and journals and supplanted a Sovietised political system that inculcated coexistence of many nationalities. Though the Soviet collapse in 1991 proved this exercise to be futile, it had succeeded in creating a state. The post-Soviet phase of development has precipitated the challenge of preserving, nay expanding, enhancing and providing it the boldness of a sovereign state. Precisely, at this juncture, when Tadjikistan has been facing these uphill challenges, regional anomalies bequeathed from the earlier era have beset the republic with an insurmountable civil war. North and south are involved in sanguinary battles. East and west look askew from the mainstream of post-Soviet Tadjikistan. As a result, all the four regions within a tiny state have started fighting with each other. Life in the state has been torn asunder and the sense of public security has become remote in the midst of a continuing civil war.

Ethno-Nationalism

Some civil factors that place Tadjikistan in the geo-political map of Central Asia are crucial to be studied. Foremost of them is the implication of the multi-ethnic character of Tadjikistan. In this context, three important aspects circumstantiate the prevailing reality: language, religion and socio-cultural life style. Central Asia as a whole, and Tadjikistan in particular is graciously endowed with the attributes of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious phenomena. The Tadjiks are Asians, while the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians are European in origin. Religiously, the native Tadjiks are believers of Islam, while the Europeans are largely of orthodox Christian stock. The Tadjiks speak *farsi* language while the

Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kyrghyz, who live in Tadjikistan, speak their respective languages, which are of Turkic origin. This division is the backdrop against which the complicated ethnic scenario in Tadjikistan must be analysed.

A critical look at the ethnic atlas of sovereign Tadjikistan gives us clear evidences of history. Other ethnic groups, who co-live with the Tadjiks, have a distinct case of their own. In this category, there are such nationalities as the Koreans, Jews and Germans. Each of them have been set apart from the mainstream of Tadjik life. Furthermore, one may club to this group different nationalities, who were the victims of Stalin's deportation to Central Asia during the II World War. Their efforts to return back to their native places have run into a *cul-de-sac*. The Soviet collapse has made their dreams of homecoming a distant proposition. All these ethnic groups continue to live and exacerbate the existing ethnic scenario in Tadjikistan by their very irreversible presence.

A crucial factor that compounds the Tadjik ethno-cultural scenario is the sizable presence of Zoroastrians in Tadjikistan - the only state in the region with such a conglomerate of believers. The votaries of this faith did not give up their religious practices, despite heavy official clampdown through the Soviet years. The believers shrank back to the mountainous areas and continued to adore their religion, which thrived unnoticeable among this specific ethno-religious group. The sway of *glasnost* under Gorbachev provided them with opportunities of freely coming up to practise Zoroastrianism¹⁰.

Similarly, another religious sect, the *Ismailit*, maintained their exclusive practice of paying homage to their religious leader, Aga Khan, who stayed either in London or in Bombay. Believer's homage in terms of goats, sheep, gold, money and whatever little any Ismailit could pay to their leader flowed freely during the Soviet years through unofficial agencies. These practices were enough to suggest a systematic flouting of the norms of Soviet atheism in Central Asia.

However, the crux of the ethnic problem, encompassed not only the small minorities, but big ethnic groups, who lived side by side with the Tadjiks. Over this plain, surfaced the Uzbek-Tadjik animosity. In published data of 1989 Soviet census, one could notice the outcome of this animosity. The data clearly reveals that between 1959 and 1989, the Uzbek population in Tadjikistan increased from 23.0 to 23.5 percent - just a marginal rise of 0.5 percent over a period of three decades. At the same time, the native Tadjik population registered a growth from 53.1 to 62.3 percent¹¹. This almost stagnation in the growth rate of Uzbek population in Tadjikistan speaks of two things: (1) there might have been mass emigration of Uzbeks from Tadjikistan due to various reasons, which is very likely; and (2) there have been mass assimilation of the Uzbeks with the Tadjiks, which seems highly improbable. Despite the relative calm prevailing over the surface, the Uzbek -Tadjik conflict has severe undertones of animosity. While such aspects as religion and ethnicity dominate the scene, the implications of religious adherence are discernible with the Islamic revivalism, sweeping across Central Asia. The fundamental difference between the Uzbeks and the Tadjiks is their adherence to different sects of Islam. The Tadjiks are the believers in the teachings of Imam Ja'far Sadiq, whose sect is called *shi'as*, and the Uzbeks are the followers of Imam Abu Hanifah, who are called *sunni*. This basic divide between the two had widened in the wake of demarcation of territories by the Soviets in the mid- twenties when they decided to keep two prominent Tadjik cities - Bukhara and Samarkand- in the Uzbek fold. In these two cities, the inhabitants were largely Tadjiks and the cities themselves were famous centres of ancient Islamic culture and civilization.

When the decision of Moscow changed these two Tadjik cities into Uzbek cities, the Tadjik national ego was ruptured. Ever since 1926, when the boundaries were re-drawn, the Tadjiks have been persuing in vain a claim on these Uzbek

cities, that were once their own. This unending territorial dispute is event-specific, and must not be confused with the overlapping cross-border settlement of ethnic groups, which is a visible phenomenon in Central Asian states. In the post-Soviet phase of development, when Moscow has formally withdrawn from the region, the resolution of this territorial dispute seems improbable because Uzbekistan is unlikely to be interested in raising the issue at all for amicable resolution.

In a lucid analysis of the parameters of Uzbek-Tadjik conflict, six pervasive dimensions were covered in a recent research in which, the author had encompassed such vital aspects of mutual animosity as language, economy, culture, religion, nationalism and land transfer¹². On all these issues, Tadjikistan in Central Asia stands as a *shi'a* island in the ocean of *sunni* Muslims. In the given situation, the domineering role of post-Tadjikistan preclude any immediate solution. However, ethnic animosity and economic development are complimentary categories of issues. Without doing away with the former, it is impossible to achieve the latter.

Religion and Politics

The post-Soviet political spectrum in Tadjikistan remained highly polarised. On one end stand the Communists, who continue to rule the roost, and on the other, there are democratic and religious forces surcharging the political milieu. Two more tendencies discernibly influence Tadjikistan. First, there is considerable influence of the unstable Afghan situation. The victory of the *mujahideens* was celebrated as the first military victory of the Tadjiks since the eleventh century"¹³. The *mujahideen* chieftain, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, came into power in Afghanistan at the most unfortunate moment of Tadjik history. The Soviet collapse provided him with the rare opportunity of fighting the Russian and Uzbek surrogates in Tadjikistan. The fond hope that Hekmatyar nurtured in his 15 years of political hibernation found implicit expression in the growing activities

of his Islamic Renaissance Party. In place of only 17 mosques and 19 churches in Tadjikistan before the Soviet collapse, the number of mosques rapidly increased to over 3000 in 1993, while the number of churches remained unchanged¹⁴. Although the 1996 political developments in Afghanistan have cast a morose shadow on regional peace and security, Islam in Tadjikistan remains a catalytic force to determine the shape of things to come.

This cascading influence of Islam from across the neighbouring countries was a sign of fundamentalism spreading in Tadjikistan. While the objective analysts called this process of re-Islamisation on the ruins of atheism a religious revivalism, the more fearful and apprehensive ones termed it as 'Islamic Fundamentalism'. In any case it had not changed the status of Tadjikistan as the most Islamised state among all Central Asian countries that travelled their journey to freedom from the Soviet fold.

The political divide between the Slavic oriented Communists and Islamic oriented fundamentalists became the core of confrontation in the Tadjik power struggle. Irrespective of their orientations, the leadership of Rakhmanov Nabiyeu and his successor, Imomali Rakhmanov were all, as they claimed, proclaimed secularists. The activities of the Islamic Renaissance Party were banned by the government, but ironically the influence of Islam could not be legally banned. As the sense of freedom soared high, so did religious emotions. Any government, whether now or in the future, has to reconcile with the impact of Islam. In a nutshell, post-Soviet developments in Tadjik politics have brought in religion as a potential factor in life which cannot be ignored. Islam is widely embraced by the people, while the government continues to claim itself secular.

Secondly, not far from this continuing tussle between the post-Soviet rulers and their religious enemies, the nemesis of another bitter confrontation in Tadjikistan is seen in the

presence of a number of political groups. They include the movement called Rastokhez or Rebirth, Democratic Party, the Tadjik Branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party¹⁵, Lal Badakshon, Migration Society and the Russian Community. All these movements, some framed into a political party or group and others still trying to build up their public image, are in the constant process of active politicking. Their activities have been curtailed by the impact of the ongoing civil war, yet they are the active political forces of independent Tadjikistan; their suppressed voice in politics matters a great deal for the future of Tadjikistan.

These emerging political forces have been experiencing the vicissitudes of post-Soviet changes. They had organised their activities in accordance with the mood of the leadership in power, and subsequently, when the Communist regime became the target of nation-wide criticism, they became vocal in demanding everything that they thought mattered for Tadjikistan. The Tadjik culture, heritage, economy, society, relations with Russia, other CIS countries and rest of the world and a host of other local, national, regional and international issues dominated their ever changing agenda. Tadjikistan began passing through an unprecedented political awakening. Its people, not knowing exactly how to react to the new political ethos, mostly appreciated whatever was national, and whatever seemed to be most appealing. In the process, two things became distinct in Tadjik politics: Tadjik nationalism and religious revivalism. The two most influential political groups that carried out these two equally catalyzing trends in Tadjik politics were Rastokhez and the Islamic Renaissance Party.

Rastokhez

Born out of the initiatives of the Tadjik Komsomol in the aftermath of the February student rallies in 1989, and conceived in the framework of *Ru-ba-Ru* or Face-to-Face Society, Rastokhez was very popular. It was an official organisation with

participation of many Tadjik officials, who debated the burning issues faced by contemporary Tadjikistan. Operating within the knowledge of the Communist authority, Rastokhez was instituted as a political group on 14 September, 1989. Physicist, Khamidullo Khabibulayev, economist, Takhir Abduz Haborov, jurist, Khalifabobo Khamidov and historian, Kholizade Abdulkadyrov were among the founders of Rastokhez. The organisation had government patronage was evident from Rastokhez founder, Khamidov, who joined the Makhamov's ministry as Justice Minister and, Abduldzhaborov who won a seat in the Supreme Soviet. The liberal policy of the regime at the end of 1990 further helped grow the popularity of Rastokhez. The movement held its first Congress in January, 1991. Ever since April, it had begun publishing a newspaper called "Tunyo", which was earlier known as Rastokhez and had a circulation of 10-20 thousand copies at varying times. In the fall of 1992, Rastokhez had nearly 30 thousand members¹⁶. Its members were freely interacting, and even proselytizing with the breakaway elements of the CPSU, known as Democratic Platform. However, in course of their development, differences arose on several issues that distanced the Democratic Platform from Rastokhez. Rastokhez remained Rastokhez and the Democratic Platform was renamed as Democratic Party. Registering itself as a separate entity on 21st June, 1991, it gradually mobilised the support of democratic forces and formed itself into a union of Democratic Forces. It also began publishing its organ "Adolat" in Tadjik and Russian languages with nearly 15,000 circulation. Tadjikistan was, thus, pushed into the realm of multi-party political culture.

Islamic Renaissance Party

As a Political Party, it has been functioning since June, 1990. Having its branches in other Central Asian states, the IRP was known to the Tadjik authorities right from the day of its inception. The government - IRP conflicts were very

conspicuous. The IRP sowed the seeds of Islamic Renaissance in the society and fanned the flames of religious sentiments not only in Tadjikistan, but also throughout Central Asia. It mobilised the believers for Islamic renaissance in a region that had been ruled by Communist atheists. Though the government hurried in banning this party officially, the IRP continued to garner support from its rural constituencies of believers.

However, the major confrontation was between the officially patronised Islam and the emerging unofficial Islam. The later was more formidable because it proved its mettle in the autumn rallies of 1991. Those who gathered during the rallies were rural folk, who milled the city square for hunger strike. Although the party effectively threatened to belittle the influence of official Islam, headed by the *Mufti* of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, it failed miserably to pull cadres from the intellectuals. As a result, it could not make a mark in Tadjik politics at the time of its transition from Communist to post-Communist society. However, IRP remained a formidable force to reckon with as much by the leadership as by the society itself.

The government understood clearly the pivotal position and mass appeal of this religious party. On 7 October, 1991, it came forward with a package of compromise. As a result, the IRP was able to maintain its legal existence, for a brief while it held its constituent congress on 26 October, 1991 and elected an *ulema* council with 18 members.¹⁷ However, because of the inherent nature of conflict, the IRP ran into rough weather by confronting the authorities. Once again it became formidable in the wake of Gulbuddin Hekhmattyar, a strong proponent of the IRP, becoming the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. The unstable political situation within Tadjikistan, especially on the Tadjik-Afghan borders was a favourable pretext for continuing the activities of the IRP in Central Asia in general and in Tadjikistan in particular.

Three other political organisations, such as the Migration Society, Russian Community and Lal Badkhshon, were all movements of a different colour. They had little to do with Tadjik nationalism. As an offspring of the political environment of the years of freedom unleashed by *glasnost*, these political organisations were primarily concerned with the upkeep of their interests. Born, nurtured and tempered in trying times of *perestroika*, only after Dushanbe spring in 1990, the activities of these groups clearly evinced the febrile nature of Tadjikistan's ethnic composition. Setting tone for the ongoing ethno-nationality hostilities, these organisations were certainly representative groups of those who comprised the minority in Tadjikistan. The Migration Society and the Russian Community were active political groups without any government support. They concentrated their efforts on helping the Russian community to emigrate to mainland Russia.

From the very inception, the government had taken a negative view of their activities. The registration application of the Migration Society was rejected by the authorities on the ground that the objectives were 'premature'. Acting entirely on political lines, when the society began negotiating with factories and enterprises about migration of Russians from Tadjikistan in the event of an upswing in Tadjik nationalism, the authorities became alert and began monitoring the activities of the Society. Led by a seismologist, Galina Belgorodskaya, the Migration Society did a commendable job for organising emigration of Russians from Tadjikistan.

The Russian community as a political party grew out of self defence in the aftermath of the February uprising in Dushanbe. Taking a neutral position and treading a cautious path in Tadjik politics, the Russian community, led by its Chairman, Valery Yushin, nevertheless, gained popularity. Because of the minority nature of its Russian constituent, its glory never touched the peak; and the organisation remained

city-based and localised to enterprises, where Russians were large in number. It operated in places like Khodjent, Dushanbe, Kulyab, Ordzhonikidzebad and other mini cities. However, this organisation was potential enough to highlight the plights of Russians in Tadjikistan. The Russians, indeed apprehended danger in living side by side with the Tadjiks and emphasised on migration at the earliest possible time.

The Lal Badakshon sprang up as a public organisation in Pamir, mainly as the name implies, in the Gorno-Badakshan oblast. As an informal group, it was one of the well organised political groups that registered itself in May, 1990, elected a 22-member Board, a 9-member Presidium and a Chairman, Amirbek Azobekov, who was until then a Docent in Dushanbe Pedagogical Institute. The organisation espoused the cause of restoring the image and life style of Pamir's national minorities, and preserving their languages. The authorities did not attach much importance to this organisation. However, the presence of this group demonstrated another dimension to the ongoing political upheaval in Tadjikistan; namely its Pamir problems.

The political awakening throughout Tadjikistan swept along ethnic lines. The ethno-nationality divide was more than apparent in the agenda of all major political parties. While Rastokhez espoused the Tadjik national pride and strove to restore it, the Islamic Renaissance Party was in the thick of a supranational plain, advocating the cause of unity along Islamic lines. Other organisations were either local or with the undertone of negligible minority. Yet, they catapulted the existing hostility along the lines of native-non-native feelings, and set the background for regional fragmentation of post-Soveit Tadjikistan along a discernible ethnic divide. The Uzbeks and the Russians, who constituted dominant minorities, were set apart from the native Tadjiks. The Garmi and Pamir Tadjiks, who were marginalised for decades, began to figure in the

scene, putting their voice of protest against the heavy influence of Russification and Uzbekisation. When the situation had headed for a civil war, and the authorities found themselves entangled in a messy affair with Russian involvement, it became certain that the civil war was fought between regional rival groups. The political colouration of an intricate ethnic situation in Tadjikistan, thus got inter-woven in Tadjik conflict. No feasible solution could be foreseen to the problems facing independent Tadjikistan, where Russia is militarily involved; yet the Russian minority remains the most vulnerable and fearful.

A Polycentric Approach

The question of Tadjik national problem has been clearly discernible on two fronts: rising native nationalism verses rising post-Soviet Russian nationalism. The former was rooted on the native attributes of Soviet Tadjikistan within the framework of a given political set-up, well demarcated territory, language with a script and various other national symbols. The later arose as a result of changing realities of post-Soviet times, when Russia was confronted with the direct security challenges on its southern flank stemming from the Soviet disintegration. The Russians felt the urgency of preserving their geostrategic interests more in Tadjikistan than anywhere else in Central Asia. The Russian presence in Tadjikistan, *albeit* regulated by a bilateral treaty of friendship and mutual help, created doubts in the minds of critically thinking Tadjiks, who questioned the very viability of their newly acquired sovereignty. This, precisely, sets the controversy: Russia versus Tadjikistan.

This native versus alien contrast on the emotional plain rolled down to practical implications, when both competed to secure a position within a particular territorial space at a particular time. Might was no more right. There was no ideological loyalty, nor any centre periphery anomaly. Therefore, sovereign Tadjikistan wondered why the Russians were there? When will that real independence visit us? Such

esoteric questions of native nationalism could only be mooted by select opposition intellectuals for whom the national pride of Tadjikistan is more precious than linkage with Russia, despite it being historic.

On the practical plain, Uzbek support to Russian troops presence on the Tadjik territory has created a triangular quagmire of contrasting interest. While the Uzbek-Tadjik hostilities lay subdued beneath the contours of rising national feelings, political, ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences have become obvious. Yet, Tadjik territorial demands for Bukhara and Samarkand assume an unending squabble. Post-Soviet Uzbekistan is so dominant a factor in Central Asian politics that its role and voice could no longer be ignored for resolution of any regional problem; let alone the Uzbek-Tadjik conflict. Therefore, the changing milieu demands to have prudent, polycentric approach for resolving knotty issues of hostilities like the Uzbek-Tadjik conflict.

The centrality of a polycentric model for resolving conflicts among Central Asian independent states is urgently felt because of the very involvement of several actors in the ongoing conflicts. First, the Russian interest could hardly be precluded. Even after the Soviet disintegration, Russia lives, thrives and continue to act in the direction of safeguarding the security and strategic interests in the southern CIS borders. Russia is thus a centre in itself too hard to be ignored. Secondly, the native Central Asian interests, which were interwoven with the Soviet interests of yesteryears are today separated. Each independent country is busy in carving out a niche for itself out of the dilapidated Soviet structure, finding it difficult to overcome the impact of close linkage; yet essaying to preserve whatever is preservable and avoid whatever is avoidable. In this difficult exercise, countries of the region have found themselves deeply involved in common quest for a cooperative platform on the one hand, and discovering intra-republican disputes, including

territorial and linguistic ones, on the other. It is of course for these new countries to choose the most viable path of mutual cooperation, the alternative to which is a path of confrontation. Thus, the new countries of the region clearly make another important centre which is vital in itself. Thirdly, there is the peripheral Islamic centre in the immediate neighbourhood, anxious to establish and expand cooperation with emerging Central Asia. Common ties of tradition, linguistic closeness and confessional affinity are some of the commonalities that bind them together. The possibility of a huge market has allured the neighbours to venture ahead with trade links. They talk of Islamic commonness as a uniting factor. This periphery has become an unavoidable centre of importance, which is difficult to handle, yet hard to be kept away. Fourthly, this purely Russo-Asiatic approach could be juxtaposed with the west-centric approach, where the interests of West European countries and the USA are directly getting involved. Through the zigzag course of contemporary history of mankind, an evidence of proven veracity is the fact that nations do act invariably in their own national interest; and in the process of making history, they tend to abide by the logistics of nothing but their own national self-interests.

Prospects

Greatly threatened by the sudden fragmentation of the Soviet empire and its abrupt downfall, the Western countries, especially the United States, had quickly apprehended an imminent danger of spreading Islamic fundamentalism¹⁸. Although the ebbs and tides of it have subsided in the last three years, the focus of interest has shifted to more dangerous zones of alien proliferation. This proliferation of new elements such as narcotic trade, drug money, indigenous cultivation of poppy, cross-border migration, continuing civil war and prevailing chaos all over Central Asia continue to puzzle the Americans. As long as this area remains a danger zone, there is potential danger to overall stability and peace in many Asian,

Middle Eastern and European countries. Furthermore, the cantankerous effect of the Central Asian chaos will continue to affect all countries in the periphery by exuding the serious problem of refugees.

In this peculiar Central Asian transition, interests of countries overlap. No real transition is palpable without a polycentric approach to the multitude of problems faced by Central Asia as a region in general and individual states in particular. Although efforts are afoot in forging multilateral and bilateral cooperation, it is yet to bear fruit. Commonality of interest among various centres enumerated above makes Tadjikistan not only a vital field of cooperation in the realm of commerce, trade, defence, culture and diplomacy, but also equally an arena of keen competition; and as a result of this competition, a hot-bed of confrontation and tension. Since all nations act in their self interest, the new Central Asian states, including Tadjikistan, will presumably be no exception. Their national interests are likely to clash in Central Asia with the present polycentric interests of many other countries. This scenario of competition and the cooperation on the one hand, and confrontation, conflict and tension, on the other, will have overbearing impact on the region in the foreseeable future.

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History and Culture of Central Asia and Kashmir: Some Salient Features

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The scope of history grows with the scope of social awareness, involving the history of the hunting man to that of a villager or a city man, and from the pre-literate society to that of a civilized one with concretionary strength to achieve or enjoy possible system of human aspirations. This depends on the rich and glorious cultural manifestation of an individual or of a society. The culture thus progresses with every progress in the society and individual. In case of its advancement or detraction from the path of progress, it reflects the rise or fall of the nation to which an individual or the society belongs. However, place or environment plays a key role in building the culture of a particular region or regions. We can come together not by adopt-

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ing modern scientific methods but by encouraging an awareness of our common heritage.

Major prehistoric or even historic archaeological investigations conducted in Central Asia and Kashmir have brightened our current understanding of Central Asian region and Kashmir. Both the regions almost share the same general features not which is evident from the identical human remains and cultural material found in two regions. The Central Asian republics were a meeting ground of civilizations which left a deep cultural mark on political, economic and social life of many countries which included Iran on the west, China in the east and entire north-west frontier of the subcontinent, including Kashmir and Afghanistan in the south. Relevant archaeological investigations in the Central Asian republics, especially Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, northern Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and now in Kashmir and China, reveal that these had close links with each other right from prehistoric times.

Central Asia is overwhelming in its vastness, yet it is full of subtle and surprising diversity. To the uninitiated traveller it appears a featureless wasteland but due to dogged efforts of geologists, archaeologists, anthropologists and palaeoclimatologists, new cultural realities have come before us which give documentary evidence of one civilization having lost its essence but having been replaced by another. Obviously, it has been the centre of cross-currents of different cultures and the people were always on the move to spread their ideas and artistic skill to other parts of Asia and the world. Especially, the valley of Kashmir, despite being surrounded by inhospitable mountains, provided a favourable pastureland for the incoming people because of its ecological niceties. As such, the historical and cultural contacts between Central Asia and Kashmir extend to remote antiquity not from neolithic period only¹ but even from pre-neolithic period². In Kashmir also, we find rich and varied cultural traces of identical nature ap-

parently woven of many strands but significantly maintaining its own identity.

Kashmir lay within that part of Central Asia which at one period was the clearing house of several separate civilizations and influences of these found their way into this natural retreat. Moreover, there was a time, early in the first millennium, when it came into contact with the wide spread eastern conquests of the Sassanid empire, with its neo Persian culture to be followed not long afterwards by a period in which its own territories extended far beyond their geographical limits. Nevertheless, with all these events and powerful cross currents, Kashmir continued consistently to maintain a certain indigenous and independent type of culture, as reflected in several of its activities, not the least of which was its form of expression in the field of art. Much of the high quality of the latter was due to the inherent aesthetic sense and rare adaptability of its inhabitants³.

Kashmir has had an enchanting environment and pleasing ecological conditions. A remarkable achievement in the manufacture of various categories of stone and bone tools even during neolithic times (3000 B.C.) clearly indicates the spirit of assimilation of the people but without giving up their self pride and distinctive character⁴. Hence, the artistic instinct was already present in the prehistoric people of the valley even before in first millennium, as recorded by Percy Brown. Even during those prehistoric days the Kashmiris had cultural contacts with Central Asia, Iran, North Western Provinces of the sub continent, Afghanistan, China and farther east. All this was possible when the prehistoric men carved out footpaths over desolate and inhospitable mountains which played a key role in the dissemination of culture from one part to the other⁵. Subsequently, these very footpaths took the place of vigorous trade routes suggestive of a strong flow of commerce, artistic and intellectual contacts between all these regions.

In Central Asia and in Kashmir also, massive tectonic movements have taken place due to constant geological processes involving massive glacial activities and erosion of material by water and wind. These changes gave rise to the accumulation of loess- palaeosol formations which are indicative of climatic oscillations. In Central Asia such formations are widely spread in Tashkent, eastern Fargana and southern Tadjikistan whereas in Kashmir these are found on the Himalayan and the Pir Panjal flanks, constituting the top deposits of *karewas*, the remnants of Quaternary lake beds. While as, loess, a silt sized sediment, represents cold, arid conditions, the paleosols, rich in carbon are indicative of warmer and wetter conditions. These loess palaeosol layers are very good indicators of climatic oscillation. Variation in climate from very hot to cold and back again determined the behaviour of animal and vegetable species corresponding to the movements of the primitive men from one place to another. The archaeological relics left by the primitive men have been collected from various sites in Central Asia. Thermoluminescence date from the loess - palaeosol deposit here (at the soil base) is determined to be 1,30,000 to 1,50,000 years old. Choppers and pebble tools were obtained from here at Karatau and Lakhuti in southern Tajikistan⁶. In Kashmir human settlement thrived during optimum climatic conditions when there was extensive development of loess - palaeosol deposit dateable to 20,000 BP (before present)⁷. A number of Upper Palaeolithic sites were found in the valley. One such site was discovered on the top terrace of the river Rambiara, at Balapura comprising of choppers and some massive discoids⁸. A well worked out chopper tool with clear cut flake scars was picked up from Sukhnag - an area lying on the east of Pir Panjal Range on direct route between Srinagar and Poonch⁹. About 100 artifacts represented by burins, blades, points and borers were obtained from Sombur, district Pulwama. This site is famous for presence of fossil remains of fish, birds, lizards, *elephas hysudricus* etc. These tools bear Upper

Palaeolithic traditions¹⁰. Earlier, palaeolithic tools were reported from Pampur, Kargil¹¹ and Pahalgam¹². Through multidisciplinary investigations, the experts have further determined the periods of increase in human population and climatic amelioration in the valley at 5000 BP (Neolithic period), 1800 BP (Kushana period) and 1000 BP (Mediaeval period)¹³.

The neolithic tradition, during the last three decades, has attracted the greatest attention as this is the first and the earliest settlement of the Kashmiris. The self-sufficient settlement with multifaced subsistence patterns was extensively spread almost all over the valley. Excavations at Burzahom in Srinagar district and at Gufkral, district Pulwama, have revealed distinctive and documented sequence of structures marked by pit dwellings, cultural material in the form of highly polished and interesting bone and stone tools, human burials within the residences (one with trephined skull) with or without grave goods, purposeful burials of animals and dogs buried with their masters besides the ceramic forms, both hand-made and wheel made. These are unique of their kind and are foreign to the Indian tradition¹⁴. A trephined skull at Burzahom is reported to be the earliest evidence of surgical procedure in South Asia¹⁵. Substantial and close parallels display affinities with Central Asia, north and central China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. It is, as such, obvious that Kashmiris were having constant contacts with the people of the neighbouring regions. Further there is an ample proof that the coming into Valley, by the contemporary Harappans of urban civilization or going out of it, was possible only because of favourable climatic conditions. More precious is the presence of a Harappan fine, globular shaped wheel made red ware pot at Burzahom with grooves on its body and painted motifs which have parallels from Hissar (Iran) and Kot Diji in Sind (Pakistan). The most interesting discovery in the series is a copper hair-pin from Gufkral, the proto-type of which has come from Manda (Jammu) dated to 2100 BC. Such objects carry West Asian affinities¹⁶. The

Neolithic tradition, therefore, presents both parallels and contrasts with sites documented in other regions, outside the Valley. Such finds have also been found in other regions of Central Asia as well. Much wanted raw material, lapis lazuli, in Harappan settlements was brought from Paddar region (Kishtwar) on Kishtwar Leh road. At Alten Tepe, southern Turkmenia of Central Asia, Harappan finds include a typical Harappan seal¹⁷. There are clear traces of similar finds from Mehrgarh in Baluchistan¹⁸, Ak Kupruk, Darr-i-Kur in Afghanistan¹⁹ and in Swat valley of Pakistan²⁰. On the whole, recent research has shown that the entire belt of Central Asia formed a part of extensive region of early farming cultures of Prehistoric (neolithic) or Protohistoric Periods. This had profound and lasting effect in shaping and developing of the cultural trends in the periods that followed.

The sensational discovery of Northern Black Polished Ware (1979-80) at Semthan, (Bijbehara), district Anantnag, confirmed archaeologically Mauryan association of the people of Kashmir²¹. As a consequence of this, Buddhism got a stronghold in Kashmir. They were followed by Indo-Bactrian, Greeks, Shakas, Parthians and Kushanas. With the advent of Kushanas, especially during the reign of the great King Kanishka, Kashmir came closer to Central Asia and other regions culturally and commercially. Their original title, Yueh Chih principality of 'Kuei-chuan' (as Chinese knew it), extended their sway over Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Indus basin, the Punjab, the western oases of Tarim basin (Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan), Sogdiana between the two great rivers, Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya, in what is now Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. They advocated their religious belief i.e. Buddhism which at once appealed to the common man. The Buddhist religion made great strides and the missionaries contributed much towards the introduction of the doctrine of Buddha - the founder of Buddhism in India. However, the greatest contribution to Buddhism in Central Asia and to China came from Kashmir.

The land, because of its natural environment, abundance of water, wood and food, attracted Buddhist monks. They came here to study the scriptures and along with the locals left for missionary work in Central Asia and China. Buddhist texts were translated into Chinese and this process hastened the spread of this religion. It was accepted as a convenient doctrine by the common man and the ruling class as well. A strong cultural interaction thus took place between Kashmir and Central Asia. The missionaries on either side raised up sentimental ideas of infinite mercy and universal charity. In terms of war, poverty and misfortune they offered a safe refuge from the world and a promise for a better way of living here and hereafter. Many of the fierce barbarians were converted. With such a zeal and continued patronage of the ruling monarchs, Buddhist centres, Buddhist temples (Chaityas), Buddhist monasteries (Viharas), Buddhist relic memorials (Stupas) sprung up in China, the entire belt of Central Asia, Afghanistan and Kashmir. These were ornamented with paintings, sculptures, painted ceiling and altars depicting Persian, Greek, Indian, especially Gandhara (another name for the province of Peshawar), art. The art of Gandhara properly speaking, is that of the period of Kanishka. Missionaries followed the same silk routes which were used by merchants formerly for flow of silk, perfumes, jewels, furs and slaves. Throughout the Kushana empire, the Buddhist religion made great strides and wide ranging missionary activity was fostered on the two silk routes, the northern one passing through Kucha, Kara Shahr, Turfan and Kashgar in the extreme west; and southern one through Yarkand, Khotan, Niya Miran and Lou-lan and passing through Karakoram passes, which would reach to western Himalayas and then to India. Yarkand is the first important town on the Central Asian side of Karakoram and lies on a direct line between Kashgar, Leh and the valley of Kashmir. Both Kashgar and Yarkand could also be approached from Gilgit, through Hunza and Sarikot passes, and further from Afghanistan. Devout pilgrims from Kashmir, Central Asia and China built

religious buildings along these routes and blazed by the merchants from Rome, whose appetite for Chinese silk increased, there was tremendous flow of artistic and intellectual contacts between all these regions. Numerous archaeological, epigraphical, sculptural material was exposed from these ancient cultural centres. At Tun Huang alone, where the two routes met, there are about 600 caves which contain wall paintings, statues, painted ceilings, manuscripts and scrolls representing art traditions and folk traditions from China, Central Asia, India and Tibet. At the Buddhist site of Miran, many shrines were set up in caves in which were found walls and ceilings ornamented with paintings, in addition to the silken banners. Figural representation was prominently displayed here. One such figure was of Buddha clad in dark, reddish brown robe, the traditional Indian dress for saints and ascetics. India had a flourishing cotton industry and was the natural habitat of cotton. In exchange of silk, fine Indian cotton fabric had been brought to China as a commodity and as a gift. It is how one can justify the 'cotton culture' was introduced into China in exchange of "silk culture" in India. In Maharashtra, at Nevasa and Chandoli, exciting discoveries of cotton and silk were made during the course of excavations, belonging to the Neolithic-Charcolithic settlement of India. In the burials of children at these sites, copper necklaces were strung with cotton and silk threads²². The Chinese silk, however, was more fine and admirable. A mole on the breast of an eunuch could be observed through the five layers of transparent material of raw silk with one layer laid on the top of the other. More delicate types were used for garments of the king or the rich person. This indicated the skill of designing and fashioning of the silken garments by Chinese. In Kashmir also, transparent and well folded garments on female figures, depicted on the terracotta tiles of Harwan monastery in Srinagar, could only be of the attractive fine material, like silk. Long and thin faces with sunken eyes and types of dresses worn by the figural representations on these tiles portray diversified ethnic tribes

who flocked on the caravan routes of Central Asia. The progressive course of such a concerted movement with religious fervour and unstinted patronage given by the high ups resulted in a flowering of artistic genius discernible in the buildings built in the mediaeval times. The early mediaeval period in Kashmir again is represented by structural or sculptural representation discovered in various regions of Central Asia. The Soviet archaeologist Prof. B. Litvinsky has discovered a monastery, temple, paintings and sculptures at Adzhina - tepe in Tadzhikistan ascribable to post-Kushan period. In fact the traditions that developed in Gandhara or north western India were almost an echo of the Central Asian traditions. Almost parallel forms of facial appearances, dress, elongated eyebrows, thin chins and style of curls on the heads of Ushkura (Baramulla) terracotta heads resemble with the terracotta heads of Bodhistavas found at Adzhina - tepe or Hadda in Afghanistan. The monastery in Adzhina - tepe had been built by local artists keeping in view the cultural traditions of Gandhara, Kashmir and Afghanistan. Such traditions are met at the original set of monastery built at Ushkura (Baramulla) in Kashmir which was later on enlarged by Lalitaditya (8th century A.D.). The next architectural movement is discernible in the appearance of stone edifices of Hindu period. The temple complex seems to have taken its character and arrangements from the Buddhist establishments of Gandhara or dome shaped stupas (beginning of 5th century A.D.) from Margiana town (locally known as Merv) of Central Asia. The small temples at Ladou, district Pulwama, with its trefoil arches, pyramidal roofs, variety of fluted columns and other typical architectural elements carry striking resemblance to Guniyar temple in the Swat valley. The impressive temple construction reached to its culmination in 8th-9th centuries, ruins of which are still existing at Awantipura (Pulwama) and Martanda (Anantnag). The plan, fluted columns, cellular peristyle surrounding, the shrines built within rectangular courtyards, bold trefoil arches, pyramidal roofs etc., portray close affinity with the Buddhist sanctuaries

of Dharamarajika of Taxila, Jamalgarhi, 36 miles north of Peshawar, Manikyala Stupa near Rawalpindi and other such structures of Gandhara and Afghanistan. In Central Asia, Brahmanical faith prevailed in many of the cultural centres. A leading source of inspiration is from an excavated site of Panjekent, an early mediaeval temple-cum-town in the west of Samarkand, on both banks of river Zafarshan²³. Here the temple architecture is at variance with the Buddhist structures or the fire Temple of Persia. The temple also stands within a courtyard with an opening on the east and with a sanctuary on the west and closed on three sides by an open gallery. In Hindu temples, this open space round the shrine is utilised as circumambulatory passage. Sculptural representation and wood carving models are some of the attractive features of the Panjekent temple. These features marked resemblances with the artistic genius, developed in the valley.

During the late mediaeval period, the core areas of Central Asia had a tremendous impact on the art and culture of Kashmir. With the advent of Muslims in Central Asia China's silk industry suffered much but they soon revived the industry through growing power of Arabs. Chinese silk, from A.D. 878 onwards, travelled through Central Asia to Iran via Muslim province of Khorasan. Political and cultural changes brought about a swift transformation in the style of arts and crafts as well. In Central Asia the new centres of Muslim art and architecture were Samarkand, Bokhara, Kashgar and Yarkand. Muslim penetration in the Valley, at the initial stage, was peaceful and purely a domestic affair. However, the growing turmoil in Central Asia during this period had a far-reaching impact on the social fabric and cultural ethos of Kashmir. As the focus of this paper is on the cultural interaction between Central Asia and Kashmir, it is outside the scope of this paper to develop on the political events in and outside Kashmir. Once the dust of invasions and incursions from across the borders had settled down, numerous scholars, craftsmen and artists

from Central Asia came over here and had the patronage of Sultans of Kashmir. Their number swarmed in the time of Zain-ul-Abidin (1420-70 A.D.), yet other rulers after him also did not lag behind in patronising artistic activity. The introduction of papier-mache, carpet industry and wood techniques in this land owe a lot to the Central Asians who came and settled here. However, the artistic skill was now utilised on the mosques, *ziarats* or tombs.

In the beginning, Muslims were too few and as such they did not start any architecture of their own. They utilized the plinth or the basement of the disused temples on which they erected mosques or tombs in simplistic forms, as these were needed by them urgently in their new set-up. While doing so, they adhered to the religious dictum of the holy persons. Lavish expenditure on religious shrines was avoided. It was upheld that God had not bestowed wealth to clothe Him in bricks and stones, yet practically it was of course done by Muslims²⁴. New forms were sought for by architects and builders in an effort to satisfy the changing demands. There was, however, a synthesis between Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim techniques²⁵. As such the Kashmir architecture of Muslims had three phases, the first represents stone edifices, columns etc. of the Buddhist and Hindu period during the first millennium, the second was the wooden architecture in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and third the stone-cum-brick architecture of the Mughals.

The readymade basement of the Hindu or Buddhist temples were sound foundations for raising the superstructures over them, either for tombs or mosques. Both these edifices had certain common features like the cubical hall and a pyramidal roof often in tiers with a slender spire above. The only difference is that the mosque had an open square pavilion which served as a minar or *mazina* for the *muzin*. The two storeyed mosque of Shah-i-Hamdan and Jamia Masjid at Srinagar are typical specimen of wooden architecture. The

largest and the most impressive instance is the Jamia Masjid where the rectangular courtyard, surrounded by colonnades on four sides, is but a cultural reapproachment of architectural grandeur of Buddhist monasteries²⁶. Doorways, open steeples, moulded finials, ventilators ornamented with *jalis*, lofty pillars of deodar and pine, supporting the roof and the brick work of finest quality, gives a deep insight into the artistic skill of the craftsmen. The Mosque of Shah-i-Hamdan or *Khanqah-i-Maulla* is a smaller structure but wholly erected in wood. The superstructure raised over the ancient basement is wood and bricks in two stories which carries a distinctive style of its own. There are many surviving examples of such distinctive religious monuments marked by mosques, tombs or *ziarats* which represent a swift change in the architecture of the time. The notable and outstanding examples, depicting a solid evidence of cultural penetration into the Valley from Central Asia, are the tomb and mosque of a Muslim saint, Madin Sahib at Zadibal and the tomb of Zain-ul-Abidin's mother at Zainakadal - both in Srinagar districts. Both these superb and magnificent monuments were erected during the supremacy of Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin. By systematic adaptation of the old for the new, he successfully projected the Central Asian Muslim architecture in the Valley. The mausoleums and tombs in particular were provided with the tile decoration of various hues and were crowned with bulbous domes. The domes are the most important contributory feature of early Islamic buildings²⁷.

The mosque and the tomb of Madin Shaib are land marks in the history of wooden architecture in the Valley. Entrance door and the ceiling of the mosque are elaborately carved. The walls were provided with trefoiled arches in bricks, the first of its kind, as these were till then projected in stone. Till recent times it was the only surviving example of locally adopted waterproof roof coverage of birch bark and clay. The overhanging edges of the roof on the sides carried rows of tongues which added lustre to the sloping roof in tiers. To its north is the tomb

of the saint - built in 1444 A.D. - which was adorned with tiles and brilliantly coloured in various hues, presenting floral patterns of interwoven heads of animals, human representations, head gears and other geometrical designs of particular interest. On the left spandrel of the entrance arch was shown the figure of a carnivorous animal with a human trunk at the neck and was shooting with a bow and arrow at the dragon that formed the end of its own tail. Among the flowers and cloud forms, the fox is curiously looking over it. In 15th century cloud forms are demonstrated in paintings from Central Asia and Herat. Some tiles obtained from the accumulated debris portray heads of the human beings. Their facial appearance and the style of headgears resemble those of the people of Persia and Central Asia.

The most remarkable type of architecture, unique in its perfection is the structure of the tomb of Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin's mother. It is named after the Sultan's pet name "Budshah", the great king. The Budshah monument communicates the grandeur of the ruler and, the craftsmen who built it. Constructed in bricks and plaster, the external walls are embellished with blue coloured glazed tiles. The dignity of the monument lies in its massiveness, complexity and size, as is evident from its superstructure composed of five domes, the largest one being the middle one. The central dome is double and is an earliest feature in India. It is fluted and is formed by semi-circular brick mouldings while the four small domes in corners are arcaded with shallow arched panels²⁸. In Central Asia, this sort of double domed structure was built by Timur (1336-1405 A.D.) at his capital city, Samarkand, in the mausoleum of his wife, Bibi Khanum and then it was also constructed at his own mausoleum at Gur-Amir. In Indian sub-continent it was Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin who first introduced this type of architecture in the mausoleum of his mother. The surviving monument is regarded as one of the most remarkable manifestations of an early Islamic architecture for being unique in its perfection, design and set

up. The general principle of adopting the plan, design and material, in raising single domed structures, continued even after the art of construction in stone was revived in the Valley by the Mughals in 16th and 17th centuries.

The Mughals gave peace and promoted trade, industry and agriculture. Even the cultural reapproachment nurtured further under their congenial reign. They built forts, palaces, *madarasas*, *khankahs* (saintly institutions), tombs, mosques, *sarais*, *hamams*, barracks, battlemented fortifications, tanks, reservoirs, bridges and other public buildings on the pattern of their buildings at Agra, Delhi and Lahore. The earliest construction was the hullock wall constructed by Akbar around Hariparbat. Empress Nurjahan erected, in 1623 A.D., two storeyed mosque, built in stone, known, as Pathar Masjid. The mosque of Akhun Mulla Shah built in 1649 A.D., is again a two storeyed building of grey lime stone with a core of brick work underneath. The extremely graceful closters faced on either side of the gateway, having carved rectangular panels closing the cuspid arches and projected with highly polished grey lime stones goes in tune with the given environ. In fact the architectural achievements of the Mughals in general was influenced by the religious fervour. On the northern side of the mosque of the saint, Akhun Mulla Shah, a range of cells were provided for the prayers, meditation and comfortable stay of the devotees of the saint. Such structures in Central Asia, called *khankahas*, became permanent dwelling places for those who devoted their lives to spiritual guidance²⁹. These gave conception of 'Fear of God' in the minds of people, symbolising the spirit of secularism, toleration, sense of sacredness and faith. The Kashmiris in general believed in *pir* (Master), *tauba* (repentance of bad deeds) *sabre* (tolerance) *tawakhul* (contentment), *khuf* (fear) and *roza* (surrender to God). These noble ideas kept the ideal of unity always alive in the hearts of local inhabitants of the Valley. Both, the son (Dara Shikoh) and the daughter (Jahanara) of the Mughal emperor, Shah

Jehan, were drawn towards mysticism when they came in the company of Akhun Mulla Shah. His devout daughter, Jahanara expressed, "of all the descendents of Timur only we two brother and sister were fortunate to obtain this felicity³⁰". In short, the harmonization of man, nature and divine strengthened the social cohesion in the Valley. In similar situations of enchanting environment, the Mughals laid out gardens at Nasim, Shalimar, Nishat, Parimahal, Chashm-i-Shahi, Bijbehara, Acchabal and Verinag. Being almost on the sloping hills, these could be readily converted into terraces. The Mughals added grace to these gardens by providing them enclosure walls with imposing gateways, guard rooms, *hamams*, water tanks, *baradaries* and pavilions. These represent the Persian style, and the inspiration for laying such type of gardens in the Valley has its source in Iran³¹.

The Mughals left deep rooted marks not only in the field of architecture but also in other fields of cultural life. They brought Kashmir nearer to the land of their original birth, Central Asia. The people of both these regions were beneficiaries. The discovery of thousands of the Kharoshti inscriptions on the Kara-Koram Highway by the French and German archaeologists who worked in collaboration with Pakistani team reveals the dissemination of cultural trends between Kashmir, Gandhara and other regions of Central Asia. Kharoshti was the common script of Kashmir and Gandhara. In the Valley, such epigraphical records have come from excavations at Harwan and Semthan; and in Gandhara on rock edicts at Shahbazgarhi near Peshawar, modern Charsda and at Mansehra near Abbotabad³². One of the road at Mansehra comes from Kashmir. In the past, the land of Dards (modern Gilgit, Chilas and Bunji areas) was approached from the south through Taxila and Kashmir, and from Badakshan and Sinkiang³³. In the matter of dress and costume, we are no less indebted to the people of Central Asia. The waist belt (*loongi*), the outstretched cloak (*pheran*), the red band worn over the

head gear (*taranga*) the snake shaped long twisted back scarf (*pooch*) are still surviving remnants of the Central Asian culture. This is also true of our food which still carries the Central Asian tradition. The saltish *tea, satu, hand, samavar* and numerous dish preparations remind us of our cultural links with Central Asia.

The extensive cultural links between Central Asia and Kashmir, from prehistory and successive periods, still stimulate global attention. The genius of art and architecture discernible from the surviving monuments or the finds from ancient settlements, are the only effective means to uncover the realities of our cultural history hidden behind the dusty layers of bygone centuries. We can renew our age-old ties by being aware of our glorious past. Disbelief in one's glorious past hurts national pride and causes internal decay. So the need of the hour is to project and emancipate our cultural bonds so that we make our lives sublime and while departing, leave behind noble footprints for our posterity.

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Antiquity of Man in Central Asia: A Summary

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Situated in the heart of the Asian continent, Central Asia is delimited on geographical grounds¹. However, we regard Central Asia as a cultural and historical region that connects the Asian heart land countries by ancient cultural, economic and political bonds, and a shared history². The peoples of Central Asia have played major role in cultural-historical processes of various epochs. Such a process began from the earliest period in the history of civilization, when human cultures emerged and determined to a considerable extent the later developments of local cultures and peoples. In this paper we shall study the general features of the earliest human culture, the Lower Palaeolithic Culture, and measure, in time span, the antiquity of man. This has been possible due to the

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availability and application of scientific means in archaeology that have pushed back the frontiers of human knowledge.

The evidence related to the Palaeolithic Cultures in Central Asia is recognised throughout the region, (figure no 1.) but it is limited only to the lithic implements.




Fig. no 1. Map of Central Asia showing Lower Paleolithic sites.

The anthropological record is almost absent as is the case outside Africa; save the fossil remains of the Peking man and the Tashiktash boy; and therefore, for building the palaeolithic history, the reliance is on the cultural fossils. Important researches have been carried out in Pakistan, Mongolia and

Tadjikistan where these cultural fossils are found in stratigraphical order. Elsewhere, we are left out with only such artefacts as are described on the basis of typology and general considerations.

Tadjikistan

The best studied area in the mountain regions of Central Asia is southern Tadjikistan. It has an undisturbed Quaternary geomorphological record of large and high hillocks of 200 meter thick loess deposits covering the earlier deposits³. In these loess deposits there are large number of weathered soils at different levels. The contents of these varved loess and soils indicate that during the Pleistocene epoch the landscape was savannah grass with temperate conifers and broad leaved woods in the climatic optimums of warmer periods, and sparse xerophytic woods in the dry and cold periods⁴. In these geomorphological sediments, particularly in the lower strata, deposited during the periods of climatic optima, a large collection of Lower Palaeolithic implements are found. In comparison their number diminish markedly in the loess deposits of dry and cold periods⁵.

A large collection of these palaeoliths, discovered from sites of southern Tadjikistan, are represented by pebble tools. These discoveries, on the basis of stratigraphy, palaeogeography, thermoluminescence dating and palaeomagnetic surveys, suggest that primitive man first appeared in this area around 300,000 years B.P.(before present). But, the period between 250,000 to 130,000 years B.P. was the most favourable for him, as the climate in the region was by and large warm. He, however, continued to live beyond these days and his presence is recorded till about 80,000 years B.P. belonging to this archaeological period. For example the Kuldara site, in the south of Dushambe, has produced pebble tools of small size which on the basis of palaeomagnetic surveys date 80,000 to 75,000 years B.P⁶.




Fig. no 2. Pebble tools from Karatau I, Tadjikistan.

On the other hand, a well stratified deposit of pebble tool complex (figure no 2), at Karatau I, has produced a large collection of implements which on the basis of thermoluminescent dating is of 200,000 to 150,000 years B.P.⁷. Another large collection of pebble tools was excavated at Lakhuti I site which gave a date of 300,000 years B.P.⁸. The pebble tools, representing the Lower Palaeolithic Culture of the mountains of Central Asia, the distinctive phenomenon in the region and are available at many other sites. On the basis of typology, these resemble the pebble tools of the Soan valley of the Punjab and loess regions of China and are of Middle Pleistocene epoch.

Kazakhstan

In the steppes of Kazakhstan and the desert regions of Central Asia there are few sites from where pebble tools have been found, but these have also yielded tools of Acheulean tradition, including hand-axes. Such mixed assemblage of tool types, found near the Semizbugu hills and elsewhere, are said to have got deposited during the III Interglacial Period, though without arriving at any final assessment regarding their stratigraphical horizons⁹. This climatic period falls at the end of

the Middle Pleistocene epoch but, in the absence of scientific dates, a clear picture of the emergence of the primitive man in Kazakhstan does not get revealed.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan

In Uzbekistan some important sites were explored and excavated and these have mostly produced tools of Acheulean complex with few pebble tools. The sites, near Tashkent and in the Fargana valley, particularly the Kulbulak site which is stratified, are rich in Acheulean tools but these sites provide no definite date of the fabrication of these tools¹⁰. Likewise, in Turkmenistan, particularly on the east of Caspian and central part of the Kopet Dag, Acheulean tools are found¹¹ but these again give no definite date to record the exact date of the arrival of the primitive man in the area.

Mongolia

In south-eastern region of Mongolia, as well as at many places in the west, there are found on the surface of ancient beds pebble tools of Lower Palaeolithic Culture (figure no 3).




Fig. no 3. Pebble tools from Ulalinka, Mongolia.

These pebble beds are dated to the Lower Pleistocene epoch and as such record a very early date for the presence of pre-historic man in the area. The site of Ulalinka, in the northern Altai, has yielded a series of pebble tools, which in spite of raising certain doubts, are of Lower Pleistocene epoch. The strata in which these are found have now been dated, on the basis of thermoluminescence, 1.48 MY B.P (million years before present).¹² Besides, a Mongolian site near the Yarkah mountains has yielded Acheulean tools for which there is no definite date available, but typologically again these are of Lower Palaeolithic Culture¹³.

China

In many parts of China, like Yunnan, Guizhoi, Hubei and Inner Mongolia, cultural fossils of Lower Palaeolithic age have been found but without any precise date. However, the Choukoutien finds, which even though lie outside Central Asia, provide an important evidence of the initial stage of the China's Palaeolithic Culture. The finds, mostly chopping or pebble tools, are of the famous Peking man, who is now palaeomagnetically dated to 200,000 year B.P.¹⁴, corresponding to the Middle Pleistocene epoch.

Afghanistan and Iran

The Lower Palaeolithic tools, both of pebble and Acheulean types, have been collected at several places in Afghanistan but these remain of general historic and cultural interest as for most of the time their geomorphological stratifications are not completely established¹⁵. However, at a site near Mashhad, in the north east Iran, pebble tools were found of Middle Pleistocene formations and are estimated to be 800,000 years B.P. in age¹⁶.

Pakistan

The best known Palaeolithic Culture of Central Asia is that of the Soan valley. Identified by Helmet, de Terra and T.T.

Paterson on the Potwar Plateau, in the Siwalik sediments of north-east Pakistan, this culture has become the standard model for defining the Asian Palaeolithic developments. Work subsequent to de Terra and Paterson had until recently made only partial amendments to this model, according to which the age of the culture was determined on the basis of geomorphological location of the palaeolithic finds, on the Soan river terraces. H. de Terra and Paterson found five types of tools located at different heights of the river bed which as per their stratigraphical model were deposited in the geomorphological strata corresponding to different ages and in varying climatic oscillations related to the four-fold Himalayan Glacial Stages¹⁷.

The earliest of these, crudely made flake tools called pre-Soan, are found in geological beds belonging to the receding phase of the II Glacial Stage. After these a series of pebble tools emerge: the earliest, known as Early Soan (Fig. no 4),




Fig.no. 4. Pebble tools from Potwar, Pakistan.

are found in deposits ascribed to II Interglacial Stage, and both these types of tools belong to the Lower Palaeolithic Culture of the Middle Pleistocene epoch. Early Soan pebble tools have also been found in the eastern Punjab corresponding to the era to which Soan tools are related¹⁸. Alongwith, these, there are Acheulean hand axes in the Punjab, on either side of the present border, the earliest of which is dated to the III Glacial Stage.

H.de Terra and T.T.Paterson accomodated their geological sequence within the then current view that the Himalayan glaciation began in the Pleistocene - sometime around 1 MY B.P - and is characterised by four major glacial episodes as represented in the Alps by the four-fold classical sequence of Gunz, Mindel, Riss and Wurm. In the recent years their work has been re-examined and a new understanding of the geology of the Potwar is being worked out in the light of current ideas of chronology, based upon magnetic polarity stratigraphy. The new chronological model greatly relies upon the significance of the tectonic uplifts, on the stability of the Potwar and adjacent regions of the Siwaliks, which in spite of its being noted by de Terra and Paterson, was underplayed by them for the geological formations of the region. Accordingly, the climatic factor deduced earlier has become subservient to this stability factor. The Siwalik series, which was laid down in the plains below the Himalayas as a result of the uplift and erosion of the Himalayan chain, has been estimated to have got progressively folded, uplifted particularly between 1.6 MY to 0.4 MY B.P¹². During this period of upheavals and upliftment of land surface, man was already here making stone tools. The earliest of these types, the crudely made flake tools, were found in a context for which a date of 2 MY B.P. has been now obtained. The pebble tools are associated in a stratum of 1.4 to 1.2 MY B.P. while as the earliest Acheulean hand-axes have been dated about 700,000 years B.P²⁰. In other words, the available chronometric dates make it to deduce that the

Himalayan glaciation itself started in the Pliocene epoch and the II Glacial Stage as recorded by de Terra and Paterson, may thus fall at the beginning of the Lower Pleistocene.

Kashmir

The Palaeolithic discoveries made in Kashmir, during about last 30 years, have provided new dimensions for the study of human existence, development and associated human cultures in Central Asia. In this context, a number of implements were found, first by Prof. H. D. Sankalia²¹ and then by Prof. R. V. Joshi *et al*²², in the moraine deposits of the Liddar and the Sindh valleys. Two such tool types have been considered to be the earliest in Asia as their stratigraphical locations and fabrication techniques suggest. The earliest of these is a flake tool, found from moraine sediments at Pahalgam, which was deposited here during the initial phase of the II Glacial Stage. This flake tool (figure no 5) has even been regarded to




Fig. no. 5 Flake tool from Pahalgam, Kashmir.

belong actually to the I Interglacial Stage²³ : in other words these tools seem to have appeared long before the earliest such tools of Asia at Soan. As the Soan flake tools are now chronometrically dated to 2 MY B.P., accordingly on the stratigraphical placement of the flake tool at Pahalgam, it can be argued that man would have fabricated this tool type in Kashmir still earlier. Even though this archaeological stratum has not been matched with the available chronometric dates of the sediments in the valley, yet it is also true that Kashmir climate was interglacial or warmer type around 2.14 MY B.P.²⁴. This type of tool, therefore, may have thus belonged to this age of warmer climate, particularly because if Sankalia is to be believed that the tool itself belonged to the I Interglacial Stage.

Another type of tool found at Pahalgam is an Abbevillian hand-axe, while as in other parts of Asia the earliest found hand-axe is the technologically evolved type, called Acheulean. This evolved type is now dated, in Pakistan, to 700,000 years B.P. The Pahalgam hand-axe (figure no 6) was found from the




Fig. no. 6. Abbevillian hand-axe from Pahalgam, Kashmir.

Middle Pleistocene formations, ascribed to the early II Interglacial Stage. While as the earliest Acheulean type found elsewhere in the region are of later stages of the II Interglacial Stage, the Pahalgam hand-axe, therefore, is older in age than the hand-axes in the region not only on the basis of technology involved for its fabrication but also on account of its stratigraphical placement. This is the age of *Homo-erectus* whose many more tools were found in the higher reaches of the river valleys of the Sindh, the Liddar and the Rembara. These discoveries have opened a new chapter for the study of the early man in Kashmir; and in this endeavour we carried out an archaeological investigation at Mansbal and found not only palaeolithic tools but also habitational abodes of early man in the form of caves²⁵. The Mansbal tools are mostly bifacial and generally depicting Middle Acheulean technique. We initially estimated these to be of Middle Palaeolithic Period, on the basis of Middle/Upper Acheulean technology involved for the fabrication of these tools²⁶, but then arrived at a conclusion that as no Mousterian types are found in the tool assemblage these may belong to the Lower Palaeolithic Culture of the Middle Pleistocene epoch. Keeping in view the nature of these rock structures, the Mansbal tools are very important as they prove the continuous history of archaeological implements. Particularly so because like all other tools found earlier in Kashmir these are found not in a high river valley but practically at the foot of it. These tools are also important because they indicate that man could live at one place rather than wander from one place to the other in search of stable lands and climatic comforts, especially when the geophysical condition of the valley of Kashmir during the Pleistocene epoch was unique and characteristic. The studies carried on the geological sediments of Kashmir of the Pliocene and Pleistocene epochs have led to the conclusion, due to the researches conducted during last fifteen years or so²⁷, that Kashmir basin was formed during mountain orogeny in Miocene and it later on got transformed into a vast lake without an outlet for drainage.

This happened in the Pliocene epoch, around 4 MY B.P. on account of the rise in the height of the Pir Panjal, due to tectonic upliftments. The Valley lake grew in size and volume and there were stupendous changes in it during the next more than three million years, and finally it started to drain out only around 85,000 years B.P through a fault at Baramulla.

In this lake, Karewa sediments, composed of muds and transported by highland waters, were deposited. These are now part of the present day geomorphology of the Valley and almost accurately present the features of its past environmental behaviour. For the geo-physical state of Kashmir, the climate which was in a state of fluctuation, played its part too. It changed from dry sub-tropical to cold-temperate around 3 MY B.P, and thereafter there were long periods of ice cold glacial climate interrupted by shorter warm interglacial periods. The first cold period that the Valley witnessed was between 2.65 to 2.14 MY B.P. and the last ended around 15,000 years B.P. Such type of environmental factors were also responsible for changing the ecological pattern, particularly the vegetation cover of angiospermic plants.

In the given situation, where tectonic upheavals and transportation of huge masses of debris by glaciers and highland waters was changing the physiography, the Valley floor occupied by a vast lake, and persistent and prolonged cold climate in existence, it is fascinating to account for the presence of man in Kashmir in this period. The flake tool finds on the high river valley was therefore on account of the appearance of *Homo-habilis* more than 2 MY B.P. at high altitudinal places when the Valley floor was not accessible to him. To begin with this fossil, man had certainly not to face the glacial climate when around 2.20 MYB.P. it had changed to warm one. *Homo-erectus* too appeared on the high river valleys, beyond the limits of the Valley lake. These human species for the sake of survival had to give a struggle in the open forests which were changing their pattern, in fluctuating

climate shifting between dry-cold and wet-warm stages on many occasions. The Mansbal record, on the other hand, is from the shores of the vast Valley lake where he located for himself dwelling abodes. These rock structures practically kept him beyond the limits of ice sheets and harsh climatic oscillations. These caves may also have allowed him to develop human relations and social groups for the very activities of survival.

Not only Kashmir record of the Pleistocene and the Pliocene epochs but also of any other region of the Central Asia suggest that the natural conditions in Central Asia were not stable before the emergence of man here. Following the mountain orogeny and the formations of the present day mountain topography of the Hindukush, the Himalayas, the Pamirs and the Tien Shan a process of aridity inside the Central Asia and tropical to temperate environment on the fringes of the Himalayas is found to have got established before the Quaternary Period. These conditions have further changed considerably within the time span of the human history. The foregoing summary makes it evident that the mountain terrain of the Kashmir Himalayas and also of the adjacent areas of the Soan possibly was the launching platform for the emergence and development of man and associated human cultures in Central Asia, particularly because of the estimated antiquity of the stone tools (figure no 7 on the following page). Like their successors of the ancient human societies the fossil men, in all likelihood, kept themselves on move and shifted in the region from one place to the other in search of stable land, comfortable environment and ecology. Even though man has inbuilt capabilities to withstand the natural disturbances and conditions, the movement of fossil men in the region may have also resulted on account of tectonic upliftments, climatic fluctuations and other natural forms.






Years BP X 1000	Geology	Archaeology	Major Hominids emerge Outside / Inside Central Asia	
12	<u>Holocene</u>	<u>Mesolithic</u>		
40		<u>Upper Palaeolithic</u>	<i>Homo sapiens</i>	
80	<u>Upper Pleistocene</u>	<u>Middle Palaeolithic</u>	<i>Neanderthalis</i>	 Tadjik
800	<u>Middle Pleistocene</u>			 Iran
1,000			<i>Homo erectus</i>	 Mongolia
2,000	<u>Lower Pleistocene</u>	<u>Lower Palaeolithic</u>		 Soan
	<u>Upper Pliocene</u>		<i>Homo habilis</i>	 Kashmir
2,500				

Fig. no. 7. Table showing Archaeological/Hominid chronology in Central Asia.

Notes and References

01. Central Asia has been delimited on various grounds, like interior drainage system, surrounding mountain chains etc. For details see, *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, 3rd edition, vol I, pp 407-920, *The New Encyclopaedia Britanica*, 15th edition, vol 2, pp 145-205.
02. This is what is being regarded as radical delimitation. Central Asia as such includes the western Turkestan, comprising Turkmenia,

- Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzia; the eastern Turkestan or Sinkiang province and Tibet of China; Mongolia, North-east Iran, Afghanistan, North-west of Pakistan and Kashmir, see G.M.Mir, *Regional Geography of Central Asia*, Srinagar, 1993, pp 7-12.
03. V.A.Ranov and R.S.Davis, "Towards a New Outline of the Soviet Central Asian Palaeolithic", *Current Anthropology* (Chicago), vol 20, pp 252-56.
 04. *Ibid.*
 05. V.A.Ranov, D.Dorj and Lu Zun E have reported that the number of Lower Palaeolithic tools is very high in a particular weathered soil stratum than those when temperature was very cold, 'Lower Palaeolithic Cultures' in A.H.Dani and V.M.Masson (eds), *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, vol I, UNESCO, 1992, pp 48-49.0
 06. *Ibid.*
 07. S.P.Gupta, *Archaeology of Soviet Central Asia and Indian Border Lands*, New Delhi, 1979, pp 51-52.
 08. V.A.Ranov, D.Dorj and Lu Zun E, *op.cit*, 1992, pp 49.
 09. *Ibid*, p 50, S.P.Gupta, *op.cit*, pp 50-56.
 10. S.P.Gupta, *op.cit*, pp 50-56.
 11. *Ibid*, pp 50-56.
 12. V.A.Ranov *et.al*, *op.cit*, 1992, p 57.
 13. A.P.Oladnikov, "The Palaeolithic of Mongolia", in F.I.Smith (ed) *Early Palaeolithic in South and East Asia*, Paris, 1978.
 14. Yan-Xian Li and Hongo-Xiang Ji, "Discussion of the Natural Environment and its Changes at the time of Peking Man", *Vertebrate Pal Asiaticque*, vol 19, 1981.
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 16. V.A.Ranov *et.al*, *op.cit*, 1992, p57.
 17. H.de Terra and TT Paterson, *Studies on the Ice Age in India and Associated Human Cultures*, Washington, 1939.
 18. G.C.Mohapatra, "Quaternary Sedimentary Cycle and Lithic Industries in North-Western India", *The Indian Geographer*, vol 13 (1-2), 1973.
 19. Hellen Rendell, "The Pleistocene sequence in the Soan valley, northern Pakistan", in B.Allchin (ed) *South Asian Archaeology 1981*, London 1984, pp 3-9 and R.W.Dennell, "The Importance of the Potwar Plateau, Pakistan, to studies of Early Man" in B.Allchin, *Ibid*, pp 10-19.
 20. Hellen Randell, *Ibid*; B.R.Allchin, "Early traces of man in the Potwar Plateau, Pakistan, a report of the British Archaeological Mission", *South Asian Studies*, vol 2, 1986, pp 69-83; H.Randell and R.W.Dennell., "Dated Lower Palaeolithic artefacts from Northern

- Pakistan", *Current Anthropology* (Chicago) vol 26, No 3, 1985, p 393.
21. H.D.Sankalia, "New Evidence for Early Man in Kashmir", *Current Anthropology*, vol 12, No 4 & 5, 1971, pp 538-61; *Pre and Protohistory of India and Pakistan*, 2nd ed.Pune, 1974.
 22. R.V.Joshi, S.N.Rajguru, R.S.Pappu and B.P.Bupardikar, "Quaternary Glaciation and Palaeolithic Sites in the Liddar valley, Jammu and Kashmir", *World Archaeology*, 1974, pp 369-79.
 23. H.D.Sankalia (*Ibid*,1974), giving reasons for this estimation states that the dispersal of such tools would have taken some time to get deposited; and thus the tool was found in a II Glacial context.
 24. The magnetostratigraphy of the Karewas (S.Kusungar, B.S.Kotlia and D.P. Agrawal, "Magneto Stratigraphy of the Karewas of the Kashmir valley", "*Climate and Geology of Kashmir and Central Asia: The Last Four Million Years*, 1985, N.Delhi, p 13) has indicated that in the Romushi section there is a formation of conglomerate bed at its base which when matched with the global magnetic stratigraphy provide a date of around 2.14 MY B.P. for the event; see D.P.Agrawal, *Man and Environment through Ages*, 1992, Delhi, figure 3.3, p 75. Such formations were made when climate was temperate and wet. The event but cannot be matched with the pollen profile of the Karewas for want of pollen material therein. But the pollen profile of the Karewas has shown that the climate of the Valley had improved around 2.2 MY B.P. which tend to become cool-temperate and wet (D.P.Agrawal, *Ibid*, p 140 and table 5.2.)
 25. These were found during the exploration programme of CCAS in Nov, 1996.
 26. Aijaz.A.Bandey, "Palaeolithic Habitational Site at Mansbal, Kashmir: Recent Archaeological Investigation", *Journal of Central Asian Studies*, Srinagar vol 8, No 1, 1997, pp 95-104.
 27. Kashmir Palaeoclimatic Project was launched in 1980 and continued till 1989. A series of articles on the subject have been published by team members, a synthesis of which has appeared in D.P.Agrawal, *op.cit.*

A Descriptive Account of China and its Central Asian Dependencies

Mushtaq A. Kaw*

Till recent past, Chinese empire stretched over a vast area in China proper and Inner Asia region on China's periphery. Inner Asia comprised, *inter alia*, the present Eastern Turkestan¹. Accordingly, when we describe here China, it encompasses China Proper as well as some parts of Eastern Turkestan. Taken as a whole, China inherited a rich legacy which is revealed by its multi-dimensional history. The present paper seeks to study several aspects of Chinese history and also examines the elements of continuity and change affected therein from 9th century till early 20th century. The information given in this paper is mainly based upon the travel accounts of Sulaiman Merchant and Abu Zaid Al Hasan². The supporting information has been gath-

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ered from some modern works compiled on China and its dependencies.

Imperial Rule

While describing imperial rule in the 9th century China, the Arab accounts report that at the top of the government stood the emperor, the absolute and supreme executive of the Chinese state overseen by a host of military governors and princes of the cities constituting the empire. Everything in the imperial institution was designed to foster a sense of awe and unapproachable remoteness. The emperor himself remained escorted in the walled, moated and heavily guarded forbidden capital city, which had two sharp territorial divisions, one occupied by the emperor and his associates and the other by the commoners. The former, rich in palatial buildings, was adorned and equipped with all such amenities as were thought necessary for the dignity of the imperial institution. While all other walled Chinese cities were adorned with five small-sized trumpets on its gates, the capital city was distinguishable by five extra-ordinary trumpets and several drums beaten as a mark of allegiance to the emperor in addition to designate the hour of the day and night. As a mark of further distinction, the emperor appeared in public only once in ten months. Even while on tour, no one could dare cutting his way or appearing on the window of his own house until the emperor was gone by³. In view of this dignified isolation, few individuals saw the emperor face to face on the eve of any procession⁴. Loyalty in absolute terms retained its supreme character till 13th century. The Ming code of 1397 subjected all Chinese to an unprecedented and totalitarian degree⁵. Even thereafter, the concept of absolutism became such a historical reality that the future rulers did not permit the construction of any such building that could rival the imperial palaces in size or splendour. The subjects too in the entire country were not allowed to put on special designs that graced the emperor's clothing

and any other item of his personal use. Even law was enforced to defend the rights of an individual against another individual or group rather than the state headed by the emperor. In fact, the common saying that "Heaven is high and the emperor is far away" is quite apt and speaks of the extraordinary status of the emperor in the Chinese social order till early 20th century⁶. While the Chinese considered the Arab king as the most powerful of all kings of the world, they treated their emperor as the Lord of all tribes, regions, states and other dependencies⁷. The traditional absolute authority was evenly applicable to the provinces constituting Chinese Turkistan. In fact, the tradition/legend has it that by virtue of a remarkable fiction, the Chinese emperors defended all their territories by the use of force—a fiction held strong by the ruler and the subjects together till early 20th century⁸.

Administration of Justice

Theoretically, the imperial powers were absolute as long as the emperor ruled by virtue but in practice, his powers were limited by prevailing traditions: law was invoked only after rituals had failed. The emperor was expected to function not merely as a conqueror and administrator but also as a guardian, as well as the highest law giver and Judge⁹. In order to redress the grievances of the masses, the emperor had hanged a bell from his palace, in the capital city. On pulling its string, the complainant was brought in person before the emperor and his case was settled. Records speak that the emperor was keen enough to attend to all those who had not been heard to their satisfaction at the level of the lower tribunals. Thus Chinese "rang the bell for what regarded justice; beat the drums for what pertained to law and religion; struck upon the leaden plate for what concerned the prisoners; upon the plate of iron for what related to the prisoners and upon the stone table for wrongs commit-

ted by the magistrates". Presently the reminiscences of the historical bell exist but without any function.

Execution of law and Award of Punishment

Although the Chinese legal system was not systematic in the Western sense, it nevertheless provided convicted persons a chance to appeal before the judges who happened to be well-versed in law with least inclination to mundane objects. In accordance with the given law, both the appealant and defendant produced claims and counter claims in writing and on their examination, the judgements were pronounced. Neither the witnesses were produced nor were the parties in conflict required to undertake any oath.

The rules of punishment were fairly set. Highway robbery, theft, adultery and homicide amounted to death which was not as fearful as its mode of execution. Both the hands of the criminal were tied together and then forced backward till they rested upon his neck. Thereafter, his right and left feet were fastened to his right and left hand in such a manner that rendered the criminal incapable to stir. In this miserable state, he was bambood unto death. The award of punishment for a bankrupt person was even more peculiar. He was plainly imprisoned for a month after which he was released with the condition to reimburse the borrowed money to the creditor within a weeks time. If he feigned resourcelessness, a public announcement was made to determine the assets of the bankrupt. If it was known that he had some definite sum with any perosn he was instantly bambood to death for suppressing the facts. The slightest of offences earned a criminal 20 strokes in addition to some marginal fine.

The post 9th century sources not only certify the punishment by bamboos but also suggest branding of human beings with iron and ink. These sources also point to the slicing of dead bodies for the sake of public consump-

tion. Such instances of cannibalism may seem legendary these days but the fact remains that the horrid practice of eating the human flesh continued in China even after 9th century . However, towards the 18th century, under the intellectual influence, the Chinese began to appreciate the morality and ethics as the highest form of human values alongwith law. They realised that "If the people are led by laws and an attempt is made to give them uniformity by means of punishment, they will try to avoid the punishment, without having any sense of shame. If, however, they are led by virtues, and an attempt is made to give them uniformity by means of rituals, they will have a sense of shame and become good."¹⁰Inhuman acts were accordingly made to yeild place to a series of reformative legislation particularly, in matters of execution of punishment. Variety of offences were treated on the basis of the merit and definite laws were framed with regard to the official negligence and misconduct. Distortion of information or suppressing facts were declared punishable offences. No doubt frauds in accounts continued but the total embezzlement was neither encouraged, nor permitted. Expensive gifts were accepted under custom, but undisguised bribes were punishable. The significant improvement in the administration of justice and execution of law, was registered during the 20th Century when proper court system based on various laws and legal codes framed all over the world, were established in China and its peripheries. Nevertheless, the growth of an effective legal system was impossible for want of several infrastructural facilities. With the result, China experienced unprecedented growth of crime rate In 1983 itself, Chinese government had to come out with a heavy hand on the criminal activities and arrest thousands of culprits without facing any trial. But very soon laws were amended so as to adhere to the rules of ethics and morality governing the natural justice¹¹.

Religious Ceremonies

A significant feature of the ritual life in traditional China was the observance of some most impressive ceremonial displays notwithstanding great cost and other financial hardships. Chinese were not so much afraid of death as they were of rituals connected with the death itself. The 9th century Arab accounts have also pointed out how long spell of mourning followed the death of a person and how huge amount was spent on the occasion. They report that the Chinese buried dead bodies twelve months after their actual death and during this period kept them covered in a coffin varnished with quick lime. It is also important to note that for the commoners they mourned for one year, and for princess and kings, three years. They invited all their relatives, friends and other mourners for paying tributes to the departed soul though still in coffin. All this warranted a huge amount which normally a poor Chinese could not afford. For this and other religious ceremonies, he was always constrained to borrow debt which passed on from one generation to another. Such type of wasteful ceremonies were so ingrained in Chinese culture that a 19th century traveller was constrained to lament upon their devastating impact on the bereaved families¹². Even in the early 20th century the evil practice was supplemented by yet another ritual of offering charitable contribution for the sake of earning better incarnation for the deceased. All such religious ceremonies were, however, tolerated by the Communist government in a simplified manner. The earlier custom of burying the kings and other persons of royal blood alongwith all their rich apparel was discontinued. The practice of burial and cremation existed though it was seldom practiced. The corpse was at times fed to vultures: as a symbol of charity¹³.

Idolatry

Popular religious beliefs and practices which derive their source from Chinese thought and Confucian values, pro-

duced a vast multicoloured fabric of institutional and individual worship. Religion thus began to encompass "an unheard of swarms of gods, deities and spirits of every kind". Worship of these deities generally featured bathing, fasting, prostration, prayers and thanks-giving offerings of incense, lighted candles, precious objects, fruit, food and wine together with music or dancing¹⁴. These activities were believed to purify the mind and body and to please the gods. In conformity with these beliefs, the 9th century Arab travelers reveal that the Chinese worshipped idols and prostrated before them for they understood that the idols spoke to them when approached for the fulfilment of any spiritual and mundane interest. Due to the state patronage, idolatry continued to command great respect even after 9th century. In early 19th century idolatrous processions were taken out for placating gods and deriving from them beneficial or protective gains. Till recently too, the Chinese used to practice idolatry and visit temples and priests of different faiths as and when occasion demanded. With the onset of the Communist Revolution in 1949, however, the age-old religious beliefs were changed to toe the line of Communist ideology and policy, though in 1980's again limited religious practice was permitted to suit the religious interests of national minority groups like Christians and Muslims¹⁵.

Muslims in China

According to Arab accounts, Muslims, like Christians, contributed to the large Chinese population, though their exact number is not available. We are simply told that by 9th century the number of the Muslims who had settled in China mostly as traders was pretty good. Kansu, the principle city of China towards Eastern Turkistan, was largely inhabited by the Muslims, whose affairs were conducted by a judge appointed by the Chinese emperor. On festive occasions, the judge performed civil services and recited *khutba* in the name of *khalifa*. His judgements, being based on the

Quran and *shariah*, were just and equitable. The number of the Muslims from 9th century and onwards exhibited an increasing tendency and by the 18th century, some prominent cities, particularly in Eastern China, were largely inhabited by the Muslims. The North-Western parts of China's empire also registered a large number of the Muslims practicing circumcision, proscribing the use of swine flesh, and preaching against idolatry though some of them like other religious sects adhered to idolatrous practices¹⁷.

General Account

Family and Marriages: While giving a general description, the Arab accounts reveal that the Chinese were mostly fair, handsome and of common stature although they were quite unhygienic and seldom took a bath. They did not wash even after a call of nature and instead used a paper for the purpose. Both men and women covered their bodies with home-spun cotton, though the rich and wealthy were dressed in silken clothes. The men were free to marry any women, other than public women, outside their tribe. The inter-tribal matrimonials were thought to add to the nobility of children—a practice that was operative even towards the late 19th century. However, all kinds of marriages were celebrated with great sanguinity and the betrothal was consummated as now, by the exchange of gifts and presents. The occasion of marriage was celebrated with playing of all sorts of instruments including the beating of drums. The Arab accounts are silent regarding the fact whether or not polygamy was in vogue in the 9th century, though towards the 19th century it was certainly practised in case where a married person was issueless.

Normally the state abstained from interfering in the private life or issues concerning family. However, it interfered where it found violation of any moral and ethical values. For instance, every women prone to debauchery was re-

quired to publically admit her evasion to marry. Her profession was there after registered through a systematic mechanism; her name including her family and residence was properly entered into a register. A string at which was hung a copper ring bearing the king's signature was put around her neck, and she was given a certificate which entitled her to a stipulated stipend. All this debarred her from the right to marry and any violation thereafter earned her death.

Houses: They dwelt in wood-made houses. Since wood was vulnerable to recurring fires, the Chinese houses, therefore, did neither have different storeys, nor stairs. Their movable assets were simply laden over chests which were always placed on the wheels so that in the event of fire or earthquake, the wheeled chests were conveniently driven out to safer places. Up to the 18th century, there was almost no significant change in the building material which largely consisted of wood, bamboos and canes employed for affecting partition in the houses. Towards the 19th century, the designing of Chinese houses underwent a change and began to have two storeys, with stones, bricks etc as the building material.

Diet: The diet of the Chinese largely comprised rice and wheat supplemented by several vegetables, fruits and all sorts of animal meat except that of swine, rats, cats and dogs. Beef, though sold privately, was generally avoided as a token of regard for domesticated animals like oxen and cows which were meant for ploughing of the agricultural land. While Chinese generally abstained from grape wine for being stimulant and intoxicant, they were averse to circumcision and killing the animals by cutting their throat. Instead, they killed them by beating their mouth so that the blood does not drain off.

Education: Such an act may appear to be inhuman, but it does not sound that the Chinese were backward and indisposed to education. As a matter of fact, they were desirous of taking to education regardless of the financial constraints. The existence of cluster of schools in every Chinese city substantiates this point. The teachers of these schools were paid from the public treasury. Their utmost propensity for education made them to learn all skills in medicines which mostly consisted of the use of hot iron to cure diseases. Their medical knowledge had taught them that the pain in kidneys or strangury was caused normally by urinating in a sitting posture which intercepts urinary passage leading thereby to a number of diseases. The Chinese equally abstained from rounding the heads of the new born babies for they otherwise apprehended considerable alteration in the brain which in the long run was likely to impair one's health. True, in the 19th and 20th centuries, Chinese progressed in curative medicines but they didnot altogether discontinue the traditional medicines drawn from locally available herbs and timber products¹⁸. Similarly, traditional education has been permitted alongwith the Western learning. Education which remained over whelmingly private in 19th century China, was further developed by the establishment of countless colleges with the dawn of the 20th century¹⁹. Nontheless, up to 1928, the government could not afford improving literacy rate. The schemes of mass education at the primary and middle school levels was taken up only after 1950²⁰.

Taxes and Duties: The Chinese were skilful artists who made their name in painting, carpentary, masonry, tailoring, shoe-making, iron, brass, silver and golden works. The state patronised these artists and awarded them for their exemplary skill. The art objects were mostly made of tortoise shell and unicorn horns imported from neighbouring countries. These art objects, together with horses, asses,

dromedaries, copper coins, tea and luxury goods, were exported to other countries. Every incoming commodity was subject to duty so as to contribute to the revenue of the country. However, trade was not the only source of income to the state. Every cultivator of eighteen years of age was levied a poll tax instead of land tax. Men who reached the age of eighty years were not only exempted from the poll tax but were also paid pension to make up for what they had contributed during their youth. In addition to poll tax, duties were imposed on salt mines and the leaves of a particular shrub called tea. In the 16th century, taxes were imposed, besides salt and tea, on market place shops, vending stalls, wine and mercantile goods, silk and cotton. No information is available regarding the fact whether the taxes or duties were realised in kind or cash. However, we are told that copper coins functioned as a currency for all sorts of transactions as the chances of fraud were perceived to be less in this high-bulk and low value currency. To be precise, the copper coinage operated till 19th century in China where one could trace plenty of money changing shops meant to transform silver or gold by weight for an equivalent.

In short, right from the 9th century to the early 20th century, the Chinese society was in a constant process of change. Amid this change, several reminiscences of Chinese culture were accommodated indicating thereby that while the Chinese were receptive to the ongoing global change, they did not, at the same time, part with their rich cultural heritage.

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Islamic Political Thought From Unilateral To Multilateral System

*Gulshan Majid**

Islam had its beginnings in a society that was tribal in character¹ having a weak and ephemeral concept of territoriality. These tribes were in a constant state of hostility with each other. The intergroup raidings, which were a common feature, were suspended only during the long period of ritual observances. These rituals and ceremonies were mainly associated with Kaaba at Mecca, giving it a position of pre-eminence and helping its people to maintain their socio-religious institutions and their own status. It was a symbiosis between the urban and the tribal *bedouins* of the desert. Within a tribe there existed, like other close-knit societies, maximum of equality with minimum of authority² as the social and cultural organisation

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was largely based on kinship. There was not any one tribal society in and around the 'twin cities' of Macca and Madina; there were many such societies³. It was largely a case of primitive democracy : every tribe maintaining and guarding its distinct faith, gods and a tract of land⁴. Every tribe chose or elected its own *shaikh* who assembled in himself the functions of a warlord, priest, and presiding officer of various ceremonies of that particular tribe. These observances helped to maintain the intrapersonal relations and regulate sharing of the economic resources. Though trader class and money lenders in Macca and Madina were pronounced entities, the society ran on tribal lines. Here class distinctions were mainly economical, neither permanent nor significant. The practice of engaging agents, on their personal merits or on the merit of the one recommending their names, for furthering individual gains and comforts, was in vogue⁵.

A political institution of any significance with its executive wing to make the decisions arrived at, effective was absent. Of course, a decision making body, called the *Mala'a*⁶, existed to resolve the disagreements or to settle day to day disputes, or any other allied problem of its members. However, the jurisdiction of *Mala'a* was very limited and its decisions had no significance unless based on unanimity. Tribal interests and the honour of the individual *shaiks* were of foremost importance⁷. The *Mala'a* had no powers in case of intra-tribal disputes or disagreements. Every *shaikh* maintaining the autonomy of tribe on all counts. Any attempt to forge a (mechanical) unity and impose a monarchy, on a Syrian (Roman)⁸ or Iranian model, were frustrated by the vehement opposition from the concerned tribal societies. One such attempt was allegedly made by one Uthman bin Auwayrith⁹ who converted to Christianity and tried to import the Syrian model of kingship. No sooner did he pronounce himself the king than he was strongly denounced by al-Aswad bin al-Mutalib¹⁰ and made to withdraw his claim; thus keeping at bay any other fortune-seeker or op-

portunist who might have fostered any such design for his community. No doubt at one time a class corporation called *Helaf-al-Fudu*¹¹, (The League of Virtuous) was established in Mecca to help the poor and needy. Its first meeting was convened by Al Zubair. Prophet Mohammad(SAW), who was one of its founder members, used to speak very highly of this league. But the attempts to establish such organisations or guilds were mostly for safeguarding the interests of the society at large and they showed the concerns of the gentry for the weaker sections of the society and exhibited a vigour for establishing a semblance of harmony in the society. The purpose was mainly social and to some extent economical; political systems was yet to emerge. It was a sort of leveling mechanism adopted by a society to facilitate its trade interests and to redistribute natural resources. The society was heavily coming under different kinds of strains¹². The trading communities of Mecca and Madina were finding these war-like conditions detrimental to the general health of the community/communities concerned.

From the foregoing discussion it must not be understood that the Arab and the Islam are somewhat synonymous terms; or mutually exclusive or interchangeable terms. Islam belonged to all those people who embraced it, all those regions which received it and all those cultures which merged with it or got rejuvenated because of it. Cultures are often defined as “inter-connected continuum, in space and time as well as in developmental relations”¹³. Societies evolve through the requirements and demands of their individual members and as such they always find themselves under strain. The demands of society on a system are directly proportional to the variables exceeding their goal range. Routine behaviour of the members of a society, mechanical responses to its customs and tradition, inadequate methods to solve the evils — whether social, economic or ethical, lead more and more on an abnormal course¹⁴. Every society tries to release itself of these unwanted pressures and strains by finding new means to utilize

the energies of its members e.g., engaging them on a profitable course and setting before them a purpose higher, loftier and sublime. It all happens through the efforts of the men of genius who again put the society on a normal course of *sirat-ul-mustaqim*¹⁵.

Mala'a and *Helaf al-Fudul* were no more than a class response, on ethical grounds, to the evils of that particular society, without, of course, interfering in its general structure. They provided 'relief' not the solution to catastrophe. Political system was yet to emerge. It emerged with the advent of Islam¹⁶. Islam created a higher order control which in turn created means to help the runaway variables to return to their range. The religio-economic measures adopted by Islam to check the escalation of run away variables needed a comprehensive, coherent and all out efforts on the part of the state for strengthening of the higher order control on priority basis. Centralized power announced their submission to a divine law which provided its people rights, opportunities and responsibilities, according to the dictates of this law (*shariah*). Islam provided these people with a cause and negated the supermacy of man over man; it did not treat man as a means to an end extraneous to himself. Establishment of a divine rule was infact the establishment of the dignity of the man himself. Creation of Islamic state, through the hands of Mohammad(SAW) was not an end in itself. But a means to help man to find his true position and to recognize his facticity. It was also an endeavour to create an exploitation free and just society under the all encompassing divine directives. The political system under Mohammad(SAW) was simplest of all. It comprised Mohammad(SAW) himself as the messenger of God, his scribe (they kept on changing) and the companions (all those who had by then adopted Islam). Orders issued from Mohammad(SAW) were followed in word and spirit. The establishment of the state was conceived as a security system within which every citizen could strive for achieving maximum

happiness according to the dictates of the *shariah* (Law of the state) and without ignoring his duties as per the requirements of the law. He, of course, discussed matters concerning his state with the *ashab*. He took its council, analysed the opinions expressed on the spot and took his decisions alone¹⁷. Transparency in all the matters was complete. The philosopher king of an ideal state as envisaged by al-Farabi,¹⁸ is modelled on the example of Mohammad(SAW) himself. Farabi calls him *Rais al awal*¹⁹; he is philosopher²⁰, king²¹, law giver²² and *imam*²³, and disposed to receive revelation²⁴. In his *Madinat-al Fadila*²⁵ he further elaborates this saying that, God mediates to his theoretical²⁶ and practical reason²⁷ a revelation which makes him a philosopher and then to his imaginative faculty making him a Prophet²⁸, a warner, capable of directing men to their happiness. "He is the *imam*, the first ruler over the ideal city-state, ruler over the ideal nation and over the whole inhabited earth²⁹. Those ruled by him are the excellent, the best and the happiest citizens. State under Mohammad(SAW) was not a means of coercion but a means to an ultimate bliss³⁰.

Khilafat at Madina also emerged on a pattern which could be compared with a 'tribal form of selection'. The gentry of the 'tribe of Mohammad', present on the day in the city and acting in the best interests of the community, chose to elect³¹, in the initial movements of deliberation³² their first *khilafa* who had neither his body guards, nor any standing army, nor any well defined boundary of the state beyond the city of Madina. *Khilafa* had neither any beauracracy nor any secretariat or a record holder. As an essential component of his state there was the *bait-ul-mal*³³ (State Treasury) and *majlis mushawarh* (council of advisors) of ten members³⁴. The one major principle on which the Islamic state was founded was *amr bi'l ma'ruf wa'n-nahy an munkar* [i.e. enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong³⁵]. *Khalifa* had not only to consolidate the gains made through the efforts of the community of *mumineen* under the guidance of Mohammad(SAW) himself but he had also to carry

the mission of Mohammad(SAW) forward. *Amr bi'l maruf* required of all Muslims in general and their *amir* in particular to create such conditions as will restrict people from perpetuating the evil³⁶. It was here that the state machinery was used as a deterrent in his capacity as the leader and *khalifa* had to be the best of the lot³⁷. Now that the state had emerged an unconditional submission to its laws (here Divine law) was pre requisite to its membership.

The ostracism principle and *lex talionis* had to be given up in favour of harmonious state laws. Crime against a person was now crime against the state.

Theoretically, *khilafa* had only delegative powers:³⁸ the source of all authority being the *shariah*³⁹ he was only the executive head⁴⁰. But in practice he combined in himself the real power and authority. He could be guided in his actions by the *ijma*⁴¹ generally believed to be the power of the *khilafat*⁴², but he acted as a sovereign, taking all the decisions by himself⁴³. The controversies, in which Uthman(Rd)⁴⁴ got himself entangled and which eventually led to his martyrdom were mainly the outcome of this dichotomy. *Kharjites*⁴⁵ and Ali(Rd) also parted company because *kharjites* never accepted the decision of the *khalifa* to delegate his essential powers or submit himself to the authority of arbitrators rather than be guided by the *shariah* and take his own decision. The moral purpose of the creation of state was to make the conditions congenial for a man to serve God. Personal obligations (*fard ain*) were naturally held supreme, but the considerations of the state for public good (*fard kifaya*) were never lost sight of. The orders and decisions of the *khalifa* passed to people through their *ashraf* (*raisul qabila*). These were generally nominated by the state, though they occasionally sided with their people(*qabila*).

The way the Islamic state came into being and the purpose for which it stood made it subservient to the authority of the "Law" as revealed to Mohammad(SAW)⁴⁶. The community

of the believers being understood as the real power base⁴⁷. Appointment of the *khalifa*, as the successor of Mohammad(SAW) was an essential requirement⁴⁸ on two counts: first for being a *shariah* requirement as *khalifa* was needed for both purposes first, for heading the religious observances prescribed by the *shariah*, and executing the *shariah*; second, for being a political requirement, as *khalifa* was required to defend his state, consolidate the gains made and to carry the message of Mohammad(SAW) forward and to make life of its subjects comfortable. These two requirements most often clashed, making the commitment of the *khilafa* towards the *shariah* suspicious and thus resulting in the shrinkage of his real power-base. The emergence of new sects, within the community of believers, with their claims to know the real interpretation of the divine law made the job of *khalifa* even more difficult.⁴⁹ *Khalifas* like Uthman(Rd) and Ali(Rd) were severely tested. These sects had their own kind of approach towards *shariah*⁵⁰. Their ideologies, which might have been conceived in all sincerity provided most important weapons to the elements not satisfied, for one or the other reasons with the working of a particular *khalifa*. In many of such flare-ups the clan interests had top most importance⁵¹.

Khilafat grew in size as per the demands of a fast expanding empire. *Khilafat* at Madina generally remained, transparent, simple without any paraphernalia and with a sense of preserving its utmost purity. In all the major decisions, concerning the community of Muslims, Abu Bakr(Rd) and Umar(Rd) tried to carry their counsellors (*ashab-ul-rai*)⁵² along with them. Actions and attitudes of governors of provinces and those of army commanders were strictly watched. In all these matters, the suggestions and instructions of the *khalifa* were to be treated as final. Umar(Rd) had to allow the recruitment of the non-Muslim Arab population into his army⁵³. This had its own consequences for the latter history of Islam. With the advancement of society and annexation of more and more states, which

were in different grades of development, new institutions arose as evolutionary mechanisms, to augment the powers of *khilafat* and reach effectively to more and more people. *Khilafat* now comprised:

Khafia⁵⁴: Represented *ijma*, of the consultative body, with no executive powers⁵⁵.

Amirs: The governors of the provinces, acting on behalf of and under the guidance of *khalifa*. They could raise and maintain their army⁵⁶, collect revenue (*kharaj*, land revenue and *jazia*, the tax from the non-muslims) head the religious observances and maintain the *shariah*⁵⁷.

Wasf⁵⁸: Acted under *khalifa* or on his behalf under governors. They were directly answerable to *khalifa* and could appoint governors in newly conquered provinces.

Katib: The scribe who could be one or more than one — without any authority.

Vassals⁵⁹: Like king of Tus and king of Kabul, their rights and suzerainty over their subjects was recognized and guaranteed under the conditions of:

- a) providing all kind of help to Islamic armies
- b) desisting from rebellion or abetting rebellion
- c) paying indemnity and annual tribute
- d) allowing Muslim missionaries to work freely and in safety.

Ali(Rd) introduced the institution of *Diwan*⁶¹, an office for maintaining the records and names of the beneficiaries from *bait-ul-maf*⁶². The office subsequently emerged as “the Department of Treasury”. In order to consolidate the gains of the Muslim armies and to allow the subjects of his Muslim state to benefit from the annexation of new fertile lands he tried to avoid confrontations at home⁶³. But Mauviya, who had, through the good offices of Uthman(Rd), developed and designed his province Syria on the model of a Byzantium state behaved like a

local dynast ignoring all his earlier pretensions to *khilafat*. His contributions to *bait-ul-mal* were inversely proportional to the revenue he was exacting from his subjects⁶⁴. While governors of all other states kept on changing, Muaviya conspicuously remained in possession of his province, Syria. In his province the power and authority of the *khalifa* was conspicuously invisible. He subsequently emerged as a parallel power to Kufa⁶⁵, which was then the capital city of Ali's(Rd) *khilafat*. From a simple socio-political arrangement *khilafat* evolved, through the exploits of Mauviya, into a complex, organised system⁶⁶. Defying the authority at Kufa (Madina) Mauviya acted like a local dynast and, after fashioning the opinion of *ulema* in his favour, assumed the *khilafat* and established Damascus as the seat of his power for nearly next hundred years : *ijma* had by now lost its representative character as well and had squeezed into a small group of people looking after the interests of their respective groups. *Ijma* now included the clan members, 'the friends of the *khalifa*' comprising his stipend holders and loyal governors; from the rest the oath of loyalty was received under threat of life and intimidation⁶⁷. The following excerpt from the speech of Hijaj bin-Yousuf sums the whole process of meeting the requirement, laid down more by precedence than by the *shariah*.

“Men of Kufa, I see before me heads ripe for the harvest and the reaper, I am he! I seem to myself see blood between turbans and shoulders. I am not one of those who can be frightened by an inflated bag of skin, nor need any one think to squeeze me like dried figs... The prince of believers has spread before him the arrows of his quiver and has tried everyone of them by biting its wood. It is my wood he has found the hardest and the bitterest, and I am the arrow which he shoots against you⁶⁸.”

In the absence of any clear and unambiguous instructions or rules, in the *shariah*, for the appointment of an *ilmam*

(or *khalifa*) there emerged different groups of people with their own solutions to the problem⁶⁹. No single procedure was adopted for the appointment of the first four rightful *khalifas*. Abu Bakr(Rd) was appointed *khalifa* when Umar bin Khattab proposed his name at Banu Saidah's house, cutting short the deliberations that were held for the purpose of selecting/electing a *khalifa*. Abu Bakr(Rd) was offered allegiance for his life long association with the Prophet, his integrity, and stature⁷⁰. Umar's(Rd) name for the *khilafat* was proposed by the *khalifa* himself⁷¹. All the people present put forth their hands to offer their allegiance. Uthman(Rd) was selected through the efforts of, Abdul Rahman-bin Auf⁷² who was entrusted to look for the popular and suitable candidate for the *khilafat* by an elective council⁷³, constituted by Umar(Rd) himself⁷⁴. Ali(Rd), the last *khalifa*, wished to be elected by the *ahl-al-shura* and *ahl-al-badr* (the consultative council and men who fought at Badr)⁷⁵.

No body needs to question the decision of the elective council in these four cases as the persons elected or appointed were the best of all and served the cause of Islam in the best possible way and with all sincerity. The question, however, is: how the elective council came to be constituted and what gave it a representative character? In the *sunnah* or the *shariah* there is no mention of any elective council⁷⁶. The *sunnah* (tradition), of course, recommends the consultation while taking or arriving at a decision. But consultation among whom? It is explicitly stated, "consultation among Muslims"⁷⁷. And consultation among Muslims does not mean consultation among Muslims of this or that city or a section of the Muslim community. In the absence of any other directive, it shall have to be the whole Muslim community. Now, for the present, there are no guidelines to reach this Muslim community which was and is scattered over many continents. The people, nations, cultures which subsequently came to form the *ijma* under Muslim rule had a experience of kings and rulers who projected themselves as divinities or sons or successors of some deity⁷⁸. These people

were in the habit of recognising their rulers, who came to power through usurpation or acquired their power through the principle of heredity, as sacred⁷⁹. Their actions, and social behaviour were generally beyond public censor. They had to be worshipped and obeyed⁸⁰.

Now this divine nature of the ruler was replaced by the divine principle which proclaimed equality for all men and women and gave these people right to choose their rulers. But given the circumstances where people had no organised voice except the sanction of the *shariah* and where they were divided in many nations and geographical units, their voice came to be represented, in the proxy, by the people near the seat of power and, in still more cases, by the people within the courts⁸¹. If it so happened that the *ijma* could afford to reject a proposal then:

a) it would invalidate the whole selection or complete proposal⁸², b) it will set in motion the elements of distablization; and if the ruler or the forces behind the proposal were determined to see it through then⁸³. i) the *ijma* would bring upon itself the wrath and hostility of the rulers, ii) the *ijma* would only invalidate itself in the face of recalcitrant ruler.

This theoretical power of the *ijma* was time and again utilized by the small sects and fortune seekers and opportunists to gain foothold against the established government⁸⁴.

Ijma had in the whole scheme of things a function — function to approve a decision already taken or to second a proposal⁸⁵ or a nomination of a particular *khalifa*. It could not afford to reject a proposal or a nomination. Their confirmation was merely formal, though necessary for various political reasons⁸⁶.

- a) Confirmation by the *ijma* was a sure way to test the popularity of the decision under review.
- b) It ensured the public support for the decision.

- c) It kept in check any voice of descent; and thus ensured the smooth functioning of the government.
- d) It gave the people a sense of participation and involvement.

In order to achieve their objective and to keep the *ijma* under control the rulers sought the services of *ulema* who tried to justify the practices of the rulers with religious dogma.

Ulema in the course of time became a substitute for the *ijma*: their decisions and judgments ultimately helped to evolve the Muslim jurisprudence. However, their support and judgment was always sought in order to legitimise the enthronement of a *khalifa*. Most of the decisions which the early Abbasi *khalifa*'s took had their origin in the thought and opinion of the *ulema*⁸⁷. But these *ulema* had a very limited role as they had neither any executive power, nor a constitutional authority to make their decisions, opinions or judgments effective and functional⁸⁸; "If necessary the *khalifa* may enlist the aid of the most outstanding learned people of the day. The principle political function of the *ulema* is the interpretation of the *shariah* in terms of the problems facing the community"⁸⁹.

Umayyads, in order to counter the propagation of ideologies hostile to their interests, initiated a process of winning over to them the men well-versed in the *shariah* and capable of developing arguments in their favour⁹⁰. *Khalifat* was now hereditary, and the *ulema* connected with the court justified it: those who had the courage to reject or oppose the decision brought upon themselves diverse calamities from the whole state machinery⁹¹. Out of the need to deal effectively with the rebellion tendencies among some sections of the people of the state grew the office of the viceroy, under whose jurisdiction fell the eastern states and provinces. As long as Mauviya was holding the Caliphate segregation of powers between the various units of *Khilafat*, was nominal but after him the segregation was complete. Units started exercising their powers autonomously.

The new institutions which got promoted began to serve their own ends and interests. With the passage of time, and under the weak *khalifa*'s they at times became liabilities on the state exchequer and even turned hostile enough to erode the very power base which had initially created them. For example, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty has many 'firsts' to his credit : he was first to appoint bodyguards for himself; first to appoint a viceroy; first to make the *khilafat* hereditary and first to create *diwani kharaj*. Under him the entire affairs of the *khilafat*, encompassing ten provinces⁹⁵, were conducted by a host of officials appointed at the sweet will of the *khalifa*⁹⁶. Each officer viz, the viceroy, governor, Lt. governor, *diwan*⁹⁷, and the like were charged with the specific duties pertaining to general administration, revenue collection, dispensation of justice, observance of religious rites and the maintenance of religious institutions attached therewith.

The constitutive authority of the first rightly guided *khalifa* was the community of the Muslims who not only approved the decision of the elective council in each case but made themselves available to the *khalifa* for the establishment of the divine Law as understood by them. *Khalifa*, at this stage, was both the constitutional authority and the functional authority. During Umayyids, however, the *khalifa* lost the constitutional authority but as long as he executed the functions of *khilafat* he possessed the circumstantial authority⁹⁸. As there were no provisions for or against the nomination of one's family member as the successor in the *shariah*, Muaviya nominated his son, breaking a precedence¹⁰⁰ or a principle established by his predecessors. But he observed all the formalities of obtaining consensus of the people, of the *ulema*¹⁰² and procured the oath of fealty from the men of any importance¹⁰³. These developments at such an early period of Islamic history eliminated the democratic spirit of Islamic polity leaving for it no chance to fight back. First casualty of the new set-up was the *ijma* which lost its face and formed the crowd. Latter Islamic history witnessed

the *ijma* as mere spectators in the tussel between fiefdoms or as the seedlings being toppled in the internecine wars, or as hallow heads rolling with the force of winds of arguments in this or that direction. The *ijma* was taken for granted : it could be carried either through articulation or manipulation or intimidation. The arguments discovered, coined and used in favour of a contender, or a pretender or a practice or an issue had nearly always political overtones barring a few occasions where men of integrity like Abu Hanifa refused to go with the crowd¹⁰⁴. Similar type of issues and the contradictions confronted the Muslim community then. Ibn Qutaiba in his *al Kitab al muarif*¹⁰⁵ quotes Abu Bakr(Rd) saying "I should have asked (the Prophet) who would succeed him in political power after him? If he nominated any one, nobody could challenge his nominee on this issue. And I should have asked him whether the *ansars* were entitled to any share in the political power"¹⁰⁶. Al Mawaridi, while stressing the *quraishite*¹⁰⁷ descent of as the condition for contesting the *imamate (khilafat)*, entertains no objections to the above condition and says" If anyone objects to it on the ground that it excludes non-*Quraishites* from the *khilafat* such an objection would not be considered, because it was this *Quraishite* descent that was presented by Abu-Bakr(Rd) as an argument for preference in the election of Saqiah Bani Sa'idah. The testament at *Ghadir-al Khumm*¹⁰⁹, where according to *shiite* traditions the Prophet is believed to have declared, "whomsoever I am lord of, his lord is Ali also"¹¹⁰.

Here genuineness of the quotes is not under question. It is the timing and the use made of these arguments by political opportunists regardless of the interests of the then Islamic state. With the loss of sanctity of the office of *khilafat* 'the edifice' started crumbling down. The Abbaside *khalifas* were made to withdraw from active political life and were subsequently relieved of many of their official duties and powers¹¹¹. They soon came under the tutelage and protection of *Buwahids*¹¹², who exercised all authority in the name of 'a besieged" *khalifa*.

With the introduction of *amiral-al-umra* (the Prime Minister), *khalifa* became a nominal head: the prime ministers exercising the real powers. Mawardi speaks of such a *imam*¹¹³ as “the constrained *imam*”, an *imam* having no actual power; his powers being appropriated by the usurper. Al Mawardi calls this usurper, *amir bi'l istila*¹¹⁴. A person whose simple allegiance to *khalifa* validates his political actions and execution of his religious functions¹¹⁵.

There was a time when the so called sovereign, the *amir-al mumnin*, could hardly move outside his “seat of power¹¹⁶”, the royal palace at Baghdad : his domain being some real estate in its outskirts. Outside Baghdad new dynasties had emerged to rule as virtual sovereigns; Spain was ruled by Muvahids; Egypt by Ubaiyads, Fatamids (909-971); Khurasan by Samanides, Tahirids, (818-872) and Saffvids. Nishapur, Bukhara, Samarkand and other city states all had their independent rulers who owed remote allegiance to *khalifa*. *Khalifa* and his *khilafat* had become a legacy of the past¹¹⁷; a burden no body was prepared to carry on his shoulders. “The governors of towns and cities proclaimed their independence. Lawlessness and chaos prevailed all over the country. The rival groups and personalities accused one another of hereby to gain supremacy and to win the favour of the people”¹¹⁸.

Under these circumstances *khalifa* was the only symbol of unity and the constitution of the *khilafat*, the only expression of that unity¹¹⁹. The Muslim political scientists and theoreticians understood the need for binding their community together. Even a semblance of unity was enough for the present. They tried to find all kinds of arguments to preserve the institution. Al Mawardi went to the extent of recognising the circumstantial authority of the *amir-bi'l istila* if he “declares his allegiance to *khalifa* and promises to maintain the unity of the *khilafat*, and enforces the laws of the *shariah*¹²⁰... In a passage al-Mawardi says that in case the usurper shows uncompromising and rebellious atti-

tude, the *khalifa* can call the help of one who can relieve him of the strains¹²¹. It was this historical situation that *khalifa* was holed in, al Mawardi accepts the situation and finds a solution which had no precedence and even encouraged the other pretenders creating still more trouble and chaos.

Al Ghazali also made a number of compromises in order to revive a dying institution and to accommodate a ruler who may be less interested in people's welfare. In his *Nasihah-ul-Maluk* he mildly admonishes his ruler and advises him to find some time out of his pursuits and hobbies in order to attend to the people's grievances.

There were two distinct evolutionary mechanisms at work at two different levels of governance. These were promotion and linearization. Promotion at the level of *khilafat* and linearization at the level of governors.

Promotion: New institutions with more specific tasks under different *amirs* emerged in response to the politico-economic problems of the empire. The *khalif's* power was actually utilized and executed through them. The unstable conditions prevailing in the empire helped some institutions to broaden their power bases within and outside the court and achieve a position of pre-eminence. Office of the *amir-ul-umra* was one such institution : from a special function it assumed the role of general purpose institution. *Amir ul umara* extended his jurisdiction over all the strategic resources and began meddling with the institutions at lower level or of lower control order. Hamadanids who rose to prominence during the reign of *khalifa* Muqtadir (907-932) latter concentrated the whole power in their hands. The Turkish slaves from their humble beginnings, as palace guards, to the role of king makers is another example of promotion. They were vying each other for the titles which a constrained *khalifa*, so unhesitatingly bestowed on them.

Linearization: The governors, who had theoretically represented their *khalifas* concentrated whole power in their hands,

in their respective provinces, . They built their army and fortunes at the cost of the higher order control. Their extortionist policies left little room for the still lower order controls to attend effectively to the local problems and essential requirements of the populace. With the result, the new dynasties emerged which exploited the sentiments of the local people in Khurasan (like those of Bowahids) and in Turkestan (like those of Samanids and Ghaznavides). These eventually turned *khalifat* into a farce. The rebellions in Khurasan, Merve, Nishapur were augmented by the discontent of the peasantry and mercantile classes against the repressive policies of the rulers who always meddled in affairs of local administration creating more instability. Tax structures and the inter-provincial hostilities hampered the mercantile activities of the classes concerned.

Though the *khalifa* and his *khalifat* had become a legacy of the past, yet Ghazalli and others thought it better to retain the system against all odds, mainly for the following reasons¹²²:

1. Unity, harmony and stability had better chances under the present arrangement with little and mild modifications.
2. It carried the sense of continuity and a collective sharing of it.
3. *Khalifat* was, with all its limitations the expression of belongingness to one single Divine system.
4. Any new system or order would have created more divisions and more pretenders for power.

Al-Ghazalli understood that, with a little modification *khalifat* could be used to play a role of arbitrator between the warring groups. The distinction between *khalifat* and *sultanate* is not so much. The *khalifa* represented authority, the *sultan* power. The *sultan* empowered the *khalifa* who authorized him in return. *Kalifa* reigned but did not rule; the *sultan* did both.

As *khalifat* had lapsed into inactivity and the *khalifa's* executive powers were already being carried out by various agen-

cies which had neither constitutional authority nor sanctions of *Shariah*, so Ghazalli, who took a cue from al Mawaradi's *amir bi'l istila*, appended a functional arm to the *khilafat* for which he found *shariah* or legal justifications too¹²³. The *sultan* who had by now assumed the role of a guarantor for *khilafat* and protector of *khalifa*, was, in order to bring him under the ambit of *shariah*, recognized by al-Ghazalli as constituent authority of the *khalifa*. In that capacity, *khalifa*, the *sultan* also recognized the authority of *khalifa*¹²⁴ (howsoever nominal it may be) "Thus the validity of the government of the *sultan* is established only upon the *sultan's* oath of allegiance to the *khalifa* and *khalifa's* in return validate formal appointment of *sultan*. By his exercise of constitutive authority, the *sultan* recognizes in fact the institutional authority of the *khilafat*, which rests primarily in the Islamic *sunni* community, and in theory the functional authority which rests with *shariah* proper¹²⁵".

The role of *ulema* in whole of this arrangement is to extend their allegiance or oath of fealty to *khalifa* and to give their approval, which was only a formality then, to his appointment of *sultan*¹²⁶. Thus the *khilafat* came to be represented now by its three constituents (1) *khalifa*, (b) *sultan*, and (c) The *ulema*. "The legal fiction was maintained, that the *khalifa* ruled supreme and no conflict of loyalties plagued the *ijama'* since men who would otherwise be usurpers and rebels, were clothed with the mantle of legality".(Gibs)

Sultan exercised real powers in his domain. He was required to send presents and other gifts to *khalifa*. He had his land, body guards, and army that did not belong to the *sultan* by right. It belonged to its actual possessor the feudal lord. *Sultans* or local kings came to power neither at the behest of a *khalifa* nor in submission to some *shariah* sanction but purely on their personal strength, manoeuvring power, opportunism and exploitation of the sentiments of the population they tried to subjugate. As against Persia, Central Asia was, as always,

governed by tribal loyalties and whenever these tribals found opportunities they rose to capture the power. These little *sultantes* were sovereigns within their own limits. The governorships which had in many cases become even hereditary had created new centres of power. These local rulers held their courts like their sovereign and even measured their swords with their co-religionists for purely political reasons.

The *sultans* and *khalifas* often claimed their divine right to rule. They, without claiming to be the gods or sons and brothers of gods like their Arsacid and Sassanian predecessors, assumed kingship as a divine gift and to ruled over the empire as a matter of divine right.

Khalifa Mansur II identifies the authority of *khalifa* with that of God. *Sultan* is the *amir* by conquest¹²⁷. His authority is unconstitutional, and without any religious sanctions unless recognized by the *khalifa* and approved by the community (*ijma*). His circumstantial authority becomes valid by his submission to *khalifa* and recognising his constitutional authority. *Khilafat* in a period of time had come to exist as a loose confederacy with *khalifa* as titular head.

Notes and Reference

01. Devoid of any state the tribes were integrated by interpersonal relations. Geographical congruity was more a source of conflict than unity. Religions ceremonies associated with the Kaaba were the occasions when they suspended their hostilities; V. Flannery, "The Cultural Evolution of Civilization", in Gregory L. Possehl (ed) *Ancient Cities of India*, New Delhi, 1979 p.28; C. A. Qadir, "Pre Islamic Arabic thought", *History of Muslim philosophy*, (ed) M.M. Sharif 1981 p. 134; Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses, The Evolution of the Islamic Polity*, 1980, p.18.
02. There were small egalitarian societies. The various segments bound with each other through the bonds of shared ancestry. These were kinship based groups. Abu'l Faraj al-Isphani, *Kitab al- Aghani*, Cairo, 1927, Vol.xix, p.128.
03. Besides Pagans, there were Jews, and Christians also; among Christians there were Nestorians physicists, C.A.Qadir, *op. cit.*, 184; De

- Lacy O Leary, *Arabia before Muhammad*, London, 1927, p.22 passum.
04. There were number of gods, which Arab nomads/tribs worshipped; each tribe had put its presiding deity in the Kaaba. The main occupation of the inhabitants of Mecca was trade, *Ibid* p, 127; Ibn al Kalbi, *Kitab al Asnam*, ed Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Cairo, 1914, Passim.
 05. Prophet Muhammad(SAW), before his announcement of Prophethood, was engaged by one respectable lady (later on *Umul-Mumenin* Khadiajaj) of certain affluence to carry his trade interests forward. Later on she married Muhammad(SAW). Many of the later day scholars related her with Waraq bin Naufal, a Christian scholar of the day. C. A.Qadir, *op. cit* 1981, p 37.
 06. Asaghar Ali Engineer *The Islamic State, Bombay*, 1975, p 11
 07. Patricia Crone, *op. cit.*,, p.23.
 08. G. Olinder, *The Kings of Kinda*, London, 1927, p.73; Patricia Crone, *op.cit.*, p.23.
 09. Ibn Khurdadbeh *'Epithetes of the Rulers of the World'*, Cf; Asgar Ali Engineer, *op. cit.*, 1975, p.14.
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. Asgar Ali Engineer, *op.cit.*, p.14; H. A. R. Gibb, *Muhammadanism*, London, 1969, p.17.
 12. Patricia Crone, *op. cit.*, 1980, p.26.
 13. A.L.Kroebar, *Anthropology*, New Delhi, 1976, p 208
 14. Patricia Crone,*op. cit.*, 1980, p.26.
 15. Abul Ala Maudoodi, "Early Islamic political thought", M. M. Sharief (Ed), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*,New Delhi, 1981, p 763.
 16. G.E. Van Gruenebaum "The nature of Arab Unity before Islam", *Arabica* , 1963, p.11), sums it up in these statements:
 1. The purpose of man is the service of God, *Ibada*
 2. Complete *Ibada* require the existence of an organised community of believers.
 3. Existence of such an community requires a government.
 4. The rendering possible of *Ibada*
 5. The primary moral purpose of the state is
 - a) ranking of *Hisba*
 - b) The conception of canon law (*shariah*) as the limitation of the government
 17. Ibn Hittam, *al Sirat ul nabawiyah*, Vol I, II, III, IV; *Muhammad at Mecca*, Oxford, 1953, Pcssim
 18. Abu Nasr al-Farabi (870-950)
 19. *Kitab Tehsil al-Sadah* 41.17-42.11; 43.18; 44.7 meaning of philosopher, Law Giver and *Imam* is the same. *Kitab Tehsil al-Sadah*. 42.4 First Ruler and Philosopher - are the same, *Tehsil* 27.13. Rosenthal - "The place of politics in Al-Farabi's Philosophy" *Islamic Culture*, 1953

- July, p.163.
20. Al-Farabi *Kitab Ara Ahl al-Madinat al-Fadilah*, Heransgegben von F. dieterici, Brill, 1895 p 64-50. 64-65; *Kitab al Suyasat al-Madaniyyah*.
 21. Personal Ruler (*Hakim Shaksi*) has divine support engaged in the welfare of his people; he is called king, modern call him *Imam*, Plato, World Ruler, Aristotle, Statesman (*Insenmadni*). His duty is to preserve the ordinances of law (*shariah*) and to conduct the affairs of states in accordance with the universal principles, *Rasail ikhwan al-Safa wa Khillan al-Wafa*, Cairo, 1928, Vol.III, pp.117-118.
 22. Ancient called him master of law (*Sahib namus*) modern designate him as Prophet, Law giver (*shariah*): Jalal-u-Din Dawani, *Akhlaq-1-Jalili*, Calcutta, 1911, p 117 (cf. W.F. Thompson, *Political Philosophy of Mohammadan people*, London, 1939, p 322); Nasir-ul-Din, *Akhlaq-i-Nasiri*(*Eng.tr*) G.M. Wickens, London, 1964, p 191. p.117; Thomson 322. (B) 285, (w 191).
 23. To preserve the ordinances of law (*shariah*) and to conduct the affairs of states in accordances with the universal principles;. Thomson 322. (B) 285, (w 191).
 24. "Muhammad Sagir Hassan al Masumi, al-Farabi," *History of Muslim Philosophy, op. cit.*, p.711
 25. *Ibid.*
 26. *Ibid.*
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. He is possessor of active intellect, latent intellect and gaind intellect, H.K Sherwani "Al Farabi's political theory", *Islamic Culture*, 1938, Hyderabad, p.298.
 29. Al Farabi, *op. cit.*, "Muhammad Sagir Hassan al Masumi, al-Farabi", *History of Muslim Philosophy*, p 711.
 30. Rosenthal, *op. cit.*
 31. Abul Ala Maudoodi, *op. cit.*, p 163.
 32. Ibn Hajar, *Fath al-Bari*, Cairo, 1325/1907, Vol.II, p 125; Ahmad, Masned, *Daral Maarif*, 3rd Ed, Egypt, 1949, Cf. Al-Maudoodi, *op. cit.*, p 660.
 33. Ibn Khatir, *alBidayah wal Nihayah*, Egypt, Vol.VIII, p.134.
 34. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, 2nd Ed., Egypt, 1352/1933, p.25.
 35. Al-Sharastani, *Kitab al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, Vol. I, London, p.125.
 36. Al-Tabari, *Tarikh al-Umum w'al-Maluk*, Vol.III, p./273; Vol.II, p.618, Cairo, 1939.
 37. Abul-Ala Meudoodi in his paper, i., quotes many such instances which depict the character and integrity of the first four Caliphs, see also Baihaqi, *al-Sunan al-Kubra*, 1st Ed, Hyderabad, 1355/1933, p.136; Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, Vol.III, p. 30. Sovereignty belongs to God, and Islamic state is infact vicegerency with no right to exercise authority

except in subordination to and in accordance with the law revealed by God to his Prophet. The *Quran* IV, 59, 105; V.44; 45; 47; VII, 3; XII 40; XXIV, 55; XXXIII 36; cf. al Maudoodi, *op.cit.*, p.556. Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p.5.

38. Al-Ghazali, *al-Iqtisad fil Itiqad*, Cairo, ND, pp.104-109.
39. Al Mawaridi, *Ahkamal Sultaniyyah*, Cairo, 1909, Chap.I, p.16.
40. *Ibid.*, p.16; Al -Ghazali, *op.cit.*, p.107.
41. Leonard Bindar, "Al-Ghazali", *History of Muslim Philosophy.*, p.775.
42. Scholars like Dawud Ibn Ali accepted *ijma* of the companions of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) only, see his *al-Ahkam*, Vol. IV, p.147; *shiite* scholars (See Syed Abid Ali, "Political Theory of the *Shiites*", *History of Muslim Philosphars*, p 227) reject the authority of *ijma* altogether.
43. The ruler must have power of making proper deduction does not need instruction or a guidance from others; Al-Farabi, *Siyasa*, *op.cit.*, pp.45-47.
44. See al Maudoodi 665; *op.cit.*, p.665. Sharastani, *op.cit.*, p 121, 130; Abu`l Faraz, *History of Dynasties*, p.120.
45. Khawarijites were Puritans of Islam, Fanatical in Religion, Democratic in Politics; Maudoodi, *op.cit.*, p.665; Von kremer, *Orient under the Caliph*, p.258 et sq. Cf. *Politics in Islam*, Khuda Bakash. p.57; W Montegomary Watt, *The Formative period of Islamic Thought*, Edinburg 1973, p 14-15.
46. Sovereign is absolutely obeyed one (*mutai mutlaq*), examplar of species *muqtada-i-nav*.
47. Leonard Binder, *op.cit.*, pp.779, 784.
48. Al-Ghazil, *op.cit.*, p 105; *History of Mulsim Philosophy*, p.784 :Existence of political ruler is essential for the adminstration of Justice and preservation of mankind at all times. His authority is vicarious (*welayat-al-Tasarruf*) p.286, w (192)
49. Abu al-Ala Maudoodi, *op.cit.*, p.784.
50. H.K. Sherwani, "Al Faribi's Political Thought", *Islamic Culture*, 1938, p.289.
51. Patricia Crone, *op.cit.*, p 32.
52. Abu Yusuf, *op. cit.*, p.25.
53. Patricia Crone, *op.cit.*; AKS Lambton, "Khilafat", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol IV, Leidon, 1990, p 942.
54. The head of the state should be appointed with the mutual consultation of the Muslims and their concurrence, The *Quran*. XIII, 38 cf. Maudoodi, *op.cit.*, p.657; Bindar, *op.cit.*, p.785.
55. Al-Shoukari, *Nail al-Autar*, Vol.IV, p.117.
56. Patricia Crone, *op.cit.*
57. Lambton, *op.cit.*, p 937-947.
58. *Ibid.*

59. Mahapadiah, Sankritiana, *History of Central Asia*, 1964, p 134
60. Patricia Crone, *op. cit.*, p 30 60
61. *Ibid*; Lambton, *op. cit.*, p 947.
62. Patricia Crone, *op. cit.*, Lambton, *op. cit.*
63. Ali always tried to avoid war in the interest of the community at large. Submitting himself to the decision of the was such means to avoid it.
64. He build a big palace for himself, was in a habit of bestowing large portions of land to his friends; Patricia Crone, *op. cit.*, p 32.
65. Patricia Crone, *op.cit.*
66. He created a new institution of body guards and vicegerency
67. Lambton, *op. cit.*, p 937.
68. *Ibid*
69. Al-Mawardi, *op.cit.*, p 10-11; 13, 15; Al-Farabi, *Suyasah. op. cit.*, p.19-23; No single mode of appointment of a *khalifah*.
70. Ibn Hisham, *op. cit.*, Vol.IV, p.308-9.
71. Abu Bakar announced his decision to appoint Umar as his successor, said", If you desire, you may sit together and elect a person whom you like, but if you desire I should use my discretion in the matter on your behalf then I assure you by one other than whom there is no God, I will spare no pains in doing you the best service" Ibn Hitham *op. cit.*, p 308-309.
72. Umar, had according to Muwardi the sole right of nominating Ali [as preceedance had been all set by Abu `Bakr] Muwaridi, *op. cit.*, p 13-14.
73. Ibu Qutaibah, *Kitab al Maarif* p 23 cf M. M Sharif, *op. cit.*, p 727.
74. *Ibid* p 25, cf al Mawardi, *op. cit.*, p 724
75. Ibu Qutaiba *op. cit.*, p.41; al -Tabari *op. cit.*, vol III, 450
76. Leonard Bindar, *op. cit.*, p779
77. "It is evident ... early Caliphs and the companions of the Prophet(SAW) regarded the Caliph's office as an elective one, to be filled with mutual consultation and consent of the Muslim community, Abu Ala Maudoodi, *op. cit.*, p 660/61.
78. Sassanian Practice, Duchessne Guillmen, *Religion in Ancient Iran.*, Eng Tr.; Jamasp Asa, 1971, Bombay.
79. It is not known whether Achemenians compared and equated themselves with God but latter rulers were avid to identify themselves with various divinitics;
80. The infallibleness of a ruler (*imam*) was well propagated by the shiite scholars to defend themselves from the allegations leveled against some of their latter imams by the Abbas-id rulers. *Shiite* scholars even contest the decision of Imam Jafar to refudiate Isma'il on the grounds that imam is sinless; Syed Abid Ali, *op. cit.*, p 789.
81. Decision of Mauviya to appoint his son as heir apparent and the way Abbaside Caliphs were nominated and deposed off and nominated

- again till the last Caliph was beheaded by Mongols tells its own story.
82. There were occasions when aggrieved parties, religious sects or individual scholars rose to challenge an appointment or election of a candidate and/or Caliph but their voice was gauged or rejected as the voice of disgruntled elements. It is a strange fact of Islamic History that those very groups, who claimed to establish the rule of law were the forces who in most cases divided the community and created instability.
 83. Abasides assumed power on the pretext of carrying aloft the opinion of ijma and or establish Shariah; Buwahids, Fatamides, Samanides all claimed their allegiance to Shariah but could hardly confirm to its tenants.
 84. Buwahides exploited the sentiments, feelings of the people of Daylam (Khurasan) to rise to power. Samanides and Ghaznavids formed their own dynasties purely on their personal strength and manouevouring capacity.
 85. Al-Ghazali enumerates three ways of appointing a *khalipha* (1) by designation of the Prophet (2) by designation of the ruling *khalipha* (3) by designation of the holder of actual power. Ijma comes only after the *khalifa* has been established on the throne al-Ghazali, *Ihya-ul Ulum*, Cf. *Hisotry of Muslim Philosphies*, p 783.
 86. *Ibid.*
 87. Khalipha al-Mamun, and Haroon Rashid often took extreme positions regarding the purely academic problems like creation of the Quran etc. and committed atrocities on the scholars. See M.G. Morony, "Religious Communities in late Sassanain and Early Muslim Iraq", *Journal of The Economic and social History of the Oreint*, 1974, p 118.
 88. *Ulema* express the functional authority of the shariah by their *fatwa*.
 89. A.Ghazali, *Iqtisad*, *op. cit.*, p.107.
 90. Men of learning were near the masses who influenced them. Ibn Rushud, *op. cit.*, Al Hawani, *Islamic Philosophy*, Cairo, 1953, pp.40-42.
 91. *Ulema's* and Philosophers were mercilessly treated for opposing the state or for expressing the views which were interpreted as to show their rebellious tendencies.
 92. A. S. Lambtan, *op. cit.*, p.942.
 93. *Ibid*; Mukhapadiah *op. cit.*, p 138-39 Patrica crone, *op. cit.*, p 30.
 94. Lambton., *op.cit* p.943. No government was kept minimum for effective central control. Syria and Merve were with *khalifa* himself. Egypt in the west; Kufa and Basra in East, these were the major proviencies rest were dependencies. Patrica Crone, *op. cit.*, p 32.
 95. Patrica Crone, *op. cit.*, p 32.
 96. *Ibid.*; Frye *op. cit.*, Skrine *op. cit.*, Governors often were proved corrupt and power hungry Baladhuri, *Ansab al Ashraf*, Vol I, ed.

- Hamidullah, Cairo, 1959, p 478.
97. *Ibid.*, p 943, P Crone, *op. cit.*, p 30.
 98. Al-Ghazali, *op. cit.*, p.782.
 99. "If Caliph appoints his son the concurrence of *Ahl-i-Hal Wal Aqd* is necessary", al Muwardi , *op. cit.*, p.15.
 100. Al-Dhahabi, *Manaqib al-Imam Abu Hanifah wal Sahabaini*, Darl ul Kutub al-Arabi, Egypt, 1366/1946, p.115, Cf. *History of Muslim Philosphy*, *op. cit.*, p.675.
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Religious Revivalism - A Case Study of Uzbekistan

Ali Muhammad Rather

Islam was introduced in Central Asia by the Arabs in 651 AD, though they failed to dominate the region.¹ The Islamic faith glorified in the region due to the support from the state and the work carried out by mystics.² Uzbekistan became thus an important Islamic centre for having produced the theologian of world repute - Al Bukhari and Al - Tirmizi in addition to such sufi scholars as Bahauddin Naqshbandi, the founder of the Naqshbandi order of sufiism.³ Here the *ulema* (Muslim clergy) had a dominating role in the society as Islamic laws governed the state⁴. Education was imparted through *madrassa* system, in Islamic sciences along with Persian and Arabic. These Islamic educational Institutions were of two types: the *maktabas* to provide

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primary education and *madrassas* to impart higher education and produce experts of judiciary, administrators etc⁵. With the arrival of Russians, these traditional Institutions were shattered thereby changing the traditional socio-cultural values in the new political environment.

The Soviet policy towards Muslims was not static but it changed from one phase to another. When the Soviets needed Muslim support they granted concessions to Muslims otherwise, the anti-religious propaganda and repression against the Islam continued to be its main policy. An organisation called "Society of Godless Militants" had the duty of conducting anti-Islamic propaganda campaign. This society was composed of Jews and Communists⁶. Several journals were published for guidance and training of the people for the tactics and methods of anti-Islamic propaganda⁷. The different tactics of anti-Islamic struggle were: 1) attack on Islamic custom and rites, 2) attack on holy places and Sufism⁸. 3) the *ulema* were attacked on various anti-people allegations as untrustworthy, exploiters and enemies of people, 4) the liberation of women from traditions like child marriages, veil, bride price and for this purpose the so-called liberated women were used.

The main aim of the anti-Islamic propaganda was the elimination of Islamic spirit from the minds of the people, weakening the influence of *ulema* in the society, developing anti-Islamic and Communist values, and habits and convincing the public that their salvation lay on scientific (Communist) progress⁹.

Since the Soviets had to face the Islamic world (in their foreign affairs) and also in order to establish credibility among its Muslim subjects, they presented a Soviet form of Islam. Some selected *ulema* were recognised as the registered *ulema* under Muslim Religious Boards headed by *muftis* and *sheikhs* and they were given training in recognised educational institutions¹⁰. These *red-ulema* (as

they were known) presented Soviet Union as a just state where all religious communities enjoyed equal rights, which was contrary to the existing reality.

On the other hand, in spite of the drastic measures adopted by Soviet govt. to uproot the religion, Islam survived with traditions and rituals; even among the Communist-bred intelligentsia, communist card holders etc. It survived in the original form through "clandestine activities", mosques and so called unregistered *ulema*¹¹. But there were also many vital undercurrent causes that kept Islam alive here. The tenacity of religious survival in the USSR was in terms of ideological lag, external capitalist influence, the war, and, above all, the neglect or inadequacy of anti-religious propoganda and the persistent activities of clerics¹². Gherkashin explained the tenacity of religious survival in the USSR in terms of certain shortcomings in the socialist society such as its inequality in rewards; its marginal injustice and coercion. M.B.Mitin in *Voprosy Filosofii* had, therefore, laid particular emphasis on adopting a cautious and scientific approach to combat the influence of Islam, taking into account its role in a number of progressive movements of great political importance¹³. Not withstanding these factors, some of the important reasons of continuing Islamic influence have been mentioned below:¹⁴

1. **National difference between the Asiatic Muslims and the European Russians.** The Russians wanted to liquidate both the national and the cultural traditions of the natives including the Muslims, simply to maintain their political dominance over them. The degeneration of morals and social norms, increasing trend of alcoholism among the native youth, have been explained in terms of decline of religious influence.
2. **Demographic distribution of the Muslim population in Central Asia.** Demographic trends were assumed

to be the second important factor responsible for the survival of Islamic influence in Central Asia. Since in religion large family concept is perceived to be a blessing the rural setting coupled with the relative prosperity provided an ideal atmosphere for the continuance of Islamic influence thereby.

3. **Social Psychology of the Muslims of Central Asia.** According to a Soviet scholar, the psychology of a Soviet Muslim was more actively influenced by the social-familial surroundings of the rural areas, where the old traditions of Islam continued to occupy very significant position. In other words, the process of an institutionalised socialisation, evolved and encouraged by the Soviets, had not been able to completely liquidate the traditional patterns of socialisation¹⁵.
4. **Existence of underground movements-sufism and *muridism*.** The fourth, and the most important, factor responsible for the continuation of strong influence of religion was the reported existence of underground movements of *sufism* and *muridism*. According to L. Klimovich, an anti-Islamic writer of USSR, "in Islam (both *sunni* and *shiite*) there exists two opposite trends: the official mosque trend led by the *muftis*, the *Sheikh-ul-Islam* and other representatives of the four official Muslim Religious Boards, and the non-official' mosque trend which is a communitarian trend, and *Sufi-dervish-murrid* trend lead by *pirs*, *sheikhs*, *ustads*. Everywhere the clerics of the non-official trend are many times more numerous than the clerics of official Islam". As per studies of Soviet scholars, the *Naqashbandi* order was overwhelmingly predominant in Central Asia¹⁶.

There is also one more factor which was responsible for the survival of religion at community and *mohalla* level, particularly among women folk. It was the underground

activity of Otines¹⁷. Otines, like the unregistered *ulema*, performed their activities clandestinely. The Otines of the Communist period were of post-hujum¹⁸ generation and were born during the period between 1930's and the end of world war II. This generation of women was educated by the Communist Party to participate in the construction of communism. These Otines were educated in state schools. Though they adapted to the Soviet system successfully but they did not part with the tradition of living in harmony with their brethren.

The post-*hujum* women, as compared to the pre-revolutionary era, remained faithful to traditional values. Even the Otines of the pre-revolutionary phase remained conscious of being the guardians of their cultural heritage. They took it upon themselves to transmit to their daughters, at least, a minimum of religious knowledge so as to play a decisive role in maintaining the tradition and also in safeguarding Islam. The political and social transformations, caused by the Soviet system, never succeeded in pushing them aside, but virtually contributed to increase their prestige. Although the Soviet regime had completely destroyed the religious scholars, some of its representative had survived and their popularity had grown in the eyes of the population. They were forced by the political circumstances to lead a clandestine life; and due to meagre means at their disposal they were not able to save the rare religious texts for acquiring an extensive and formal knowledge of Islam. Once they had been deprived of their setting (that is the *maktabs* for women) they took over new places, such as the village sections of the *kalkhoz* or the *mohallas*. It was in the *mohallas* that the Otines were most active. The Otines performed their activities in homes and participated in *mohalla* councils, as well¹⁹.

During the period of strict prohibition on religious activities, Otines organised evening courses in their homes,

usually twice a week, and taught their pupils to recite a few verses from the Quran, and to perform certain ceremonies, related to births and funerals. Some of these Otines still had in their possession religious books, using Arabic script which their mothers or grand-mothers had succeeded in preserving from the censorship. Using these texts and also the related texts in vernacular they took advantage of the system in order to obtain a minimum of religious knowledge. The only alternative at their disposal, in this quest, was to specialise in the history of the peoples of the Soviet Orient. The few religious works that could be found, in particular the Holy Quran, were reserved for a very small number of specialists. Specifically Islamist, historians, philosophers and anti-religious propagandists²⁰.

In a survey study conducted recently a number of such Otines have been referred to. A lady of 75 years called Zamira, a *shiite* Muslim, was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party, but she was initiated as an Otin at the age of seven, by her mother. She received secular education including a course in scientific atheism and later specialised in Iranian history, which allowed her to become familiar with Arabic, Chagaty Turkic and Russian. She learned Arabic at the Oriental Institute in Moscow and was thus able to decipher the religious book, that belonged to her grandfather. After introducing herself as Otine, at maturity, she was able to introduce her students to written Arabic scripts and to teach them to recite a few verses from the Quran and to read a collection of Persian mourning litaby. Similarly another woman called Maryam, a retired 55 year old Tatar woman (from Kazan) and presently in Tashkent specialised in history of the Tartars of Kazan and thereby learned the use of the Arabic alphabets. This enabled her to translate into modern Tartar, some verses from the Quran (which had been translated from Arabic to Tartar). Her students were thus able to read passages from the Quran at a time, when the great majority of Muslims still could not²¹.

The level of religiosity, as per surveys conducted in 1986 and 1987, was higher than 10 or 20 years ago especially among the younger generation and among the intellectuals. This religiosity level had raised in the observance of different Islamic practices and rites: the daily prayers *nemaz*, fasting during the month of *Ramzan*, contributions for the construction and maintenance of mosques, attendance at the mosque on the occasion of Muslim festivals and observance of the main familial rites such as circumcision, marriages, burial and sometimes pilgrimage to holy places²².

In Uzbekistan as per a sociological survey of 1987, in district Guzar of Kashka-Darya it was found that 70% of the population carried out religious ceremonies and rituals and over 80% of them were having higher and secondary education. This wide-spread multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamic revivalism was observed, in the overall Muslim regions of the USSR, at different levels in the society²³; at the lowest level by observing traditional rites and rituals; at the middle level by activities of *sufis*; and at the higher level by educated elite in national culture and history transmitted by Islam.

It has been reported that the observance of religious rites was done by the majority of the youth. The religiosity was, more or less, same in cities and in the country side, as reported by the Director of the Uzbek branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism of the Academy of Social Sciences in Tashkent. It was on this account that authorities admitted that "Islam is like a cancer spread over our land and contaminating more and more people. Yesterday believers used together for an unoffensive prayer, today they take part in a collective mass ritual. What will they do tomorrow?"²⁴. Most of the persons who were participating in the religious festivals and ceremonies none else than the youth²⁵.

The struggle between official atheism and Islam, in the *perestroika* and *glasnost* period, was conducted at the lower level. Customs verses new secular rites was a nation wide powerful movement initiated by young intellectuals, who believed that the survival or the assimilation of their national culture depended on the issue of competition between the old and the new rituals. Soviet sources there upon believed that *wahabis* were behind such 'anti-Soviet fundamentalist movement'. In a report of Tadjik Communist Party, in Dec 1987, it was revealed that the unofficial Muslim clerics, who fanned religious sentiments and called for *jihad* against the existing system, were reportedly trying to infiltrate into the Communist Party, Soviet law enforcement organs and even KGB. It was asserted by Benningsen that the success of Afghan *mujahidin* in Afganistan was an obvious cause of these courageous acts. Already in 1986 religious clandestine publications and recordings were seen. This was termed as *Islamizdat* i.e. religious publications (typed/xeroxed) and cassettes with sacred Muslim texts and talks by religious authorities. It is believed that some of these cassettes were produced abroad²⁶. Religious scholars of Iran were blamed in particular for sending religious literature to the Central Asian republics for spreading the faith among the non-believers, as well. It was also affirmed that the electronic media of Iran propogated anti-Soviet and pro-Islamic ideology²⁷.

Religious Activities in Contemporary Uzbekistan

With the independence, Uzbekistan has acquired a religious identity that had been lost during Soviet regime. Since 1991, the process of re-Islamization (which actually started in the days of *perestroika* as mentioned above) has grown tremendously as is revealed by such activities as pilgrimage to Mecca, construction and restoration of mosques, opening of various religious establishments, the development of religious literature, the implementation of

azan in Arabic, growing of beards in case of men and wearing of *hijab* in women, appearance of the *parandaja*, and the revival of Islamic co-operative engagements etc., though Islam has not been recognised as the official religion in any of the Central Asian republics, nonetheless, it is referred to as an element of historic culture, which implies an awakening of religious awareness²⁸.

It is important to note that in Uzbekistan the majority of the population (80%) profess Islam and Christians (eastern Orthodox) are upto 10% and rest are the representatives of some other confessions. The Muslims include both *shiite* and *sunni*. The official version of Islam which was prevalent during the Soviet regime has already been fragmented as the authority of the Soviet *mufftis* was rejected.

The Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan has been renamed as Muslim Board of Mawaraunnahr²⁹. It has been decided that no organisation which bypasses the spiritual direction of the new Board will be recognised. It has been unanimously approved by the Board to introduce Arabic alphabets in the Central Asian republics³⁰.

The Board so formed has the following aims and activities³¹.

1. The control and maintenance of the mosque.
2. The compilation of *fatwas* (Verdicts)
3. The training of religious workers.
4. The publication of religious literature.
5. Contact with Muslim brethren in foreign countries.
6. Organisation of trips to Saudi Arabia, for Muslims, who wish to perform the *haj* and *umrah*.
7. Leading of explanatory work among the population on all items, connected with religion, religious rites, correct behaviour in society and personal life etc.
8. The financial help of the needy section of the population.

There is a special department for performing the above mentioned activities. The department, which occupies itself with the guidance of mosques, has under its jurisdiction 500 mosques. *Imam-khateeb*s, qualified preachers, the local members of the Muslim Board constantly read *fatwas* before the believers and answer their questions regarding religion. Here the books are recommended for understanding of Islam, the Holy Quran, the *sunnah*, journals and other religious books are also distributed. Another important function of Muslim Board is the preparation of religious books. The publication department of the Board has reprinted the Holy Quran several times. A newspaper called 'Islam Nuri' in Uzbek language is published in addition to books and booklets on Islam. The Board also makes *haj* arrangements and renders material help to needy Muslims. The Board sustains its activities with the help of the funds raised within or received from outside.

There is a special department called Foreign Department of Muslim Board of Mawarunnahar. The department performs the duty of reception of delegation and individuals coming either on invitation of the Board, or as guests of other institutions and organisations, who are interested in the work and religious activities of Muslims. The Foreign Department of the Board also takes active part in the organisation of religious conferences, which are periodically convened in Uzbekistan and other parts of the former Soviet Union. The Mufti Azam of Central Asia and Kazakhstan has office in Bara Khan *madrassa*. The office manages the mosques and schools (*madrassas*) and in addition to it supervises the religious matters of Muslims.

The network of religious practitioners is also in the process of being rebuilt. The previous unregistered and clandestine *ulema*, as mentioned above, have reappeared on the scene. However, a new generation of *ulema* is being

created which differ from those *ulema* who belonged to a particular category of people i.e. *sayids*, *sufis* etc. There is no *maktab* but the mosques work for it. The women clerics i..e. traditional *Otines* along with some other women have been allowed by the Board to teach in some mosques and also in some newly formed *madrassas* (Elementary education centres) viz in Kokand and Bukhara³². The *Otines* have been called upon by the Religious Board to supervise young girls, adolscent girls and adult women as well, in religious affairs. Since, the *Otines* are not able enough to teach the modern religious education a new group of women (Islamists) have taken over, though they are few in number. They are trained in the reciting of the Quran, at Mecca and are said to process the *wahabi* ideology. Their ability to recite the Quran, with *tajwid*, attract the common people. The *Otines* do not consider them as their rivals but go to them and seek their help in learning the *tajwid*. So a great zeal among the young generation of women is observed for learning the *tajwid* and *tafseer* of the Quran³³.

In the Soviet period only elderly persons were found taking part in prayers, but now the youth also participate in Friday prayers in mosques³⁴. However, it is not compulsory for everyone to go to the mosque to perform *nemaz* and observe fast. Islam is considered now a part of culture³⁵, and hence dress including *hijab* for women is re-appearing. Little girls are seen going to *darasgahs* (Quranic schools) wearing *hijab*. Similarly men growing beards are also seen there now³⁶.

There are religious schools-*madrassas* in each region of Uzbekistan and there is an Islamic Institute called Imam-al-Bukhari at Tashkent³⁷. *Mir Arab Madrassa* was the only theological centre during Communist rule, and it accomodated 80 students but now enrolment has reached to 250. In addition to it other institutes have been opened, which include *Nadir Dewan Bagay Madrassa*⁴⁷. In these

students learn advanced knowledge in order to become *ulema*. There is tremendous increase of Islamic education among youth of Uzbekistan. In Imam-al-Bukhari Institute Tashkent alone, there were 600 students seeking admission in 1991, though there is arrangement for 200 students only. This institute provides religious education in Uzbek and Kazakh languages. Many students go abroad for higher studies of religious education. In 1994, 150 persons were studying in Egypt and Turkey³⁹ and many more were in Iran.

In Uzbekistan upto 1996 two thousand new mosques were constructed and many more are still raised. Some of these mosques such as Mirza Galib Masjid have been financed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia⁴⁰.

Notwithstanding the Tsarist or Communist anti-Islamic measures, Central Asian people, in the absence or presence of their traditional institutions, build up their Islamic faith 'secretly' and continued to stick to the age old traditions and customs.¹⁷ During the relaxed days of *perestroika* and *glasnost* new changes were observed in the attitude of people towards religion and thereby resulting in the incremental increase in the percentage of the people adhering to Islam. It seems certain that all this happened because the socio-cultural setup of the region is mostly based upon such Islamic values and traditions that had flourished because of *sufism*, practised in its various orders. Such social order continued to play its part, "secretly, clandestinely" and in the garb of Communist cadets till it came to forefront again after the disintegration of the USSR.

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17. An Otin is a female muslim dignitary, meant for the welfare of women belivers. Responsible for the education of women from birth to adulthood, they are in direct contact with the faithful. Even if they do not always possess a formal knowledge of Islam, they never-the-less wield real authority over the female population. Whenever there are celebration of national, religious or femalial importance, such as birth rituals, marriages or funerals, the Otines are responsible for the recitation of prayers. In the way they fulfil the same function as *ulemas*. They provided religious instruction in traditional *maktabs* of girls, in pre-Communist era. They not only taught girls to recite the Quran, but also played role in the *zikir* ceremonies directed by women *sufis*.
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Mongolia and Islamic Revivalism

*Mohd. Rafiuddin Mukhdumi**

History shows that few Kazakh families moved either from Chinese side or through Kazakhstan and settled in Mongolia in 1860 A.D. A population census conducted in June 1935 shows that there were 30,000 Kazakhs amongst Mongolia's total population of 738.2 thousand¹. According to the latest information from the ministry of demography there are around 1,75,000 Kazakhs in Mongolia which constitute about 5.5% of Mongolia's 2.5 million population. These Mongolian Kazakhs have succeeded in preserving their national customs and traditions. They are in majority in the western province of the country, called Bayan Olgi and constitute about 80% of the state's population. In other provinces of Mongolia, however, Kazakhs live in small

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concentrated areas, including towns and villages as per the following spatial distribution of population:-

1.	Bayan Olgi	1,45,000
2.	Ulan Bator - the capital of Mongolia and Tov province	1,0,000
3.	Nayalax	5,000
4.	Baganop	500
5.	Darkhan	1,000
6.	Sharangul	7,000
7.	Erdenet	5,000
8.	Shoka	300
9.	Hovd - The province bordering Chinese Turkistan	10,000

The Kazakh Muslims of Mongolia, it is well known, were victims of cruelty and oppression under the Communist rule of almost seven decades. Muslim scholars who resisted the government orders were either hanged or shot dead. The mosques were destroyed. The Holy Quran and other religious books were banned and the resource centres for teaching Islam were demolished. However, in view of changing international scenario, Mongolian government was left with no alternative but to go for democratic reforms in political, economic and cultural fields. With these reforms, the people of Mongolia witnessed complete religious freedom in early nineties of this decade. The Buddhist majority of the Mongols and even the Muslim minority of the Kazakhs are taking full advantage of the religious freedom. Kazakhs in particular are trying to revive their Muslim culture. Soon after the democratic reforms an institution named Muslim Society was formed in Ulan Bator with its branch at Olgi city. Contacts were made with Kazakhstan, Turkey and Pakistan to impart religious training to young Muslim boys.

Even during a ban on religious activities, which continued for many decades, Muslims of Mongolia had almost forgotten the basics of Islam. However, the religious spark was dormant among them and the elderly Muslims, whether male or female, are well-versed in reciting the Holy Quran offering the *namaz*.

There are still some elderly Muslims who narrate vividly the harsh persecution of Muslims during the Communist rule. One Muslim proudly narrated how amid fearing torture or even death from army, police and other state security agencies, he succeeded in burying the Holy Quran with utmost prevention on the top of a mountain and with the dawn of democracy he dug it out safely after 42 years.

Another Muslim, Mulla Shutan, from village Nayalax, about 45 kilometers from Ulan Bator, was till 1991 in possession of the Holy Quran which was written 107 years before. The amazing thing about it was that every page was written with complete *sabba qirrat* (seven ways to recite the Holy Quran). According to Mulla Shutan, during 1940's when the Communist Party under the iron hand of Marshall K.Choibalsan made religious laws more stringent, it was declared that any person who teaches the Holy Quran, *namaz* or anything about religion will be hanged or shot dead alongwith with his family members. In spite of all this fear and terror, Shutan used to recite the Holy Quran secretly late at night after his wife, children and other family members slept.

The process of building mosques in Mongolia started in early nineties. Hazrat Abu Bakr Siddique Mosque was the first mosque to be constructed in Mongolia in 1991 followed by many others elsewhere. The Muslims therein could profess their faith with freedom and without any fear, hindrance or pressure. Every inaugural function represented a unique blend of communal harmony, as even the abbot of the local Buddhist Monastery, alongwith his fellow *lamas*, participated in the function, and they were honoured with special gifts and robes offered by Kazakh women. Thus Mongolia exhibited a complete religious harmony between Buddhists, Mongols and Muslim Kazakhs though each of them had seperate places of worship for the purpose. Muslims, for instance, offered prayers regularly in the mosques at Bayor Olgi, Ulan Bator, etc. These Muslims comprised together the natives as well as outsiders from India,

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, etc. Each year, some missionary groups like *Jamatis* and *Islami-majlis-i-Khuddam-ud-din* visit these mosques to educate the Muslims on the basics of Islam besides reminding them of their responsibilities towards the welfare of the community as a whole. The missionary agencies are mostly self-financed though foreign aid at times sustains their religious activities having missionary agenda in mind, the workers of these missionary groups visit the houses of the natives to appeal them towards Islam. These agencies firmly believe that Mongolian Muslims should identify themselves with the Islamic history and culture for which the construction of mosques and *madrassas* is considered essential. However, realising the financial incapacity of many a Mongolian Muslims, the missionary groups particularly *Islami-majlis-i-Khuddam-ud-din* provide funds for the construction of religious institutions and assist all kinds of indigent Muslims.

Such type of the religious fervour culminated in a process whereunder Mongolian Muslims took to perform *haj* and translate the Quran and other Islamic literature in Kazakh language, the language of the majority of *believers*. Indeed the funds for the purpose of publication are largely floated by the Saudi Government.

While Mongolian Muslims, more or less adhere to the basic tenets of Islam, they do not at the same time part with those practices which form a part of their culture. The festival of *nauroz* which had been banned during the Communist rule, is again being celebrated with great enthusiasm. So are other cultural activities like drama, dance, etc. performed to highlight the Kazakh way of life in Mongolia. In family matters too, the traditional practices have again revived. Marriages are still arranged by the parents and instances of "love matches" are exceptionally noticed in Mongolia. However, in all types of marriages, the observance to and the recitation of *nikah khutba* is considered inevitable.

Due to the economic forces, a substantial number of Kazak Muslims leave for Khazakistan to seek better mode of existance besides to take education there. Upto 1994, around 70,000 Mongol Kazakhs migrated to other countries. These migrants included all types of people including shepherds, workers, skilled labourers, businessmen and the students. Despite their migration, the process of religious revivalism, in which some Kazak boys and girls have become proficient enough to learn and memorise the Quran, is leaping forward beyond proportions. Alongwith the science and technology, the Mongolian Muslims have started taking keen interest in the study of Islamic literature. Even those Kazakh students and skilled and unskilled workers who migrated to Kazakhstan and other countries for whatever reasons, continue to contribute, after their return to homeland, to the cause of Islam in whatever way possible.

The foregoing discussion reveals that the Mongolian Muslims largely comprised the Kazakhs who had come to settle in Mongolia in the 2nd half of the 19th century. Over the years, they consolidated their strength. While subscribing to the faith in Islam, they constructed mosques, *madrassas* and other institutions for the dissemination of Islamic knowledge among their youngsters. They also undertook missionary activities for the purpose. True, most of them adhere to the basic tenets of Islam, there is, however, a little section of them who are money-minded and prefer economic gains to the religious and spiritual pursuits.

Ethnic Factor in the Economies of Central Asia: A Case Study of Kazakhstan.

*M.Afzal Mir**

Ethnicity is being regarded as a volatile and dangerous global problem which threatens the unity and stability of the political system in the segmented societies, especially in the new formed states. In the modern context all states are multinational states with varieties of ethnic groups. The stability of the state's political system, therefore, reasonably depends on the way the groups are moving in the political system and the way the state is functioning in respect of meeting the groups¹.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the tension between various ethnic groups is increasingly growing in Central Asia. From economic viewpoint, the tension between

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Asian (native) and non-Asian is more serious than the one between Asians themselves keeping in view the fact that non-Asians including Russians, Germans, Ukrainians were largely skilled labourers who adequately contributed to the economy and the management of affairs in the region. The present paper intends to study the impact of disintegration of Soviet Union on the ethnic composition of the region in general and Kazakhstan in particular.

Central Asia

The ethnic composition of Central Asia plays a major role in its orientation. In the late 1980's the five largest ethnic groups in Central Asia - Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tadjiks, Turkmens and Kyrghyz - constituted a majority and all of them except Tadjiks were Turkic in ethnicity and language. As a result of their incorporation into Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, inter-regional migration of a variety of ethnic groups - including Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Germans and Koreans - gave a distinctive multi-ethnic character to the cultural geography of the region.

Currently more than 10 million inhabitants of Central Asia are non-Asian viz. Russians, Germans and Ukrainians (Table 1). For the most part, they are urban dwellers, highly skilled workers, and orthodox Christians. The non-Asian are in a majority in the republic of Kazakhstan. In the republic of Kyrghyzstan, the non-Asian form a quarter of the population. In the other three Central Asian States, the non-Asian are an influential minority, though outnumbered by the Asians. Among various non-Asian ethnic groups, the Russian population is largest in Kazakhstan, where they are almost equal to Kazakh people. In other Central Asian republics their number is 22% in Kyrghyzia, 10% in Turkmenia, 8% each in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan (Table-2).

Table - 1
Central Asian Republics
Population - 1990

Republics	Pop.In mlns	Russians	Other Nationalities
Turkmenistan	3.6	10%	9%Uzbeks,3% Kazakhs & 1% Ukranians
Uzbekistan	20.3	8%	5% Tajiks, 4% Kazakhs
Tadjikistan	5.3	8%	24%Uzbeks, 1%Tatars, 1%Kyrghyz . 1% Ukranians
Kyrghystan	4.4	22%	13% Uzbeks, 3%Ukranians, 2% Germans
Kazakhstan	16.7	38%	6% Germans, 5 %Ukranians
Total	49.9 (9.6mln Russians and 1.5 mln other Nationalities)		

Source: Derived from "The Soviet Unions Unequal parts: Diverse and Restless," *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1990, *Time*, Sept, 9, 1991; *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1990 Quoted in, "Central Asia: Current situation and future prospects," *Strategic Digest*, 23(80), August, 1993, p.1256.

Table - 2
Ethnic Composition of Central Asian Republics
(By percentage)

Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan	Kyrghyzia	Turkmenia	Tadjikistan
Kazakhs 40	Uzbeks 71	Kyrghyzs 52	Turkmen 72	Tadjiks 62
Russians 38	Russians 8	Russians 22	Russians 10	Uzbeks 24
Germans 6	Tadjiks 5	Uzbeks 13	Uzbeks 9	Russians 8
Ukrainans 5	Kazakhs 4	Ukrainans 3	Kazakhs 3	Kyrghys 1
Other 11	Others 12	Germans 2	Ukrainans 1	Ukrainans1
		Others 8	Others 5	Others 4

Source: *Strategic Digest*, 23(80), August 1993, p. 1256.

Distinct ethnic composition of a society has a definite relationship with its economy. This is itself proved by the unpropitious results that followed the disintegration of Soviet Union on the newly born Central Asian republics inhabiting different ethno-social groups. The event led to the outflow of ethnic Russians and Germans from Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan fostering thereby a situation prone to the shortage of the skilled labour in these republics. Under the fear that ethnic clashes may follow the rise of local nationalism, these republics registered a sharp decline in the number of the non-Asians during the years proceeding the Historical Event of 1991.

Kazakhstan, which is abundantly resourceful, is no exception to this grave situation. Here too, under the growing influence of local nationalism, the Russians and all other non-Asian communities were required to learn Kazakh language as a pre-requisite for retaining any kind of office. It is worth mentioning here that the process of outflow of non-Kazakhs accelerated when Kazakhs raised nationalist slogans "Kazakstan for Kazakhs only" sending thereby considerable consternation among the ranks of all non-Kazakh inhabitants. Result being increased in and out migration of Russian Slavs and ethnic Germans, who had hitherto set an unprecedented record of living in harmony with the Kazakhs regardless of their distinct ethnicity. It was not therefore surprising to see the Kazakh villages and towns wearing a deserted look after the exodus of greater number of non-Kazakhs though the government is indisposed to this process of migration for manifold reasons. Nevertheless, some ethnic Russians continue to live in northern Kazakhstan where in 1993, they launched a movement for dual citizenship which did not, however, bear any fruitful results except that it made the government to shift its capital from disturbance-prone Alma Ata to a relatively safer zone of Akmola. This was done just to escape from the potential threat of the separatists in northern Kazakstan.

In short, Kazakstan, which is still at its embryonic stage of development, seems to be exposed to a dreadful problem of ethnicity which in turn is likely to weaken its economic base besides sever its relations with Russia not only in terms of trade but even export of oil to Russa for Black Sea countries.

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Al-Biruni's Sociological Study: A Methodological Approach

*G.N. Khaki**

Al-Biruni, a towering scholar of 10th century AD was born and brought up at Khawarizam, Uzbekistan, the highest centre of academic excellence¹. He showed great inclination towards learning and pursued the cultural bent of the khawarizamians.² Although he had a profound interest in the study of exact sciences⁴, he did not neglect humanities and social sciences³. Indeed he had gone ahead of the earlier thinkers by not stopping merely at a general classification of sciences but exploring new chapters in the study of sociology.⁴ According to Ibn Khaldun sociology, the study of society in terms of its relations and organisation, was the product of various intellectual movements and initially arose in connection with the ethical, theological and political philosophy. It also

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evolved from biology, physics, chemistry, history, economics and those social, political and theological movements which were created by the revolutions of *kharijites*, *asharites*, *mutazalites* and *ikhwan-ul-safa* and later by the religio-political movements that arose from time to time in the different parts of the Islamic world. Thus inspired by the Islamic fundamentals, Al-Biruni in spite of carrying the scientific studies, defined a new system of knowledge called the science of society characterising beliefs, customs, manners, religions, history, myths, languages and culture. In this manner, Al-Biruni studied the human society with highly academic oriented tools on which almost rests the basis of present sociology⁵.

Al-Biruni's ideas and methodical outlook, was largely influenced by Islamic culture⁶. Renowned Muslim *savants* from Central Asia were devoting themselves not only to the process of collection of *hadith*, but also to innovating some unique specific tools and methods of critical evaluation of the reports and as well as the reporters technically known as *asma-ul-rijal* and *jarah wa tadil*. This phenomenon has profoundly influenced Al-Biruni's vision and world view⁷. In the preface to his work *Kitab ul Hind*, he has classified the value of different reporters and has distinguished various classes of reporters⁸. He has very emphatically advocated the value and importance of truth in historical research, certainly under the inspiration of the Quranic verses. The distinctive feature of Al-Biruni's method is non-interference in the researcher's personal views, beliefs and value system of a society and its members⁹. In *Kitab ul Hind*, he says "In most parts of my work, I simply relate without commenting upon, unless there is a special reason for doing so"¹⁰. Instead of condemning the beliefs of a society he objectively and analytically studies them in order to understand their origin and function¹¹. In his study of the Indian society, for example, he has employed the comparative methods and has based his observations on comparison and contrast.¹² He has studied some institutions such as marriage, faith, caste

system etc and has compared them with the social institutes of other societies¹³. While commenting upon the concept of God and Idol worship among Hindus he does not apply a generic approach to elaborate these beliefs¹⁴ but employs individual approaches with reference to the Hindus and the Muslims, both of whom were part of the society¹⁵. Same can be said about his study of these concepts in relation to the common man and the elite and that too, with a comparative study of Islamic belief¹⁶. He therefore argues that the errors committed by the uneducated class of society among Hindus regarding the concept of God are not peculiar with them alone but occur in other religions as well, such as Judaism, Christianity¹⁷.

In a similar manner he studied the universality of idol worship. To him the idol worship was restricted to uneducated and lower classes of the Hindus. As such he does not condemn this practice as ignorance or savagery by arguing that even the ancient Greeks considered the idols as mediators and worshipped them under the names of stars¹⁸. Even the Pagan Arabs had imported idols into their country from Syria to worship them, hoping that they would intercede for them with God. His method of interpreting various beliefs of the Indian society, such as marriage, religion and magic was also based on the logistics. Infact, the objective before him to write a comprehensive book on Indian society was to redress the subjective and irrational approach of his predecessors, and to have a comprehensive survey of Indian thought. While going through Abul Abbasssi's "Aleranshari" on Indian Culture, for example, he found it quite irrelevant and baseless. Al-Biruni was not the first to work on India's glorious past, it has been studied by numerous Arab scholars¹⁹ like Masudi, Sulayman, Abu Zayad, Ibn ul Fiqih, Apul, Faraj, Idrisi, Ibni Rusta and Ibni Khursadbeh²⁰. Their observations were however, based either on travel accounts or were confined to a specific area of India, mostly southern part of India, and the information thus gath-

ered was generalised. On the contrary, Al-Biruni made deep and patient investigation into many unfamiliar and hidden facts of Indian culture and thereby produced a book so objective, so learned and so compassionate²¹. He did not rely on heresay but used his own judgement even on points of interpretation, and after analytically studying all relevant sources of information, he removed whatever appeared to him as irrational and absurd²². However, for the sake of objectivity he consulted other sources on any given sociological or historical development.

In short Al-Biruni provided the scholars of sociology an effective tool to evaluate social relations while making Indian society a unique model of study. In the words of Arthur, Al-Biruni must rank high in the list of the worlds great scholars. No history of Mathematics, Astronmny, Geography, Anthropol-ogy or History of religion is complete without acknowledgement of his immense contribution. One of the outstanding minds of all times, distinguished to a remarkable degree by the essential qualities which have made possible, both science and social sceinces²³, Al-Biruni is a demonstration of the universal-ity and timelessness of a great mind²⁴.

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Errata

Page No.	Line No.	Incorrect	Correct	Page No.	Line No.	Incorrect	Correct
1	10	stream	streams	201	18	absolute	absolute
2	17	enterprenures	entrepreneures	201	22	conquerer	conqueror
5	23	inagurating	inaugurating	202	27	perosu	person
13	2	Bylourussia	Bylorussia	203	1	legendry	legendary
15	4	president	presidents	203	14	yeild	yield
20	25	Rosneftgaz	Roseneftgaz	204	8	mounring	mourning
21	8	inisits	insists	205	3	spirts	spirits
21	12	territoty	territory	205	4	worhsip	worship
22	5	Sultunate	Sultanate	205	14	cammand	command
23	19	Atyrau	Aturau	205	16	derivng	deriving
28	11	Bosforous	Bosphorous	207	25	Beaf	Beef
37	9	arbitrary	arbitrary	208	25	was	were
38	31	refineries	refineries	208	28	carpentary	carpentry
39	17	artifical	artificial	208	28	masonary	masonry
43	5	competetion	competition	208	29	golden	gold
44	26	enterpreneurial	entrepreneurial	209	16	curency	currency
49	35	interest	unrest	209	27	ongiong	ongoing
50	32	restrucing	restructuring	210	5	Choergo	Chicago
71	1	matintain	maintain	211	2	Multilateral	Multilateral
79	23	Breifly	Briefly	230	9	Khadiajaj	Khadija
82	25	are	is	241	31	Otins	Otines
82	26	appraoch	approach	241	31	prohiabition	prohibition
98	1	Inod	Indo	242	28	litaby	litany
98	17	garmets	garments	244	3	verses	versus
98	18	pharmaceuticals	pharmaceutical	246	4	qaulified	qualified
98	21	lonas	loans	247	33	accomodated	accommodated
110	9	economics	economies	248	32	Bartnold	Barthold
111	2	area	areas	248	33	knidayatov	Khidayatov
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117	21	Asian	Asia	252	1	includeing	including
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124	20	particularly	particularly	254	1,5,	missionery	missionary
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137	17	wagf	waqf	260	21	conteruation	consternation
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188	7	thermolumin- iscence	thermolum- inescence	264	21	classisfied	classified
				264	26	interferance	interference
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195	29	capibilities	capabilities	265	2	societeis	societies
198	21	evenet	event	265	17	argueing	arguing
199	1	stretched	stretched	265	33	Khursadbeh	Khurdadbeh
199	5	enompases	encompasses	266	14	Astronmny	Astronomy
199	7	dimentional	dimensional	267	19	Al-Biruni	Al-Biruni's
200	1	complied	compiled				